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ABSTRACT
Usable, Secure Content-Based Encryption on the Web
Scott Isaac Ruoti
Department of Computer Science, BYU
Doctor of Philosophy
Users share private information on the web through a variety of applications, such
as email, instant messaging, social media, and document sharing. Unfortunately, recent
revelations have shown that not only is users’ data at risk from hackers and malicious insiders,
but also from government surveillance. This state of affairs motivates the need for users to
be able to encrypt their online data.
In this dissertation, we explore how to help users encrypt their online data, with a
special focus on securing email. First, we explore the design principles that are necessary to
create usable, secure email. As part of this exploration, we conduct eight usability studies of
eleven different secure email tools including a total of 347 participants. Second, we develop a
novel, paired-participant methodology that allows us to test whether a given secure email
system can be adopted in a grassroots fashion. Third, we apply our discovered design
principles to PGP-based secure email, and demonstrate that these principles are sufficient to
create the first PGP-based system that is usable by novices.
We have also begun applying the lessons learned from our secure email research
more generally to content-based encryption on the web. As part of this effort, we develop
MessageGuard, a platform for accelerating research into usable, content-based encryption.
Using MessageGuard, we build and evaluate Private Facebook Chat (PFC), a secure instant
messaging system that integrates with Facebook Chat. Results from our usability analysis of
PFC provided initial evidence that our design principles are also important components to
usable, content-based encryption on the Web.

Keywords: Security, HCI, Usable security, Content-based encryption, Secure email, Webmail,
End-to-end encryption, user study
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Chapter 1
Introduction

Users share private information on the web through a variety of applications, such as
email, instant messaging, social media, and document sharing. TLS protects this information
during transmission, but does not protect users’ data while at rest. Additionally, middleboxes
can weaken TLS connections by failing to properly implement TLS or adequately validate
certificate chains [19]. Even if a website correctly employs TLS and encrypts user data while
at rest, the user’s data is still vulnerable to honest-but-curious data mining [24], third-party
library misbehavior [34], website hacking, protocol attacks [10, 12, 18], and government
subpoena.
This state of affairs motivates the need for content-based encryption of user data. In
content-based encryption, users’ sensitive data is encrypted at their own device and only
decrypted once it reaches the intended recipient, remaining opaque to the websites that store
or transmit this encrypted data.1 The best known examples of content-based encryption are
secure email (e.g., PGP, S/MIME) and secure instant messaging (e.g., OTR). In addition
to protecting communication, content-based encryption can protect any data users store or
distribute online; for example, files stored in the cloud (e.g., DropBox, Google Drive) or
private postings to web-based message boards.
In this dissertation, most of our research focuses on a specific application of contentbased encryption—secure email. We chose this focus for several reasons:
1

In contrast, connection-level encryption (i.e., TLS) only protects data during transmission, and not while
it is stored or handled by websites.

1

1. Email is the dominant form of communication on the Internet. There are 4.3
billion email accounts, owned by 2.5 billion users. Collectively, these users send over
205 billion email messages per day.2 This dwarfs other platforms, including instant
messaging clients such as WhatsApp (42 billion messages per day).3
2. Sensitive information is sent over email. While not necessarily an every-day
occurrence, from time to time individuals need to use email to send highly sensitive
information. For example, some businesses will ask that a job applicant send their social
security number to the business in order to process a reimbursement.4 Furthermore,
unlike many other communication mediums, email is usually archived by the email
server, increasing the vulnerability of sensitive information sent over email.5
3. Advances in secure email are likely to be applicable to other content-based
encryption systems. While there are some features that are unique to secure email,
many of the principles for designing securing email in a usable manner also apply to
other content-based encryption systems. For example, in this dissertation we used
principles learned from our secure email work to create a secure Facebook Chat system
that was well received by users.
4. Email is unlikely to disappear in the near future. While new communication
platforms continue to replace other applications, email has seen steady growth. This
indicates that advances in secure email will have far-reaching and long-lasting benefits.
5. Secure email obviates the need for secure storage depots. Because email
transmission is not secure, many organizations resort to the use of separate secure
messaging websites for sensitive communication. When a user receives a message on
these systems, they also receive an email that tells them to log into the secure messaging
2

http://www.radicati.com/wp/wp-content/uploads/2015/02/Email-Statistics-Report-20152019-Executive-Summary.pdf
3
http://www.iphoneincanada.ca/news/whatsapp-1-billion/
4
I have personally experienced this as I was interviewing for jobs; multiple institutions requested that I
send them my social security number to process my reimbursements.
5
This also demonstrates why connection-level security (i.e., TLS) is insufficient, as it does nothing to
protect data while at rest.

2

website to read their sensitive message. This is an annoying and cumbersome process
that is largely disliked by users [24, 26]. Secure email would remove the need for these
separate web applications, allowing sensitive information to be sent directly through
email.
While the cryptographic primitives that enabled secure email have long existed [13],
prior to the work in this dissertation it was an open problem whether secure email could be
implemented in a usable fashion. In this dissertation, we explore what design principles are
necessary to allow secure email to be sufficiently usable for the masses.

1.1

Email Security

When email was first designed in 19716 no meaningful attention was paid to security. As
such, it is unsurprising that it was trivial for attackers to steal email and also to inject false
messages (see Figure 1.1 for details of these vulnerabilities).7 Since then, there have been
attempts to patch security on top of email (e.g., STARTTLS, DKIM, DMARK, SPF), but
even with these advances it is still possible for an attacker to steal and inject email messages
(see Figure 1.2).
As such, email is an easy target for attackers. For example, Durumeric et al. found
that in seven countries over 20% of inbound Gmail messages are being stolen [10]. Also,
email can also be stolen while it is stored at the user’s email server.8 Additionally, the
inability to authenticate the sender of an email increases the likelihood of email phishing, a
multi-billion-dollar problem.9
6

http://openmap.bbn.com/~tomlinso/ray/firstemailframe.html
Injection of false messages refers to an attacker creating a message that claims to be from Alice, and
then getting that message sent to Bob. This type of attack is highly useful as part of a spear-phishing attack.
8
This could happen either as the result of a breach (https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/
national-security/chinese-hackers-who-breached-google-gained-access-to-sensitivedata-us-officials-say/,
a
malicious
insider
(http://gawker.com/5637234/gcreep-googleengineer-stalked-teens-spied-on-chats,
or a subpoena (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/
PRISM (surveillance program),
http://www.law360.com/articles/488725/post-snowden-googlereport-shows-data-requests-growing).
9
http://krebsonsecurity.com/2016/04/fbi-2-3-billion-lost-to-ceo-email-scams/
7

3

A better approach for protecting email is content-based encryption. In content-based
encryption, email is secured (i.e., signed and encrypted) before it ever leaves the sender’s
machine. This means that regardless of the trustworthiness of the network over which the
email message is sent, it is still safe from attackers (see Figure 1.3). We note that in much of
the literature, content-based encryption is usually called end-to-end encryption. We use both
terms interchangeably in this dissertation.

1.2

Unusable, Secure Email

One of the earliest attempts at providing content-based encryption for email was Pretty
Good Privacy [13], better known by its acronym PGP. PGP was developed in 1991 by Phil
Zimmerman, and allows users to encrypt and sign their email messages using public key
cryptography. In PGP, keys are generally validated using the web of trust—i.e., user’s verify
and sign their associates’ public keys; a user can check if they trust a key by seeing if they or
one of their associates has signed that key. Public keys can be shared in a number of ways,
such as sending the key directly to other users, posting the key to a personal website, or
uploading the key to a key directory.
Eight years after the first release of PGP, Whitten and Tygar studied the usability
of PGP 5.0 [38]. In their study individuals were brought into a lab, asked to pretend that
they were part of a political campaign that required emails to be encrypted with PGP. In
their study, 9 of the 12 users (75%) mistakenly sent messages unencrypted, and several even
included their private key in their emails. Moreover, at the conclusion of the study, Whitten
and Tygar found that participants were unclear as to how PGP protected their email.
Sheng et al. [33] repeated the Whitten and Tygar user study with PGP 9.0. They
noted that some egregious usability issues had been addressed since PGP 5.0, but also found
that users were still confused regarding key management and digital signatures. As part of the
work in this dissertation, we evaluated a modern PGP-based, secure email client—Mailvelope.
In our study only one in ten participants was able to use Mailvelope to send encrypted email,
4
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An attacker is able to steal email in five different locations: during transmission
between the user and their email server (A, E), during transmission between email servers
(C), while at rest on either user’s email server (B, D).
An attacker is also able to inject false messages at any of the five locations
(A, B, C, D, E).
Figure 1.1: Basic Email Security
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With TLS, an attacker is unable to steal messages during transmission between the
user and their email server. Theoretically, an attacker should not be able to steal messages
during transmission between email servers (C), but in practice this location is still vulnerable
to attackers [10, 12, 18]. As TLS only protects data during transmission, an attacker can
still steal a user’s email while at rest at the user’s email server (B, D).
Additionally, TLS does not protect against an attacker injecting false messages at any
of the above locations (B, C, D). DKIM can partially protect against message injection during
transmission of messages between email servers (C), but cannot prevent message injection at
the user’s email server (B, D).
Figure 1.2: Email Security with TLS
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In end-to-end encryption, messages are encrypted at Alice’s computer and are
decrypted on Bob’s computer. Even if an attacker were able to steal a user’s email during
transmission or storage at an email server, the attacker would be unable to obtain the
plaintext content of the message.
In addition to encrypting the email she authors, Alice will also sign it. This allows Bob
to verify that the email he received really was authored by Alice. This feature of end-to-end
encryption prevents an attacker from injecting false messages.
Figure 1.3: Email Security with End-to-End Encryption

7

demonstrating that over a decade and half since Whitten and Tygar’s original study, PGP
remains unusable.
Another approach for content-based encryption of email is Secure/Multipurpose
Internet Mail Extensions (S/MIME). Similar to PGP, S/MIME uses public key cryptography
to encrypt and sign email. Unlike PGP’s web of trust, S/MIME certificates are authenticated
using the certificate authority (CA) system.10,11
Garfinkel and Miller studied the usability of S/MIME with automatic key
management [15]. In their study, they repeated and expanded upon the original Johnny
experiment. Their results showed that automating key management significantly increased
the usability of secure email. Still, even with this improvement a large number of the
participants in the study were unable to correctly send secure email.
Prior to the work in this dissertation, there was no evidence that secure email could be
made sufficiently usable for adoption by the masses. This has led some to question whether
secure email for the masses is a feasible goal.12,13

1.3

User Studies

A key component of this dissertation is the use of user studies to evaluate secure email
systems, both those we created and systems from industry. In these studies, users will be
brought into the lab or other spaces specifically prepared for the study and will complete
several tasks using one or more secure email tools. After completing the assigned tasks with
a given system, users then complete a survey regarding their experience with that system.
Additionally, participants’ screens are recorded and this recording is used to calculate task
completion times and note mistakes made while using the system. Finally, we interview
participants regarding their experience to gather additional qualitative data.
10

The CA system is the same mechanism by which websites are authenticated in TLS.
More recent versions of PGP also support certificates validated using the CA system, but in our experience
this is not widely used feature for secure email.
12
https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2015/11/testing the usa.html
13
https://moxie.org/blog/gpg-and-me/
11
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1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
10)

I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I

think that I would like to use this system frequently.
found the system unnecessarily complex.
thought the system was easy to use.
think that I would need the support of a technical person to be able to use this system.
found the various functions in this system were well integrated.
thought there was too much inconsistency in this system.
would imagine that most people would learn to use this system very quickly.
found the system very cumbersome to use.
felt very confident using the system.
needed to learn a lot of things before I could get going with this system.

Table 1.1: The Ten SUS Questions
Questions Questions
1,3,5,7,9 2,4,6,8,10
Strongly Agree
10
Agree
7.5
Neither Agree or Disagree 5
Disagree
2.5
Strongly Disagree
0

0
2.5
5
7.5
10

Table 1.2: SUS Score Card
1.3.1

System Usability Scale

A system’s usability is measured using a standard usability metric—the System Usability
Scale (SUS) [7, 8]. SUS has been used in hundreds of usability studies [5] and the original
SUS paper [7] has been cited over 3,535 times.14 In work not included in this dissertation,
we have shown that a system’s SUS score is consistent across different sets of users [25].
Moreover, Tullis and Stetson compared SUS to four other usability metrics (three standard
metrics from the usability literature and their own proprietary measure) and determined that
SUS gives the most reliable results [36].
The SUS metric is a single numeric score from 0, the least usable, to 100, the most
usable, that provides a rough estimate of a system’s overall usability. To calculate a system’s
SUS score, participants first interact with the system and then answer ten questions relating
to their experience (see Table 1.1). Answers are given using a five-point Likert scale (strongly
agree to strongly disagree). The questions alternate between positive and negative statements
14

Citation count retrieved from Google Scholar on June 9, 2016.
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Percentile
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40

C

OK
Marginal Low

50

60 70
65

40

D

Poor
Not acceptable
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35
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85

90

Good
M. High

SUS Score

70

95

100
A+

A
Excellent
Acceptable

B

80

Best

90

100

Figure 1.4: Adjective-based Ratings to Help Interpret SUS Scores
about the system being tested. Participants’ answers are assigned a scalar value (see Table 1.2)
and then summed to produce the overall SUS score, and the system with the highest average
SUS score is the most usable.
SUS produces a numeric score for a non-numeric measure (i.e., usability), making it
difficult to intuitively understand how usable a system is based solely on its SUS score. To
give greater context to the meaning of a system’s SUS score, we leverage the work of several
researchers. Bangor et al. [5] analyzed 2,324 SUS surveys, and derived a set of acceptability
ranges that describe whether a system with a given score is acceptable to users in terms of
usability. Bangor et al. also associated specific SUS scores with adjective descriptions of the
system’s usability. Using this data, we generated ranges for these adjective ratings, such that
a score is correlated with the adjective it is closest to in terms of standard deviations. Sauro
et al. [31] also analyzed SUS scores from Bangor et al. [4], Tullis et al. [36], and their own
data. They calculate the percentile values for SUS scores and assign letter grades based on
percentile ranges. The above contextual clues are presented in Figure 1.4.

1.3.2

Mistakes

In this dissertation, we define a mistake as a user accidentally sending sensitive information
in the clear when they intended to encrypt it. As part of our studies, users will be instructed
to send several encrypted messages. Using the screen recordings, we will record how often
users accidentally send these messages without encryption. After the study, we will interview
users about these mistakes to try and determine what caused them and how the system could
be designed to avoid these mistakes in the future.

10

1.4

Dissertation Overview

Chapter 2—Scott Ruoti, Nathan Kim, Ben Burgon, Timothy Van Der Horst, and Kent
Seamons. Confused Johnny: When Automatic Encryption Leads to Confusion and Mistakes.
Ninth Symposium on Usable Privacy and Security (SOUPS 2013), Newcastle, United Kingdom,
2013. ACM.
Chapter 3—Scott Ruoti, Jeff Andersen, Travis Hendershot, Daniel Zappala, and Kent
Seamons. Private Webmail 2.0: Simple and Easy-to-Use Secure Email. Twenty-Ninth ACM
User Interface Software and Technology Symposium (UIST 2016), Tokyo, Japan, 2016. ACM.

The first question we tackled in this dissertation was whether it is possible to create
secure email that is usable by the majority of novice users. To this end, we explored different
design principles that could increase the usability of secure email, and implemented these
design principles in various prototypes. To maximize usability, our prototypes used identitybased encryption (IBE [32]) to encrypt and sign messages.15 We then tested these prototypes
and other systems across a range of user studies, analyzing the results of these studies to
determine which design principles were most important for usable secure email.
The results of our studies demonstrated that the prototypes we built successfully
allowed novice users to send and receive encrypted messages. Moreover, our work provided
the first evidence that it was possible to create usable, secure email for the masses, as all
previous results had been negative. Still, our early studies of secure email only demonstrated
that users could use secure email when paired with an expert user (i.e., a study coordinator).16
15

IBE is a form of public key cryptography. In IBE, a user’s public key is their email address, meaning
that all users of email already have a public key that can be used to encrypt and send them email. Private
keys are generated by a trusted third-party key escrow server. To obtain their private key, a user will prove
ownership of their email account, after which the key escrow server will provide the user with their private
key.
16
This limitation is present in all secure email research [2, 15, 33, 38].

11

Chapter 4—Scott Ruoti, Jeff Andersen, Scott Heidbrink, Mark O’Neill, Elham Vaziripour,
Justin Wu, Daniel Zappala, and Kent Seamons. A Usability Study of Four Secure Email
Tools Using Paired Participants, 2016. Under Submission.
Chapter 4 is an extended version of a paper published in CHI. Scott Ruoti, Jeff Andersen,
Scott Heidbrink, Mark O’Neill, Elham Vaziripour, Justin Wu, Daniel Zappala, and Kent
Seamons. “We’re on the Same Page”: A Usability Study of Secure Email Using Pairs of
Novice Users. Thirty-Fourth Annual ACM Conference on Human Factors in Computing
Systems

(CHI

2016),

pages

4298–4308,

San

Jose,

CA,

2016.

ACM.

To address this limitation, we developed a novel methodology where we tested the
ability of pairs of novice users to begin using secure email between themselves. The results
of our study using this novel methodology demonstrated that our secure email prototype
could be adopted by users in a grassroots fashion. Furthermore, qualitative feedback from
participants and observations by study coordinators demonstrated that our new methodology
elicited more natural participant behavior and more fully explored the usability of the systems
tested, as compared to prior study methodologies for secure email.

Chapter 5—Scott Ruoti, Jeff Andersen, Tyler Monson, Daniel Zappala, and Kent Seamons.
MessageGuard: A Browser-Based Platform for Usable End-to-End Encryption Research.
Under

Submission,

2016.

In this dissertation, we also applied the lessons learned from our secure email research
more generally to content-based encryption on the web. As part of this effort, we modified one
of our early secure email prototypes, allowing it to support generic content-based encryption
across the Web. Additionally, to assist other researchers in exploring this space we architected
12

this new system so that it could be used as a platform for research into usable, secure
content-based encryption on the Web. We named this platform MessageGuard.

Chapter 6—Chris Robison, Scott Ruoti, Timothy W. van der Horst, and Kent E. Seamons.
Private Facebook Chat. Fifth ASE/IEEE International Conference on Social Computing
(SocialCom 2012) and Fourth ASE/IEEE International Conference on Privacy, Security, Risk
and Trust (PASSAT 2012), pages 451–460, Amsterdam, The Netherlands, 2012. IEEE
Computer

Society.

MessageGuard was used to build most of the secure email prototypes we developed
during our research. To verify our belief that MessageGuard could be used to create usable,
secure prototypes for other applications (i.e., not email) of content-based encryption, we used
MessageGuard to develop Private Facebook Chat (PFC), a system that adds content-based
encryption to Facebook Chat. Results from a user study of PFC demonstrated that many
of the design principles we were using to build usable, secure email could also be applied
to instant messaging.17 Moreover, our experiences building prototypes using MessageGuard
demonstrated that MessageGuard as a platform significantly reduced the cost and difficulty
of prototyping and evaluating content-based encryption solutions.

Chapter 7—Jeff Andersen, Tyler Monson, Scott Ruoti, Kent Seamons, and Daniel Zappala.
A Comparative Usability Study of Key Management in Secure Email. Under Submission, 2016.

To conclude the work in this dissertation, we applied everything we had built and
learned up to that point to try and create usable, secure email based on PGP.18 As part of
the evaluation of our PGP prototype, we used MessageGuard to build three secure email
17

Based on quantitative results and participant feedback from our study, we feel confident that MessageGuard
will also be beneficial to other types of content-based encryption (e.g., secure file storage).
18
PGP-based secure email that can be used by the masses is the holy grail of this area.

13

variants, each of which used a different key management approach: PGP, IBE, and passwords.
Using our paired-participant methodology, we then compared these systems to each other to
determine their relative usability.19
Our results indicate that users find all three systems to be usable. Participants were
evenly split regarding which system was their favorite (PGP–30%, IBE–37%, Passwords–30%),
as participants had varying secure email preferences—for example, some participants liked
that with the Passwords system they had full control of their security, whereas other users
did not want to have to manage passwords for each of their contacts. Still, our results
demonstrated that PGP can be made usable for novices, answering long-standing questions
regarding its viability. Furthermore, by demonstrating that PGP can be made usable, we
have opened the doors to future work within the field of usable, secure email.

19

The three prototypes incorporated all the design principles we had identified as being necessary to make
secure email usable, and only differed as required by each key management approach, eliminating potential
confounding factors in our analysis.
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ABSTRACT

rity overlays

A common approach to designing usable security is to
hide as many security details as possible from the user
to reduce the amount of information and actions a user
must encounter. This paper gives an overview of Pwm
(Private Webmail), our secure webmail system that uses
security overlays to integrate tightly with existing webmail services like Gmail. Pwm’s security is mostly transparent, including automatic key management and automatic encryption. We describe a series of Pwm user
studies indicating that while nearly all users can use the
system without any prior training, the security details
are so transparent that a small percentage of users mistakenly sent out unencrypted messages and some users
are unsure whether they should trust Pwm. We then
conducted user studies with an alternative prototype to
Pwm that uses manual encryption. Surprisingly users
were accepting of the extra steps of cutting and pasting
ciphertext themselves. They avoided mistakes and had
more trust in the system with manual encryption. Our
results suggest that designers may want to reconsider
manual encryption as a way to reduce transparency and
foster greater trust.

1.

INTRODUCTION

Secure email solutions exist but have not been widely
adopted. Research indicates that this is due in part
to usability issues, especially in the areas of key management and portability [19, 15]. These issues are a
significant impediment to secure webmail, as users expect high levels of usability and portability from their
webmail systems. We believe that users will adopt a secure webmail system only if it is tightly integrated with
their existing webmail systems in order to maintain the
usability and convenience they are accustomed to. If
secure webmail becomes a burden to users, they will reject it and choose instead to focus on their primary goal
to send and receive email.
This paper presents results and lessons learned from
usability studies of Pwm (Private WebMail, pronounced
“Poem”), our solution to extend existing webmail systems (Gmail, Hotmail, Yahoo! Mail) with end-to-end
encryption and message integrity. Pwm’s security is
mostly transparent; key management details are hidden
and users are never exposed to ciphertext. Pwm was designed to maximize usability so that users would be willing to adopt it. Pwm integrates tightly with webmail
Categories and Subject Descriptors
providers’ interfaces using security overlays, reducing
H.5.2 [Information Interfaces and Presentation (e.g.
the burden a user feels towards learning a new system.
HCI)]: User Interfaces—user-centered design, evaluaThe first research question addressed in this paper
tion
is how usable is Pwm’s tight integration with existing
webmail systems using security overlays and its transparent encryption. Pwm was designed to help everyday
General Terms
users send and received encrypted email with little or
Design, Human Factors, Security
no training. We conducted IRB-approved user studies
of Pwm where nearly all participants were able to deKeywords
crypt secure messages sent to them without any prior
notice or training.
Usable security, secure email, manual encryption, secuHowever, these user studies revealed two concerns:
First, some users did not trust that the system was secure because the security details (key management and
encryption) were so transparent that they did not have
a clear idea about how the system actually worked. Second, a small but consistent number of users accidentally
Copyright is held by the author/owner. Permission to make digital or hard sent plaintext when they intended to communicate a
copies of all or part of this work for personal or classroom use is granted sensitive message. Since the steps a user takes to send
without fee.
Symposium on Usable Privacy and Security (SOUPS) 2013, July 24–26, a message are quite similar for both encrypted and unencrypted data, a user’s “click-whirr” response makes
2013, Newcastle, UK.
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them susceptible to sending sensitive messages without
first enabling Pwm [5]. Several users realized their mistake immediately after they sent the message, but the
damage was already done.
These problems caused us to reconsider hiding some
of the security details. The second research question
addressed in this paper is whether manual encryption
in an application separate from the browser would prevent users from mistakenly sending out sensitive information without encryption, compete with Pwm in terms
of usability, and reveal enough security details that users
would have greater trust in the system. To test this hypothesis, we built Message Protector (MP), a mockup
that included manual encryption in an application separate from the browser.
We conducted two more IRB-approved user studies
using MP. We were surprised that users rated MP with
manual encryption to be as usable as Pwm. Users also
had more trust in MP with manual encryption and avoided
the mistake of sending out sensitive messages unencrypted. However, more users preferred that security
systems be tightly integrated with the browser. Thus,
in the effort to balance security and usability, we argue
that a combination of exposing some encryption details
and tight integration will produce a system that users
trust and help them to secure their data without making
mistakes.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows:
Section 2 describes Pwm, and Section 3 presents the
user studies of Pwm. Section 4 describes MP, and Section 5 presents the user studies of MP. Section 6 presents
the limitations of our user studies and Section 7 discusses related work. Section 8 contains conclusions and
future work.

2.

and message integrity to existing webmail systems
(Gmail, Hotmail, Yahoo! Mail) and runs in all major
browsers (Chrome, Firefox, Internet Explorer, Opera,
and Safari). Pwm is designed to maximize usability
and provide additional security to users who are already sending sensitive information over email. Pwm
addresses the problems we identified as follows:
1. Pwm tightly integrates with existing webmail systems using security overlays, windows placed over
the webmail providers interface that allow users
to interact with secure content. Security overlays
are functionally transparent to users helping avoid
the frustration of learning a new system.
2. Key management is automatic and fully transparent to users. Keys are managed by a key escrow
server that uses email-based identification and authentication (EBIA [8]) to authenticate users without their interaction.
3. All encryption is handled automatically by Pwm,
and users are never directly presented with ciphertext or the details of encryption.

2.1

Security Overlays

2.2

Key Management

Pwm uses security overlays to tightly integrate new
security features into existing webmail interfaces. A security overlay is a window where users view and interact
with secure content. It is positioned directly over the
portions of the webmail provider’s interface that need
to be secured. The user interacts with the security interface in lieu of the overlaid portion of the webmail
provider’s interface. A security overlay is displayed using an iFrame and uses the browser’s same domain policies to protect its contents from access by the honestbut-curious webmail provider.
Security overlays are designed to be functionally transparent to users, matching the functionality that exists
in the overlaid portion of the webmail provider’s interface. This functional transparency allows users to complete tasks in the way they are accustomed to, lowering
the chance that users will disable the secure system to
more readily complete their tasks. Security overlays are
also designed to be visually distinctive from the webmail
provider’s interface. This distinction assists users in determining whether they are using a security overlay or
the webmail provider’s original interface and highlights
features unique to the security overlay.
For example, Figure 1 is an encrypted Pwm email
and Figure 2 is that same message after it has been
decrypted. The security overlay has been positioned
in the page where users expect to read email. Functionally, it is identical to reading any other message,
but visually it is distinctive and allows users to quickly
identify when they are reading encrypted emails. We
avoid visual transparency as that would prevent users
from determining when the system is in use and reduce
trust in the system [7].

PWM

Based on earlier research and our experience, we believe that there are three problems inhibiting the adoption of secure email by the masses:
1. Users are resistant to change. If secure email requires too much effort for the perceived benefits it
will be rejected by users [11].
2. Users do not understand how to obtain, distribute,
or use cryptographic keys [19, 15]. Additionally,
PKI-based secure email has a chicken and egg problem, as most users will not perform key management until they have received an encrypted email,
and users cannot receive an encrypted email until
they perform key management.
3. Users are confused by the details of cryptography [19]. This leads users to omit or incorrectly
use various cryptographic operations necessary for
securing email.
We hypothesized that if these difficulties were overcome, users would be able to successfully use secure
webmail and be willing to adopt it. Based on this hypothesis, we developed Pwm (Private WebMail, pronounced “Poem”). Pwm adds end-to-end encryption

A key escrow server handles key management. The
key escrow server follows the principles of identity-based
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Figure 2: Decrypted email
email is the instructions for setting up Pwm. These instructions are designed to help first time users obtain
the software needed to decrypt the email. Optionally,
the sender of an encrypted email can add a personalized
message explaining the nature of the encrypted message
and the need to obtain Pwm to access it. This message
can provide important context so the recipient can trust
that the message is legitimate.
Once Pwm is installed and running, it automatically
decrypts the email and displays the plaintext contents
of the message to the user in a security overlay (Figure 2). If they had opened the email with Pwm already
running, they would only see the decrypted message and
not the encrypted email. Users can detect that they are
reading a decrypted message because of the visual distinctiveness of security overlays and the addition of a
lock icon to the subject of the message (Figure 2 and
Figure 3)
When a user replies to an encrypted email, their response is automatically encrypted for them. Unlike
replies, new messages are not encrypted by default. Instead, users are presented with an open lock icon next
to the email compose form that must be clicked in order
to activate the security overlay for composing encrypted
email (Figure 4). When users click the send button
on the security overlay, the message is encrypted and
sent automatically without ever showing them ciphertext. We take this user-centric approach to maximize
the impact encrypted emails have on users by reserving
encryption for when it is needed [10]. Since new users
must install software in order to read Pwm messages,
it limits the number of new users required to install
Pwm to those that need to access sensitive messages.
It also helps to minimize the impact on webmail’s adbased revenue model. Encrypted email limits the webmail provider’s ability to scan user’s messages in order
to serve targeted ads. If default encryption produced a
surge of encrypted emails, this might cause a webmail
provider to block Pwm traffic or actively limit Pwm’s
ability to tightly integrate with the webmail interface.
For convenience, a user can turn on encryption permanently for a given recipient that they always desire to
communicate with securely.

Figure 1: A sample email prior to decryption
cryptography (IBC) introduced by Shamir [14] in that
cryptographic keys are generated based on users’ identities (i.e., email address). This model allows users to
send encrypted email to recipients who are currently
outside the system. Unlike IBC, the key escrow system
uses symmetric key cryptography and key derivation [4,
12] instead of public key cryptography. The advantages
of key escrow are (1) key management can be fully automated, (2) users can never lose their encryption keys,
and (3) keys can be automatically ported to new devices. The disadvantage of key escrow is that the key
escrow server has access to users’ keys, which is a recognized trade-off to get the other usability benefits [1].
Pwm interacts with the key escrow server using an invisible key management security overlay. This security
overlay handles all key management operations (e.g.,
obtaining and storing keys, authentication). Authentication is handled by Simple Authentication for the
Web (SAW [18]), a form of email-based identification
and authentication (EBIA [8]). SAW generates an authentication token for the key server and then splits it
in half. One half is returned to the requester and the
other half is sent to email account that is being authenticated. Pwm runs inside the webmail provider and has
access to this email, allowing Pwm to obtain the full authentication token without reliance on user input. The
combination of key escrow and SAW allows for transparent and automatic key management, removing many of
the difficulties users faced with traditional secure email
solutions.

2.3

Automatic Encryption

Pwm hides almost all security details from users. Encrypted Pwm emails include ciphertext, but it is positioned so that it will be largely ignored by users (Figure 1). The most prominent portion of an encrypted

2.4

Setup

The prototype can be installed and run using either
a browser extension or a bookmarklet. A browser ex3

Figure 3: New Pwm email in inbox

Figure 4: Compose interface
tension is a well-known method for adding functionality
to the browser, but bookmarklets are a newer and increasingly popular method for doing the same thing. A
bookmarklet is simply a browser bookmark that contains JavaScript instead of a URL. The bookmarklet
and the browser extension both function by inserting the
in-page services script tag onto the webmail provider’s
web page. The only difference between the two is that
the browser extension is always running, while the bookmarklet must be clicked each time the user visits Gmail.
Bookmarklets have several advantages in comparison
to browser extensions, the most important being ease
of setup. On the prototype’s website, the bookmarklet
is represented by a large button with the text “Secure
My Email”. Installation is as simple as dragging this
bookmarklet to the bookmarks bar. Bookmarklets are
also quick and easy to use, whenever Bob wants to run
the prototype he only needs to click the “Secure My
Email” bookmarklet in his bookmarks bar.
As demonstrated by the success of Pinterest,1 average
users are able to set up and use bookmarklets with little
difficulty. Since this does not qualify as installation in
the traditional sense, Bob does not need administrative
privileges to use it. Furthermore, the prototype can be
set up and run on any computer where Bob accesses
webmail.

3.

Figure 5: Pwm website
minimize unfamiliarity with Gmail impacting our results, we stipulated that volunteers for the study should
be active Gmail users. We also indicated that the study
would take approximately thirty minutes and provide
compensation of $10.
During this study, all participants used the same computer2 . We provided Gmail accounts to participants
to use in the study. This allowed us to preserve the
privacy of the participants’ personal accounts and furthered our ability to provide a uniform environment.
Participants were required to complete the study using
the Google Chrome Web browser.To match a fresh install of Google Chrome, we ensured that the bookmarks
bar was not displayed initially. Before beginning, participants completed a demographic questionnaire (Appendix A.1). Users were not required to identify themselves, and we did not record the identity of any participant.

PWM USER STUDIES

We conducted two IRB-approved user studies to evaluate the usability of Pwm. The goal of these studies
was to test whether Pwm’s design would lead to secure email that was both usable and desirable for users.
This included determining whether new, untrained users
could set up and use Pwm relying only on the directions provided in the plaintext portion of the encrypted
email (Figure 1) and Pwm’s website (Figure 5). We
also wanted to discover what, if anything, caused users
to fail when sending and receiving encrypted email. Finally, we wanted to determine users’ opinions toward
the tight integration provided by security overlays.
The participants for both studies were recruited at
Brigham Young University using posters that invited
students to participate in a Gmail usability study, but
did not alert them that it was related to security. To

3.1
3.1.1

Bookmarklet Study
Setup

This study used the bookmarklet version of Pwm and
was comprised of 25 students, representing 19 different
majors, and with low to medium technical experience.
Of the 25 participants, 19 (76%) had been Gmail users
for over a year and only 3 (12%) had been Gmail users
for less than 6 months. Twenty-three (92%) of the participants used Gmail on a daily basis.
We remotely monitored each user’s actions in realtime using RealVNC and recorded their actions locally
using CamStudio. Participants were presented with simple tasks to complete using Pwm (Appendix A.2). After
2

1
Pinterest is a website that makes heavy use of bookmarklets. http://pinterest.com/
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completing the tasks, participants were presented with
a short survey about their experience using Pwm (Appendix A.3). We then augmented this survey with a
brief interview in which we asked each participant about
difficulties or failures we had observed.

3.1.2

did not repeat this error on the second task. When
asked about this, he said that he was accustomed to
using Gmail on his iPod Touch where the send button
is in the upper left-hand corner of the screen where the
“Compose” button was in our test.
On the third task, 22 participants (88%, CI ±12.74)
successfully sent an encrypted email on their first try.
Of the three who failed, one immediately recognized his
mistake and correctly sent an encrypted email before
receiving a reply. When asked about this, he reported
that he knew it wasn’t encrypted when he didn’t see the
security overlay’s black background. The remaining two
participants successfully sent an encrypted email after
receiving the reply asking them to try again. One of the
two stated that they had misread the instructions and
didn’t realize they were supposed to encrypt the email.
The other reported that he didn’t realize he needed to
click the bookmarklet again and said that he wouldn’t
repeat that mistake again.

Tasks

Each participant was given three tasks to complete using Pwm. These tasks were designed to simulate what
an individual would experience if they received an unsolicited Pwm email and began using Pwm.
In the first task, participants were told to check their
inbox for an email containing instructions on how to
proceed with the study. Unknown to them, this email
had been encrypted using Pwm. Participants were given
no explanation or help from the study conductor and
were required to rely only on the directions provided by
the encrypted Pwm email. Once decrypted, the email
instructed participants to send an encrypted reply and
return to the study instructions. The primary goal of
this task was to observe whether untrained users could
successfully set up and use Pwm with no outside assistance. Because we were in a lab environment where
participants knew they would not be exposed to any real
risks, we refrained from drawing any conclusions about
participants’ trust in bookmarklets.
For the second task, participants were asked to open
a new Gmail session, send an encrypted email to the
study conductor, and then wait for a reply with further instructions. If participants did not encrypt their
email, they would then receive an unencrypted reply informing them that their email had not been encrypted
and instructing them to try again. Once the participant
successfully sent an encrypted email, they received an
encrypted reply instructing them to close Gmail and
return to the study instructions.
The third task required a new Gmail session be started.
Since Pwm was no longer running, the participant would
need to restart Pwm by clicking on the bookmarklet.
The primary goal of this task was to determine whether
participants would be able to correctly restart Pwm in
order to compose an encrypted email.

3.1.3

3.1.4

System Usability Scale

3.1.5

Lessons Learned

We used the System Usability Scale (SUS) [3], a usability evaluation metric developed at Digital Equipment Corp., to rate the usability of Pwm. SUS works
by asking participants to respond to ten statements on
a Likert scale. We included these statements as part of
the survey we administered to participants. Based on
the participants’ responses we calculated a SUS score
of 75.70 out of 100 (standard deviation (SD) of 13.61,
CI ±5.33) for Pwm.
As part of an empirical evaluation of SUS, Bangor et
al. [2] reviewed SUS evaluations of 206 different systems
and compared these against objective measurements of
the various systems’ success to derive adjective-based
ratings for SUS scores (Appendix C, Figure 1). When
compared against Bangor’s findings on 273 SUS studies,
our score of 75.70 falls in the third quartile (70.5–77.8)
and above the mean score of 69.5. Pwm’s score qualifies
for an adjective rating of “Excellent” and is considered
“acceptable” in Bangor’s acceptability range.
Overall, this study was a success. Pwm succeeded
in helping first-time users set up and use secure email.
When asked in the survey what they liked about Pwm,
23 out of 25 (92%) stated that it was simple and easy
to use. No participant indicated that they felt Pwm
was difficult to use. Most participants stated that they
would use Pwm if they needed to send secure email.
Five of the participants (20%) even asked if Pwm was
available for download because they wanted to begin
using it immediately.
Participants were able to clearly tell the difference
between Pwm’s secure interface and the underlying interface. Some liked the distinct black background of
the security overlay while others wished it looked more
like Gmail’s native interface. When asked, all participants indicated that it was easy to determine when
email had been encrypted using Pwm. The three participants (12%) that initially failed the second task indicated that in the future they would not make the same
mistake as they would ensure they could see the dis-

Results

Overall, participants were highly successful in using
Pwm. All but one of the 25 participants (96%, Confidence Interval (CI) at 95%, ±7.68) successfully set up
Pwm and decrypted the email received in the first task.
The only participant who failed to decrypt the email had
correctly set up Pwm but then moved on to the second
task without trying to read the decrypted email. When
asked why she did this, she said that it was because she
assumed the task was complete once she had added the
bookmarklet. This was a flaw in the task setup because
we should have had information contained in the encrypted message that participants needed to report in
order to continue on with the study. This would also
have more closely resembled real world use cases.
Of the 24 that decrypted the email in the first task,
23 (96%, CI ±7.84) successfully sent an encrypted reply.
The only participant who failed to send the encrypted
reply had correctly used Pwm but then clicked Gmail’s
“Compose” button rather than the “Send” button. He
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tinctive look of the security overlay before sending a
sensitive message. While it is hard to know if this is
correct, it is still encouraging that users were able to
recognize the importance of the visual distinctiveness.
Bookmarklets also proved to be highly usable. Only
five (20%) of the participants had used a bookmarklet
before; nevertheless, all participants were able to set
up and use Pwm. Many participants noted that they
liked the fact that the Pwm bookmarklet did not require
installation. The one complaint was that the instructions for how to install the bookmarklet should have
been more prominent. No participant demonstrated
pre-existing knowledge of how to enable the bookmarks
bar and the instructions were crucial in helping them
set up Pwm. The participants who read the instructions before attempting to add the bookmarklet set up
Pwm far faster (average of 30 seconds) than those that
tried to add the bookmarklet without first reading the
instructions (average of 1.5 minutes).
We asked about half of the participants, including
the three who struggled with the second task, how they
would react to having email encrypted by default. We
explained that this would ensure that they would not
accidentally send email without encryption. The participants disliked this idea. In their minds, they saw encryption as something that they would only turn on for
sensitive messages and thought it would be annoying to
need to frequently turn off encryption. They recognized
that decrypting messages adds work for the recipient,
and wished to avoid this unless the message was important. Some participants rejected automatic encryption
because they believed that only Gmail users could install Pwm and read messages they had sent. Also, it
is possible that the short-term nature of the study unfairly biased participants against the ease of decrypting
messages as a disproportionate amount of their time (in
comparison to real use scenarios) was spent installing
Pwm.
We were interested to discover that approximately
one third of participants were interested in how their
email was being encrypted. Although these participants
lacked the technical background to fully understand the
cryptography being used, they would still like to see
these details published on Pwm’s website. They indicated that this would make them feel more confident
using Pwm. Even though Pwm users do not want to
be concerned with cryptographic details (e.g., key management, signing) while operating Pwm, they still want
this information available so that they can feel more
confident that Pwm is securing their messages.

3.2

Pwm against Voltage also allowed us to compare users’
reactions to secure email systems requiring software installation (Pwm) against systems requiring account creation and verification (Voltage).
In this study, Pwm was run using a browser extension.
In the first user study, some participants suggested they
would prefer to use an extension to a bookmarklet, and
we wanted to see if using the extension would make any
difference in the user’s experience.

Setup

3.2.2

Pwm Tasks

3.2.3

Voltage Tasks

The second study was comprised of 32 students. Like
the Pwm studies, participants were aware they were taking part in a usability study, but were unaware of its focus on security. All but one (97%) participant had been
using Gmail for over six months, and 27 (84%) reported
that they used Gmail on a daily basis. All participants
had experience using Google Chrome. Two of the participants (8%) had encountered PGP in the past but
had never used it for any significant period of time.
This study was a within-subjects study, where participants were given simple tasks to complete using both
Pwm and Voltage. The order in which they used the
systems was randomized so that half used Pwm first,
and the other half Voltage. After completing the tasks
for one system, they were given a survey rating their experiences (Pwm – Appendix A.4, Voltage – same questions as Pwm, but with “Voltage” replacing “Pwm”).
Participants would then complete the tasks and associated survey for the other system. Participants were
given a survey with questions about their online security behavior and preferences (Appendix A.5). Finally,
participants were interviewed to gather more information about their experiences.
The tasks for Pwm remained the same as the first
Pwm study. The only difference was the instructions
on the Pwm website were replaced with instructions for
setting up and running the browser extension instead of
the bookmarklet.
To begin, participants opened an email that had been
sent to the provided Gmail account using Voltage. This
email, which was generated by Voltage, contained an
HTML attachment that included a link to the Voltage
website where they could read their encrypted email.
At the Voltage website, participants were instructed to
create a free Voltage account in order to view their message. Participants had been provided with fake credentials that they could use to fill in the account creation
form. After submitting this information, participants
were directed to return to their email to retrieve an account verification email from Voltage. After verifying
their new Voltage account, participants were able to return to the Voltage website and read their encrypted
message. This message instructed them to send a secure
reply, which in Voltage only requires clicking “reply.”
Unlike the Pwm tasks, participants were not required
to send a new encrypted email through Voltage. The
participants were using free Voltage accounts, which do

Voltage Comparison Study

In order to establish that Pwm provided usability
benefits in comparison to existing depot-based secure
email solutions, we conducted a user study comparing Pwm with Voltage SecureMail Cloud3 (hereafter referred to as Voltage). Like Pwm, Voltage was designed
to allow messages to be encrypted and sent to recipients
who had not taken any preparatory action. In addition
to comparing usability of similar features, comparing
3

3.2.1

http://www.voltage.com/products/vsn.htm
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not allowing sending new email (only replying), and licensing fees made it impractical to give each participant
a commercial account. This step is trivial in Voltage,
as it is no different than sending an email in any depot
system, and so we do not believe this omission affects
the usability results.

3.2.4

The SUS score for extension-based Pwm is lower than
bookmarklet-based Pwm (75.70) but this difference is
not statistically significant (unequal variance two tailed
t-test, p = 0.1576). We believe that this difference in
perceived usability was due to a bug that caused a delay between when the page loaded and Pwm became
fully functional. This delay caused visible confusion in
7 of the 32 participants (22%), four of whom later commented that the delay bothered them. This annoyance
could have contributed to the lower scores Pwm received
in this study.

Results

Pwm Results.

As with the first study, all participants successfully
set up Pwm, but this time they did so without any mistakes or delays. This is likely due to the ease of installing
browser extensions in Chrome (only requires two mouse
clicks) as well as greater user familiarity with browser
extensions (in the first study 5 participants (20%) has
used bookmarklets before, where as in the second study
28 (87.5%) had used extensions previously).
Users did experience confusion about being required
to refresh the Gmail page before the extension became
active (a limitation of Chrome extensions). Several users
needed to return to the Pwm website and re-read the
instructions before they refreshed the Gmail webpage.
All of the participants (100%) successfully decrypted
the email they received. They also all successfully sent
an encrypted reply. In the third task, three participants
(9%, CI ±11.22) sent their message without encryption.
Two of the three recognized their mistake immediately
after clicking “Send;” one recognized the mistake when
he saw the lock icon on the compose form just after he
clicked “Send” and the other when he realized he had
not seen the dark background of a security overlay.

3.2.6

Voltage Results.

As with Pwm, all participants (100%) successfully
read their encrypted message and replied to it. However, 14 of the 32 participants (44%, CI ±17.32) complained that the process for reading the initial email was
extremely cumbersome. Two participants (6%, CI ±8.23)
expressly stated that they did not want to leave Gmail
to access encrypted email. Overall, only six participants
(19%, CI ±13.59) indicated that they preferred Voltage.
Of these participants, four preferred the look and feel
of Voltage’s website, one disliked installing any browser
extensions, and one liked that there was a separate site
for handling secure messages.

3.2.5

Lessons Learned

In addition to the SUS results, the user surveys also
showed that users largely preferred Pwm to Voltage.
When asked why, they stated that it was because Pwm
was integrated directly with Gmail. This supports our
original hypothesis that users are resistant to systems
that require changes to existing behavior, and that tight
integration is able to overcome this concern. Also, like
the first study, many participants expressed a desire to
use Pwm if they needed to encrypt their personal email.
Several participants suggested ways to improve Pwm.
First, while they liked the simplicity of the browser extension, they were also interested in having the option
of using a bookmarklet to run Pwm, preferring the flexibility that having both options would provide. Second, participants suggested Pwm’s website should look
more professional and provide additional details on how
Pwm functions. While this is not directly useful to most
participants, they indicated that their confidence would
be bolstered by the knowledge that Pwm’s claims are
open to scrutiny by security experts. These suggestions
closely parallel suggestions from the first user study.
Also, of the six users who preferred Voltage, only one
preferred it for reasons inherent to depot-based secure
email, while the other five would have preferred Pwm if
these two issues were addressed.

4.

MP – MANUAL ENCRYPTION

The results from our Pwm user studies along with results from a user study of Private Facebook Chat[13] (a
companion system built using security overlays for Facebook Chat) were very positive, especially when compared to some earlier usability studies for secure
email [19, 15]. However, several aspects of Pwm and
PFC were concerning. First, each study had a small
number of users (approximately 10%) that forgot to enable encryption before they sent secure messages. Second, follow-up interviews with participants revealed that
some of them did not understand how Pwm works, believing that anyone with Pwm installed could decrypt
their email if they stole it.
Initially we thought these issues would be simple to
resolve. We considered modifying Pwm to better train
users, including displaying video explaining how to encrypt message the first time they ran Pwm, but ultimately felt that this would make users think Pwm was
either spam or a virus. We also considered turning on
encryption for all messages, but decided against doing so
because it places an undue burden on each recipient and

System Usability Scale

Pwm’s extension implementation had a calculated SUS
score of 70.70 (SD 12.28, CI ±4.26). Voltage had a calculated SUS score of 62.66 (SD 17.53, CI ±6.07). This
is a statistically significant difference (paired two tailed
t-test, p = 0.0073). This result matches opinions expressed by participants during the interview at the end
of the study. According to Bangor’s adjective ratings,
both systems qualify for an adjective rating of “Good.”
Pwm was in the third quartile and above the mean of
69.5 while Voltage was in the second quartile and below
the mean. According to Bangor’s acceptability ranges,
Pwm qualifies as “acceptable” while Voltage ranks as
“low marginal.”
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to existing systems and determine if users would trust
the system and find it usable, and if they would make
fewer mistakes.
As with the Pwm studies, the participants for these
two studies were recruited at Brigham Young University using posters that invited students to participate
in either a 45 minute Gmail and Facebook study or a
30 minute Gmail study for the first and second studies respectively. The compensation for both studies was
$10.
All participants used the same computer and browser
as in the previous user studies. Once again we provided
participants with Gmail and Facebook accounts to use
during the studies. Before beginning, participants completed a demographic questionnaire (Appendix B.1).
Users were not required to identify themselves and we
did not record the identity of any participant.

Figure 6: Interface for encrypting a message

5.1

potentially interferes with the revenue model of webmail
providers; when asked about this option, participants in
the user studies also rejected it as undesirable.
Ultimately, we concluded that Pwm’s security details
were too transparent. This transparency led some participants to author and click “Send” before realizing
they had not enabled encryption (a “click-whirr” response [5]). It also caused some participants to not
trust Pwm. Since the users did not see the ciphertext,
they lacked confidence that encryption and decryption
were taking place and didn’t understand how the system
worked.
We built a mockup of Message Protector (MP), a
standalone application that allows users to manually
encrypt and decrypt messages. We believed that a separate application with manual encryption could help
users better understand what was happening and help
them avoid mistakes.
MP is a very simple system. Following installation,
MP prompts users to sign in with their email credentials. Users then select email contacts they would like
to communicate with securely. These two steps would
permit automatic key management and allow users to
clearly determine who can read their encrypted messages.
Users are then able to encrypt and decrypt messages
(Figure 6). To encrypt a message, they input their desired message into the “Input” text field and click “Encrypt”. Their message is then encrypted (base-64 encoded in the mockup) and the ciphertext is placed in
the “Output” field. Users then copy the ciphertext to
whatever application they wish to use to store or transmit it.
To decrypt a message, users input the MP ciphertext
into the “Input” field and then click the “Decrypt” button (“Encrypt” changes to “Decrypt” when ciphertext
is detected in the “Input” field). The plaintext is placed
in the “Output” field.

5.

Encipher.it Comparison Study

In the first MP study we wanted to test MP against
an existing secure data sharing tool with manual encryption. We selected Encipher.it4 because it is a relatively well-known tool, which unlike most other similar
tools is currently functional. Encipher.it is a generic
bookmarklet-based secure data sharing tool that can
encrypt text in any HTML textbox. To use it the user
types a message in a textbox and clicks the Encipher.it
bookmarklet. Encipher.it then prompts the user to supply a password which is used to encrypt their message.
This password must be transmitted out-of-band to the
recipient. Following encryption, Encipher.it displays
ciphertext in place of the original plaintext message.
When a recipient receives an encrypted message and
clicks the Encipher.it bookmarklet, Encipher.it prompts
the user for the sender’s password. After the recipient
supplies the password, the message is decrypted and
displayed in place of the ciphertext on the webpage.

5.1.1

Setup

This study was comprised of 28 participants. Participants were told that this was a usability study but were
not made aware of its security focus. Of the 28 participants, 25 (89%) used webmail daily and 27 (96%)
used Facebook weekly. Sensitive information had previously been sent over webmail or Facebook by 24 (86%)
of the participants, while only three (11%) of them had
encrypted those messages. All (100%) participants reported that protecting the contents of sensitive information was important.
At the beginning of the study, participants were presented with a document that described the study (Appendix B.2). The study was a within-subjects study,
where participants were given simple tasks to complete
using both Encipher.it and MP (Appendix B.3). The
order in which the systems were used was randomly
chosen; 16 (57%) participants used MP first and 12
(43%) used Encipher.it first. After completing the tasks
for one system, participants were then given a survey
to rate their experiences (Appendix B.4). Participants
would then complete the tasks and associated survey

MP USER STUDIES

We conducted two IRB-approved user studies to evaluate MP. The goal of these studies was to compare MP
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for the other system. Participants were finally given a
post-study survey asking them to state which system
they preferred and why (Appendix B.5).

5.1.2

According to Bangor’s adjective ratings, both systems
qualify for an adjective rating of “Good.” MP was in
the third quartile and above the mean of 69.25, while
Encipher.it was in the second quartile below the mean.
According to Bangor’s acceptability ranges, MP qualifies as “acceptable” while Encipher.it ranks as “low
marginal”

Tasks

Users were given step-by-step instructions on how to
complete three tasks using both systems. Task 1 instructed users to install the given system.
Task 2 instructed participants to open Gmail and
send an encrypted message containing the text “The
last four digits of my SSN is 6789" to the study coordinator. Participants then received an encrypted response
to this message and were instructed to decrypt it. To
continue they had to input the decrypted message.
Task 3 instructed participants to open Facebook and
send an encrypted message containing the text “My
bank account password is cougars" to the account’s friend
named “Alice Jones.” Participants then received an encrypted response to this message and were instructed to
decrypt it.

5.1.3

5.1.5

Results

MP Results.

Of the participants, 25 (89%, CI ±11.45) correctly
completed the Gmail tasks and 27 (96%, CI ±7.17) completed the Facebook tasks. The mistakes were split between not understanding how to use the tool and not
understanding which portion of the ciphertext to submit
to correctly complete the task.
Participants largely succeeded in understanding how
MP worked. Twenty-five participants (89%, CI ±11.45)
correctly identified who could read encrypted messages.
Additionally, 25 participants (89%, CI ±11.45) were
able to correctly identify how to decrypt a message using MP.

Encipher.it Results.

Many participants were not able to get Encipher.it to
allow them to encrypt or decrypt messages. Only 16
(57%, CI ±18.34) participants were able to decrypt a
message in Gmail and only 14 (50%, CI ±18.52) were
able to send an encrypted email. Similar to MP, participants fared a little better using Encipher.it with Facebook, as 17 (61%, CI ±18.07) participants successfully
decrypted a message and 23 (82%, CI ±14.23) participants successfully encrypted a message. Four participants (14%, CI ±12.85) failed the encryption tasks because they never communicated to the test coordinator
the password they had used to encrypt the message.
Participants largely understood how Encipher.it worked,
but not as clearly as they understood MP. Twenty-three
(82%, CI ±14.23) correctly identified who could read
encrypted messages, but only 20 (71%, CI ±16.81) understood how to decrypt a message.

5.1.4

System Usability Scale

MP had a calculated SUS score of 72.23 (SD 13.02,
CI ±4.96). Encipher.it had a calculated SUS score of
61.25 (SD 20.11, CI ±7.65). This is a statistically significant difference (paired two tailed t-test, p = 0.0176).

5.2

Pwm Comparison Study

The results of the initial MP study were very positive and so we decided to compare it against Pwm. MP
was a mockup to study manual encryption and lacks
any functionality to help first time recipients of an MP
message know how to proceed. For this reason, we selected to replicate the previous MP study (with Pwm
replacing Encipher.it) instead of modeling this study after the original Pwm studies. The goal of the study was
to see how well MP fosters user understanding when
compared to Pwm, and also to explore users’ attitudes
when comparing the two systems.

5.2.1
9

Lessons Learned

MP was much better at helping the participants avoid
making mistakes (paired two tailed t-test, Gmail Decryption – p = 0.0171, Gmail Encryption – p = 0.0052,
Facebook decryption – p = 0.0022, Facebook encryption
– p = 0.1033 [Not significant]). This is likely due to the
higher usability marks received by MP, as users found
it far easier to use.
MP also performed better at helping participants understand who could read encrypted messages (paired
two tailed t-test, p = 0.0114) and also how to successfully decrypt messages (paired two tailed t-test,
p = 0.1610), though the second result is not statistically
significant.
Perhaps the greatest surprise was that MP’s SUS score
was as high as Pwm in our previous studies. We had not
anticipated this outcome, as we felt that the extra effort
of manual encryption would cause participants to reject
the system. It is clear from participant responses that
they felt more confident using MP precisely because it
helped them understand what they were doing. This is
reflected by the majority of participants who indicated
that the usability of the system was important to them
in deciding whether they would use it in their personal
lives (MP – 24 [86%, CI ±12.85], Encipher.it – 22 [79%,
CI ±15.09]), and more people found MP easy to understand (MP – 23 [82%, CI ±14.23], Encipher.it – 17
[54%, CI ±18.46]).
At the conclusion of the study, we asked participants
which system they preferred and why (Appendix B.6,
Table 1). First, most participants preferred integrating
encryption with the browser and several participants
preferred Encipher.it primarily for this reason. Participants that preferred MP also indicated that they wish it
had been more integrated. Still, there was a small number of users who felt that MP being a separate application increased security. Second, we observe that users
recognize the problem of distributing keys, and several
disliked that this was a necessary step of Encipher.it.

Setup

This study was comprised of 28 participants. Participants were told that this was a usability study but were
not made aware of its security focus. Of the 29 participants, 28 (97%) used webmail daily and Facebook
weekly. Sensitive information had been sent over webmail or Facebook by 27 (93%) of the participants, while
only one (3%) had encrypted those messages. Once
again, all (100%) participants reported that protecting
the contents of sensitive information was important.
The setup and tasks for this system were similar to
the Encipher study, but did not include the Facebook
tasks since Pwm does not support Facebook. The order
in which the systems were used was randomly chosen;
15 (52%) participants used MP first and 14 (48%) used
Pwm first.

5.2.2

variance two-tailed t-test, p = 0.9980). In aggregate
across all studies Pwm had a SUS score of 73.84
(SD 14.17, CI ±3.04) and MP had a SUS score of 73.14
(SD 13.56, CI ±3.60). This was not a statistically significant difference (unequal variance two tailed t-test,
p = 0.7596).

5.2.4

Results

MP Results.

Of the participants, 27 (93%, CI ±9.29) correctly decrypted a message and 28 (97%, ±6.21) successfully encrypted a message. Comprehension was also high, as
27 (93%, CI ±9.29) correctly identified who would be
able to read encrypted messages and all 29 (100%) participants correctly identified how to decrypt a message
using MP.

Pwm Results.

Twenty-five (86%, CI ±12.63) participants were able
to decrypt a message and 24 (83%, CI ±13.67) were able
to send an encrypted email. This is lower than previous results for both Pwm and PFC, and this is possibly
due to the study not as closely mimic real world conditions. Pwm is designed to help first time recipients of
unsolicited encrypted messages, and so does not provide
step-by-step documentation like Encipher.it or MP.
A number of participants fared poorly in understanding how Pwm was functioning. Only 22 (76%, CI ±15.54)
of the participants correctly identified who could read
a Pwm message, and only 21 (72%, CI ±16.34) knew
the proper steps to decrypt a message. Perhaps even
more interesting is that 6 (21%, CI ±14.82) participants
stated they were unsure of who could read messages and
4 (14%, CI ±12.63) were unsure how to read an encrypted message, whereas no users (0%) reported being
unsure of how to use MP in either category.

5.2.3

Lessons Learned

MP’s manual encryption and clear separation led to
nearly all participants correctly understanding who
could read messages (paired two tailed p-test, p = 0.0225)
as well as how to decrypt a message (paired two tailed
p-test, p = 0.0028). Since Pwm keeps more security details transparent to its users, they did not understand
how Pwm works and were aware of their lack of understanding.
We were once again surprised that MP performed on
par with Pwm in terms of usability. Contrary to our
initial thinking, users are not opposed to manual encryption. Users preferred manual encryption because
they felt it helped them understand, and thereby trust,
the system. Even though MP is a mockup and Pwm is
a working system, participants felt that MP was more
secure based on its manual encryption.
At the end of the study, we again asked participants
which system they preferred and why (Appendix B.6,
Table 2). Their answers are helpful in understanding
how these results should guide our research. First, users
preferred the integration provided by Pwm. Even users
who preferred MP were likely to state that they felt
Pwm was more usable, but choose MP because they
didn’t feel they could trust Pwm. Second, participants
felt that manual encryption was necessary to their understanding. Without seeing the ciphertext, they did
not feel that Pwm was actually encrypting messages
and so were unwilling to use it, and accordingly did not
feel that Pwm’s other usability benefits were enough to
overcome this concern.

6.

LIMITATIONS

There are three key limitations in our user studies:
1. The first MP study was an exploratory study designed to measure the potential benefits of manual
encryption. MP was not designed to spread in a
grass root fashion like Pwm, so the first MP user
study assumed the user had already installed the
necessary software and shared secret keys before
they received an encrypted message. Once the results from the first study indicated the potential
benefits of manual encryption, we decided to compare MP against Pwm. We modeled this comparison study after the first MP study for consistency.
Thus, the second MP study assumed the user had
already installed Pwm. The user tasks focused on
encryption and decryption and not software installation. While this proved sufficient for comparing
comprehension, the results of this study are not
fully representative of all aspects of Pwm, and potentially biased participants by not allowing them
to experience one of Pwm’s key usability features.

System Usability Scale

MP had a calculated SUS score of 73.96 (SD 14.23,
CI ±5.42). Pwm had a calculated SUS score of 75.69
(SD 16.31, CI ±6.21). This was not a statistically significant difference (paired two tailed t-test, p = 0.61633).
In comparison to Bangor’s findings both systems qualify for an adjective rating of “Excellent.” Both were in
the third quartile and above the mean of 69.25 and both
qualifies as “acceptable” on Bangor’s acceptability scale.
Extension-based Pwm scored higher in this study then
in the second Pwm user study, but this difference was
not statistically significant (unequal variance two tailed
t-test, p = 0.1867). Extension-based Pwm in this study
scored nearly identically to the bookmarklet-based version of Pwm from the first Pwm user study (unequal
10

2. Our user studies were short-term laboratory studies. Short-term studies have several inherent limitations: first, it is hard to accurately address trust
in a laboratory setting [16], and second, it does
not allow us to analyze whether participants would
correctly use the prototype over an extended period of time. Perhaps MP’s lack of integration
would become a considerable issue after repeated
use. Similarly, the perception of Pwm’s usability
could change over time. In the future, we plan to
conduct long-term studies to address these issues.

Express, and sometimes users failed to read the instructions accompanying the visual indicators. Our work also
illustrates the benefits of automatic key management,
but we use a very different key management paradigm
based on identity-based cryptography since we focus on
making it easy for users to obtain our software after
they have received an encrypted message and to start
encrypting their webmail. We also observed some issues
related to too much transparency. Our work is complimentary, and we could incorporate KCM to address the
kinds of attacks they describe in their paper.
Clark et al. [6] analyze the P25 short-range wireless
two-way communications protocol used for emergency
and law enforcement personnel. They discovered that
a small amount of sensitive traffic is inadvertently sent
unencrypted due to individuals and groups being confused about when encryption is actually turned on. One
contributing factor is the user interface design that enables encryption by rotating a knob to a specific position. They observed that users occasionally assume
encryption is on and mistakenly communicate in the
clear. We experienced a similar phenomenon with our
software interface that lets users turn encryption on and
off.
Fahl et al. [7] conducted usability studies for various
design options for Facebook private messaging. They
determined a strong user preference for automatic key
management. They also selected automatic encryption,
but there wasn’t a significant preference for it compared
to manual encryption. They suspected that making encryption details too transparent could fail to generate a
feeling of trust among the users of a system, and they
recommended that this issue be explored in more detail
in the future. Our work provides evidence to confirm
this suspicion. We had users report that they had more
trust in a system that exposes more security details.
Sun et al. [17] examined the usability of OpenID,
a promising Web single sign-on system. They identified concerns and misconceptions among users that inhibit the adoption of OpenID. They illustrate how the
OpenID login flow promotes an inaccurate mental model
to users. They describe an alternative to the OpenID
login flow that assists users in forming a more accurate
mental model and believe that this will help users be
more likely to adopt OpenID. In our research, we observed that some users were wary about adopting our
email system even though they found it easy to use because the security details were too transparent.

3. The first SUS question reads “I think that I would
like to use this system frequently.” In the poststudy interviews, we determined that users were
giving Pwm lower scores for this question because
they did not feel that they would send secure email
very often, even though they were enthusiastic
about using Pwm whenever they would send secure email. Thus, SUS scores may be negatively
impacted by an important yet infrequent activity, even if the tool for performing that activity is
highly usable.

7.

RELATED WORK

Whitten and Tygar conducted a usability study of
PGP 5.0 in their seminal paper on usable security [19].
It served as a wakeup call to the security community
because a large percentage of users failed to complete
basic tasks installing and using a state-of-the-art secure
email tool. In their study, 3 of the 12 users (25%) mistakenly sent the secret message unencrypted. In our
work, we demonstrated a secure webmail tool with very
high success rates sending encrypted email, but we also
observed a small percentage of users mistakenly sending
out plaintext.
Sheng et al. [15] repeated the Whitten and Tygar user
study with PGP 9.0. They noted some improvements
due to automatic encryption, but they identified a number of problematic issues surrounding key management
and digital signatures. One of their major findings was
that encryption was so transparent that users were unsure whether it had occurred or not. The paper recommends that users be given the option to designate
in advance whether an email is to be encrypted or not.
We designed Pwm to follow this suggestion, but our own
studies indicate that users can still mistakenly send out
a sensitive message without encryption.
Garfinkel and Miller [9] created a secure email system
that combined the idea of Key Continuity Management
(KCM) with S/MIME. They introduced a tool to Outlook Express that would alert users through visual indicators if a sender that had previously sent them secure
email was now sending an email that was not signed
or was signed by a different key. They repeated the
original Johnny experiment with some additional tasks
to test how users reacted to attacks against the KCM
system. Their work demonstrated that automatic key
management provides significant usability compared to
earlier studies that burdened users with key management tasks. They observed that their tool “was a little
too transparent” in how well it integrated with Outlook

8.

CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE
WORK

The contributions of this paper are:

• An overview of the design of Pwm, which layers
encryption over existing webmail solutions using a
novel approach of security overlays that are functionally transparent but visually distinctive. Pwm
is specifically designed to spread in a grass roots
fashion so that a user can send any other user an
encrypted message before the recipient generates
any cryptographic keys or installs any software.
11

• The results of a series of usability studies of Pwm
that compare it to several existing secure email
tools. The systems are compared using a standard
usability metric, System Usability Score (SUS).
Pwm is shown to be highly usable and compares
favorably to the other tools used in the studies.

nificantly more usable than Encipher.it and also helped
users better understand what security was being provided. We then tested MP against Pwm and found evidence that manual encryption can foster greater trust
and reduce user errors. The user studies also revealed
that participants preferred that security systems be
tightly integrated with the browser.
Thus, in the effort to balance security and usability,
we argue that a combination of exposing some encryption details and tight integration will produce a system
that users trust and help them to secure their data without making mistakes.

• Even though most Pwm users in the study encrypted and decrypted messages correctly, a few
users mistakenly sent out secure messages in the
clear. Users were unsure whether to trust the system because security details are too transparent.
We compared Pwm to MP, a mockup that uses
manual encryption. We were surprised that users
rated the usability of MP on par with Pwm. They
had more trust in MP and avoided mistakes. Our
results suggest that designers may want to reconsider manual encryption as a way to reduce transparency and foster greater trust.

8.1

Future Work

We were surprised that users were accepting of the extra effort that manual encryption requires in MP compared to the transparent encryption in Pwm. Even more
significant was the feeling of trust fostered by manual
encryption in MP. We are not yet convinced that MP
should replace Pwm because there was a strong preference for tight integration with the website from a number of users. Also, we believe MP would be unacceptable to users when sensitive information is exchanged so
rapidly (e.g., secure chat) that it would require repeated
switching between applications. Instead, we intend to
combine the advantages of Pwm and MP into a hybrid
system that leverages the strengths of MP in order to
overcome weaknesses in Pwm.
Our experience demonstrates that automatic encryption hides so many details that users are confused about
what precisely is occurring and can sometimes lead users
to mistakenly disclose plaintext when the encryption
option is too similar to no encryption. We plan to
take these lessons learned and apply them to our nextgeneration secure Webmail tool. We plan to support
manual encryption and explore varying degrees of separation in order to eliminate confusion and mistakes. For
example, we plan to add manual encryption to Pwm’s
existing security overlays. Instead of treating encryption and transmission of email as one step, we will have
the compose security overlay produce cipher text, and
then require the users to separately click “Send” on the
webmail interface. Additionally, we will require that
users manually choose to decrypt Pwm email messages
by clicking a button, instead of having this occur automatically.
Another potential way to incorporate manual encryption, but with more separation, would be to move encryption and decryption into a sidebar. This sidebar
would be hosted in a security overlay and would be independent of the underlying website. This independence
would allow it to support all webmail providers, as well
as any other websites that allow users to share text. It
could also work in conjunction with the more integrated
portions of Pwm by becoming the fallback mechanism
used when the more integrated Pwm is unable to parse
a website.
We will experiment with these and similar ideas to
strike a balance between manual encryption/separation
and usability/integration. Hopefully this would raise
the SUS score of Pwm to increase the probability that

Usable secure webmail has been a long unsolved problem. Pwm (Private WebMail) is a system that adds
end-to-end encryption and message integrity to existing webmail systems. Pwm addresses the problem of
usability in secure email in three ways: First, Pwm integrates tightly with existing webmail interfaces, providing functionally transparent interfaces, to relieve the
burden users feel when learning new systems. Second,
Pwm features fully automatic key management that requires no interaction from users. Third, Pwm provides
transparent and automatic encryption, whereby users
can trivially encrypt and sign their messages. Overall, Pwm was designed to maximize usability while still
providing good enough security and is advantageous to
those already sending sensitive information over webmail.
To verify the usability of Pwm we conducted two
IRB-approved user studies with 25 and 32 participants
respectively. In a laboratory setting, the participants
were sent an encrypted email that also contained plaintext instructions on how to set up and use Pwm in order
to read the message. Every participant, except one who
misunderstood the instructions, was able to decrypt and
read the message. The second study included a comparison with Voltage, an existing depot-based email encryption system.
Even though participants gave Pwm high usability
marks, a small but consistent percentage of participants
(approximately 10%) forgot to enable encryption. Some
users did not trust that the system was secure because
the security details (key management and encryption)
were so transparent that they did not have a clear idea
about how the system actually worked. We speculated
that a combination of manual encryption and a clear
separation of duties would help users trust the system
and avoid sending information without encryption. To
test this hypothesis we built Message Protector (MP),
a mockup that included manual encryption in an application separate from the browser.
Using MP, we conducted two more IRB-approved user
studies with 28 and 29 participants respectively. In the
first study we compared MP against an existing secure
data sharing tool, Encipher.it. MP proved to be sig12

users will recommend it to their friends.5 We will conduct further laboratory studies to verify how well our
improved system is trusted and helps users avoid mistakes. Finally, we will then conduct a long-term usability study to determine if our results carry over into the
real world where users would use Pwm to protect their
sensitive data.
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APPENDIX
A. PWM USER STUDIES
A.1

Demographic Questionnaire

A.2

Bookmarklet Tasks

Are you a student?
What is your major?
What is your occupation?
What is your gender?
What is your approximate age?
How long have you been a Gmail user?
Approximately how often do you use Gmail?

Introduction
Thank you for your participation. During this study, you will be asked to perform certain tasks using Gmail and
then provide feedback to help us improve our software. During the course of this study, all acts taking place on the
screen will be recorded along with audio of anything we discuss. This will help us learn whether or not our software
is easy to use. None of the video or audio content captured during the study will be released publicly or given to a
third party. Before beginning the study, we will also ask you to provide some demographic information. None of the
results published as part of this research will personally identify you as a participant.
You will have access to a temporary Gmail account for use in completing tasks during this study. You will not be
asked to use your own Gmail login name or password at any time. Do not enter or access any of your own personal
data during the study since everything on the screen will be recorded.
You will receive $10.00 as compensation for your participation in this study. The expected time commitment is
20-30 minutes. If you feel uncomfortable with any aspect of this study you may quit at any time.
Please advance to the next screen when ready.
Task 1
Please login to our test Gmail account with the login name and password shown below. Read the first message
and follow the instructions given in the message. Close Gmail when you are finished and advance to the next page
of instructions.
Click here to open Gmail
Username: pwmstudy@Gmail.com
Password: pwmusability
Task 2
Please log back into our test Gmail account with the user name and password shown below. Send a secure message
to Gmailstudy@isrl.cs.byu.edu using Pwm. Include the ID number you were given in your message. Wait for a reply
with further instructions.
Click here to open Gmail
Username: pwmstudy@Gmail.com
Password: pwmusability

A.3

Bookmarklet Post-study Survey

SUS Questions:
Please answer the following question about Pwm. Try to give your immediate reaction to each
statement without pausing to think for a long time. Mark the middle column if you don’t have a
response to a particular statement.
Choose from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree).
1. I think that I would like to use this system frequently
2. I found the system unnecessarily complex
3. I thought the system was easy to use
4. I think that I would need the support of a technical person to be able to use this system
5. I found the various functions in this system were well integrated
6. I thought there was too much inconsistency in this system
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7. I found the system very cumbersome to use
8. I would imagine that most people would learn to use this system very quickly
9. I felt very confident using the system
10. I needed to learn a lot of things before I could get going with this system
Remaining Questions:
Please give your response to the following general statements. Try to give your immediate reaction
to each statement without pausing to think for a long time. Mark the middle column if you don’t
have a response to a particular statement.
Choose from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree).
1. I trust Gmail with my sensitive email messages
2. I am concerned about Gmail scanning my messages
3. I feel safe sending important information through email
4. I worry that some messages aren’t really from who they say they are from
5. I found the bookmarklet easy to use (The button you dragged to your toolbar is called a bookmarklet)
Have you used a bookmarklet before this study?
What did you like about Pwm?
What did you dislike about Pwm and how would you like it to be changed?
Have you ever been asked to send sensitive information you were not comfortable sending through
email?
What type of sensitive information were you asked to send?
Did you send the requested information?
Have you ever received information you were not comfortable receiving through email?
What type of sensitive information did you receive?
If you started using Pwm on your own, would you prefer protection for new messages to be? Choose
one: Always on; Only on for the message that was open when you clicked "Secure my Email"; Off, unless I click a
separate button on the Gmail page

A.4

Extension Post-study Survey

Please answer the following question about Pwm. Try to give your immediate reaction to each statement without pausing to think for a long time. Mark the middle column if you don’t have a response
to a particular statement.
Choose from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree).
Same SUS questions from A.3.
What did you like about Pwm?
What did you dislike about Pwm and how would you like it to be changed?
Other comments on Pwm

A.5

Additional Post-study Questions

Please answer the following general statements. Try to give your immediate reaction to each statement
without pausing to think for a long time. Mark the middle column if you don’t have a response to a
particular statement.
Choose from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree).
1. I trust Gmail with my sensitive email messages
2. I am concerned about Gmail scanning my messages
3. I worry that some messages aren’t really from who they say they are from
4. I feel safe sending important information through email
5. I feel safe creating accounts with usernames and passwords on new sites
6. I feel safe installing browser extensions or plugins
7. Creating accounts for new websites is easy
8. Installing browser extensions is easy
9. I feel safe clicking on links in email messages
10. I feel safe clicking on links in email messages from people I know
11. I never click on links in email messages
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Have you installed browser extensions, add-ons or plugins before today?
What has prevented you from installing browser extensions, add-ons or plugins in the past?
When deciding whether you will trust a browser extension, add-on or plugin, what influences your
decision?
Have you ever been asked to send sensitive information you were not comfortable sending through
email?
What type of sensitive information were you asked to send?
Did you send the requested information?
Have you ever received information you were not comfortable receiving through email?
What type of sensitive information did you receive?

B.

MESSAGE PROTECTOR USER STUDIES

B.1

Demographic questions

B.2

Study Introduction

B.3

Message Protector Tasks

What is your age?
What is your gender?
What is your major?
How do you rate your level of computer expertise?
How often do you use webmail?
How often do you use Facebook?
Have you ever sent private or sensitive information via Web email or Facebook?
How did you send that information Select all that apply: Web email; Facebook private message; Facebook wall
post; Instant message; Other (please specify below):
How important is maintaining the privacy of your messages containing sensitive information? Very
important; Important; Neither important nor unimportant; Unimportant; Very unimportant
Have you ever encrypted an email or Facebook message?
Purpose
The purpose of this study is to compare two Internet encryption systems, Message Protector (MP) and Encipher.
What to Expect
In the study, you will attempt a set of tasks that Internet users regularly perform. You will do each set of tasks
twice, once with MP and once with Encipher. Following the completion of each set, you will complete a survey about
your experience with the application. During this study, all actions taking place on the screen will be recorded along
with audio content of anything we discuss, however we will not record video of you. This will help us to analyze our
software’s usability. None of the video or audio content recorded during the study will be released publicly or given
to third parties. Prior to the study beginning you will complete a short survey about yourself. None of the results
published as part of this research will personally identify you as a participant.
Introduction
MP and Encipher are programs that allow Internet users to encrypt text that they communicate through websites.
In this study you will perform common Internet tasks with MP and Encipher. This study will take about 45 minutes.
Try to perform each task as quickly and accurately as you can. If you get stuck at any point, please call the proctor
for assistance. You will receive $10.00 as compensation for your participation in this study. If you feel uncomfortable
with any aspect of this study, you may quit at any time. Thank you for participating!
Message Protector Tasks
Message Protector (MP) is a computer program that allows users to protect Internet messages (e.g., email, Facebook private messages) via encryption. In this portion of the study, you will execute various tasks that comprise the
primary functionality of MP and answer a few related questions.
Scenario 1: Installation
In this scenario, you will install MP on a computer. Please follow the instructions as closely as possible.
Scenario 1 Task 1: MP Installation
Access http://MessageProtector and follow the instructions in section 1 “Installing Message Protector.”
MP requires an email address and the email account password to allow the user’s contacts to be able to read their
protected messages. For this study, we have created the following test account for you to use:
Email Address: userstudyMP@Gmail.com
Password: mpUserStud
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Allow the following contacts to read your protected messages: randomFriend@hotmail.com,
mom@familyWebsite.com, recipientMP@Gmail.com, stalwartStudent@byu.edu
Scenario 2: Gmail
In this scenario, you will encrypt and decrypt email messages with MP. Open Chrome and click the Gmail bookmark on the Favorites bar. A test account will already be logged in.
Scenario 2 Task 1: MP Email Encryption
Access http://MessageProtector and follow the instructions in section 2 “Encrypting Messages” to send an email
to recipientMP@Gmail.com. Include the phrase “The last four digits of my SSN is 6789” in the message.
Scenario 2 Task 2: MP Email Decryption
After completing the previous task, you will receive a protected reply email from recipientMP@Gmail.com. Access
http://MessageProtector and follow the instructions in section 3 “Decrypt Message” to decrypt the protected message.
Type the decrypted message below:
Scenario 3: Facebook Private Message
In this scenario, you will encrypt and decrypt Facebook private messages with MP. Open Chrome and click the
Facebook bookmark on the Favorites bar. A test account will already be logged in.
Scenario 3 Task 1: MP Private Message Encryption
Access http://MessageProtector and follow the instructions in section 2 “Encrypting Messages” to send an encrypted Facebook private message to the user study account’s friend named “Alice Jones.” Include the phrase “My
bank account password is cougars” in the message.
Scenario 3 Task 2: MP Private Message Decryption
After completing the previous task, you will receive a reply private message from “Alice Jones”. Access
http://MessageProtector and follow the instructions in section 3 “Decrypting Messages” to decrypt the protected
message.
Type the decrypted message below:
Finished
This concludes the Message Protector portion of the study. Please answer the questions below about your experience. Please record your immediate response to each question. If you feel that you cannot respond to a particular
question, please mark the center point of the scale.

B.4

Message Protector Post-study Survey

Please answer the following question about Voltage. Try to give your immediate reaction to each
statement without pausing to think for a long time. Mark the middle column if you don’t have a
response to a particular statement.
Choose from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree).
Same SUS questions from A.3.
My level of understanding of MP directly affects whether I would use it to protect my email and Facebook messages.
Who can read messages that you protect with MP? Choose one: Anyone that has MP installed, receives the
message, and that I have selected to communicate with securely; Anyone who receives the message and who I have
selected to communicate with securely; Anyone who receives the message; Anyone who has MP installed; I don’t know
After MP is installed, what actions must recipients take to read MP protected messages? Choose one:
Access the MP website; Copy the message and paste to MP; Copy the message, paste to MP, click the Encrypt button;
Copy the message, paste to MP, click the Decrypt button; I don’t know
How often would you use MP to protect your email and Facebook messages? Choose one: Always; Very
Often; Occasionally; Rarely; Very Rarely; Never
What did you like about MP?
How could MP be improved Select all that apply: Provide better operating instructions; Provide more information
about MP to the user; Provide an easier way to select trusted contacts; Provide a more intuitive user interface; Provide
a less intrusive or cumbersome experience; Other (please specify below):

B.5

Additional Post-study Survey Questions

Please answer the following question about Voltage. Try to give your immediate reaction to each
statement without pausing to think for a long time. Mark the middle column if you don’t have a
response to a particular statement.
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Choose from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree).
I feel that it is important to encrypt my emails and Facebook messages that contain sensitive or private information
I would use a different Internet Encryption tool for every website that I store or share sensitive information
I trust Gmail employees to not disclose, misuse, or abuse my email and Facebook messages
I trust Facebook employees to not disclose, misuse, or abuse my email and Facebook messages
I would trust a company other than Facebook or Gmail (i.e., Encipher, MP) to protect my email and Facebook
messages
Which system would you prefer to use? Choose one: Message Protector; Encipher; Both; Neither
Please explain your answer to the previous question:

B.6

Survey Responses
Table 1: Encipher.it Comparison Study Results

Preferred System
Message Protector
Encipher
Message Protector
Neither

Neither
Encipher
Message Protector

Message Protector
Message Protector
Message Protector
Message Protector
Message Protector
Message Protector
Encipher
Encipher
Message Protector
Encipher

Encipher

Reason
I had trouble decrypting the messages when using Encipher.
I felt I understood how Encipher works more clearly. Also, I liked having the bookmark
tab available.
The program was easy to use and did not require any kind of key.
I felt that anyone with Message Protector would decipher my emails so there is no point
in encrypting them. / Encipher was a little clunky. I don’t understand how I would set
up a passcode and how the receiver would know what it was / Plus I don’t send private
information that frequently.
Both were too complicated. I probably wouldn’t use either because it takes too much
time and i would just take the risk of me getting my stuff stolen
Encipher is easier to use even though the person receiving the message has to have the
encryption key.
Encipher didn’t work either time and was slow. I think it would be easier than message
protector though as it is already integrated into the website and i dont have to leave the
page I am on. So I like the idea of encipher better but since it didn’t work for me, I am
biased to MP
It felt safer. Encipher just felt like a pop-up that I should block and I wasn’t sure why
it was safe or how I would get the security key thing or give it to the people I would
want to see my private message.
Message protector is most easy to use i like it!!!
IT is easy to use
I have a hard time remembering passwords, and I don’t really understand how I could
send a password privately to the recipient of an encrypted message via Encipher it.
Message Protector was simpler for me to understand and use.
I liked that I didn’t need to specify an encryption key in Message Protector and my
secure contacts were already recognized by the computer.
Unlike Encipher, it doesn’t require a new key each time you want to encrypt or decrypt
a message.
I didn’t have to load my contacts into it. You also need a decryption key from the
sender, so you can’t just decrypt it if you have the program, like Message Protector
allows you to do.
Encipher is already integrated into the internet so it’s much more convenient to use. I
would use message protector if I wasn’t in an HTPPS website.
Just was eaiser to use. No password needed, and I felt that it was more secure.
Encipher is a quick and easy tab that requires everytime a new password that can be
complex. That’s it. you use the tab, you use a password. that simple. MP requires
installing something and going from window to window, and someone can decipher your
messages with your email and email password, or your contact’s email or email password.
Most people don’t have that complex passwords and so I would be concerned a bit with
Personal Information. Encipher uses a whole new level of protection.
I think that Encipher is better because it has you pick your secure contact every time.
With the MP, you could accidentally send sensitive info to one of your ’safe’ contacts,
but not the one that you wanted to see that info. Encipher is more user friendly.
Continued on next page
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Preferred System
Encipher
Message Protector
Message Protector
Both
Encipher
Both

Message Protector

Encipher
Both
Both

Table 1 – continued from previous page
Reason
Even though Encipher requires a decryption key, it doesn’t require pasting your message
into a separate window.
Easier and cleaner experience. It didn’t take me even half the time to figure out how to
use this as it did with Encipher.
They both are nice. I like the toolbar aspect of Encipher, but did not like that the
encryption key did not work for me on the first task.
I can send protected messages to all my friends who have the key but not only with
some limited contacts.
If I have to send some private information over the internet, it’s most likely that I would
do so with my father who is not very good at using computer. Encipher would be easier
for him to start with. If he gets used to it, I would switch to Message Protector. Also,
I can use Encipher at any computer with the least effort-just adding to favorites. It’s
extremely convenient. However with other people who are good at computer, I would
use Message Protector right away. And if I have to send a very important message, I
would use Message Protector, since I feel like it’s a more secured program.
I don’t know if it was me, but I couldn’t make the Encipher program decrypt the
messages. However, I worked with Message Protector much better and I was able to
decrypt the message. However, I feel Encipher has a better idea in just simply typing
in a password instead of copying and pasting. If Encrypt would’ve worked for me I
would’ve liked it more because of the simplicity.
more protection. I could forget who I selected from my contacts if I use message protector.
Enchipher was quicker and easier, but Message Protector was easier to do without
contacting the sender/recipient for a password which I feel is a plus.
With important sensitive information, such as my SSN or Bank account number and
password, I would use MP because the fact alone that it requires a download and then a
separate window from the conversation makes it feel more secure, although it probably
has no actual security difference. With more routine information, such as the fact
that I can’t stand my untrustworthy boss, I would use Encipher because it is fast and
conveniently located in the bookmarks bar, rather than requiring that I open a program
I have saved somewhere on my computer. / / On top of this, if I were to have a long
conversation, all of which I would like to have encrypted, I would use MP because it
requires less time to function and to carry out operations. However for a quick encrypted
message, I would use Encipher becasue it is more convenient than opening a separate
program.

Table 2: Pwm Comparison Study Results
Preferred System
Both
Message Protector

Both
Pwm
Pwm

Reason
I like the encryption for the Message Protector, but it is not as convenient as Pwm since
it is right in Gmail.
The reason i would prefer Message Protector is because it seemed more reliable and
safe. There seamed to be a more secure connection between you and the recipient due
to the fact that you had to add the secure email. I’m not sure how it works and that
not just any one can decrypt your message with the same software. I think that PWM
is defiantly easier to use but doesn’t seem as secure. If i am wanting to encrypt some
content I would take a little but longer to make sure that it is safe
They both seemed effective and useful. I would use the system that others are using.
Pwm was integrated into Gmail which I use and many of my friends as well.
I liked MP, but Pwm being directly in the email makes it more user friendly and less of
a hassle.
Continued on next page
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Preferred System
Message Protector

Pwm

Pwm
Message Protector
Pwm
Pwm
Pwm
Pwm
Both

Both
Pwm
Message
Message
Message
Message

Protector
Protector
Protector
Protector

Both
Pwm

Message Protector
Message Protector
Message Protector
Pwm
Message Protector

Message Protector
Pwm

C.

Table 2 – continued from previous page
Reason
Message Protector gives me a reason to believe that my message was actually encrypted.
Pwm, on the other hand, was very easy to use, but seemed almost too easy. I can still
read my message after encrypting, which makes me think that perhaps it wasn’t actually
encrypted.
I would use Pwm simply because it’s an extension easily integrated into Gmail. It
required little customization, just a simple click of the button. However, I felt a little
more confident that I was using MP correctly and that it was encrypting my messages.
My choice is mostly out of design and convenience, trusting that both programs do the
task effectively.
Mainly because I don’t have to have to separate windows to encrypt/decrypt stuff. It
just seems less of a hassle when it’s built into the Gmail system.
Although MP was a little (not by much) more difficult to use, I can be certain of who
is able to view the encrypted data.
I found it faster and easier for the program to encrypt and decrypt messages for me
than copying and pasting it myself.
It was simpler, and easier to use.
Much more convenient. MP is too much of a hassle, although if it was more secure than
Pwm, I might use it, but I would still use it much less than Pwm.
Pwm was much easier to use and the instructions were easier to understand.
Depending on who I was corresponding with, I may switch between encrypting programs.
It seems useful, but it may require the other party to have some decrypting program
installed, which is not very convenient for banks or places that I might be sending
messages to.
I would use both because I am not very educated on either of them. I would want to
use both to see which would become more comfortable for me. When I understood more
about them I could then decide which was more effective for me.
I like Pwm’s integration right into the browser. The only fault is that you only see the
encryption after it has been sent, so if it fails, your information isn’t encrypted.
I found message protector to be a little easier to understand
It was easier to use and had much better instructions.
See the reasons stated before for using MP - offline encryption, more intuitive, etc
Even though it is slightly more difficult to use, it seemed more secure. I also liked that
you could choose what contacts could communicate with.
Pwm is much easier to use.... but Message Protector seems like it might be safer in only
letting certain people see it? DEfinitely prefer pwm if it’s just as secure.
I would prefer Pwm, because you don’t have to copy and paste your message, then press
the encrypt or decrypt button, as you need to do with MP. I think that it is easier just to
have pwm enabled, which is a lot faster and smoother, and it just protects your message
for you, without needing to encrypt the message manually.
It’s much easier to use, and makes more sense than Pwm. I like that you can see all the
steps of what you’re doing, so you feel more in control of the process.
Pwm didn’t work for me.
MP had a simpler design and was much more user friendly. ( i felt like i was in a catch-22
with Pwm.)
PWM requires fewer steps and was less complicated to me.
I feel that Pwm, as a Gmail extension would be easy for anyone to get. If I were to
send sensitive information to the wrong address, to my understanding the could simply
install the extension and view it. With MP, they not only need a 2nd party program
installed, (one not as easily located) and I would need to have them on my selected
contact list. It feels safer.
Though it was slightly more complex in the set up I personally found it more easy to
use. I like that I could see that it was encrypted.
It’s easier than Message protector.

BANGOR’S SUS SCALE
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Figure 1: An adjective oriented interpretation of SUS scores [2]
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ABSTRACT

INTRODUCTION

Private Webmail 2.0 (Pwm 2.0) improves upon the
current state of the art by increasing the usability
and practical security of secure email for ordinary
users. More users are able to send and receive encrypted emails without mistakenly revealing sensitive information. In this paper we describe user interface traits that positively affect the usability and
security of Pwm 2.0: (1) an artificial delay to encryption that enhances user confidence in Pwm 2.0
while simultaneously instructing users on who can
read their encrypted messages; (2) a modified composition interface that helps protect users from mistakenly sending sensitive information in the clear;
(3) an annotated secure email composition interface that instructs users on how to correctly use
secure email; and (4) inline, context-sensitive tutorials, which improved view rates for tutorials from
less than 10% in earlier systems to over 90% for
Pwm 2.0. In a user study involving 51 participants
we validate these interface modifications, and also
show that the use of manual encryption has no effect on usability or security.

Recent measurements demonstrate that email is
largely insecure [8, 6, 11]. Although adoption
of connection-based encryption and authentication is increasing (i.e., STARTTLS, SPF, DKIM,
DMARC), these technologies are often configured
incorrectly and have weaknesses that render them
susceptible to attacks. However, even if transmission of email was properly secured, email at rest is
generally unencrypted, leaving email open to scanning by an honest-but-curious email provider or by
a government that coerces an email provider into
allowing access. End-to-end encryption provides
email with much stronger protection. With end-toend encryption, the sender encrypts email messages
before transferring them to the email provider, ensuring that no one but the intended recipients is
able to read the messages.
Unfortunately, usable secure email is still an open
problem more than 15 years after Whitten and
Tygar’s seminal paper, Why Johnny Can’t Encrypt [26].1 Arguably the most secure form of endto-end encryption is PGP, but PGP has continually
been shown to be unusable [26, 21, 15]. More recently, research has shown that by relaxing the security requirements of PGP, it is possible to create
usable, secure email [10, 16, 1]. While these newer
systems have lower theoretical security than PGP,
they have higher practical security—i.e., using these
new tools, ordinary users are able to encrypt their
email, something that they are largely unable to do
with PGP-based tools.
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Of these usable, secure email systems, Private Webmail (Pwm) is specifically targeted at helping the
masses encrypt their existing webmail accounts,
such as those provided by Google, Yahoo, and Microsoft. A set of user studies of Pwm demonstrated
that it had significantly higher usability than similar secure webmail systems (Encipher.it and Voltage
Mail [16]). Still, in this evaluation of Pwm about
a tenth of participants accidentally sent email in
the clear when they meant to encrypt it, and many
1
We note that S/MIME is widely used in certain organizations (e.g., US government), but this adoption has
not spread to the masses.

and sending the message in one step (automatic
encryption).

more users were unsure of the security provided by
Pwm.
In this paper, we describe an improved interface
design for Pwm that addresses issues raised in the
original studies. First, we added an artificial delay
to encryption that enhances user’s confidence in the
strength of the message encryption while simultaneously instructing users on who can read encrypted
messages. Second, we modified the email composition interfaces to better ensure that users understand which emails are encrypted and help them
avoid mistakenly sending plaintext in the clear.
Third, we annotated the encrypted email composition interface to help users understand how to correctly use secure email. Finally, we implemented
inline, context-sensitive tutorials, which improved
view rates for tutorials from less than 10% for Pwm
to over 90% in some cases for Pwm 2.0. Through
a user study involving 51 participants, we demonstrate that our new design, referred to as Pwm 2.0,
is significantly more usable and secure than Pwm.

BACKGROUND

In this section, we review related work for secure
email and automatic vs. manual encryption. We
then describe the threat model that motivates our
work. Finally, we describe the original Private Webmail system.
Related Work

Whitten and Tygar [26] conducted the first formal
user study of a secure email system (i.e., PGP 5).
They found serious usability issues with key management and users’ understanding of the underlying public key cryptography. Subsequent studies
of newer PGP-based clients have shown that PGP
tools are still unusable for the masses [21, 15].
Garfinkel et al. [10] conducted a usability study
of secure email based on S/MIME, and observed
that hiding encryption details can impact usability. For example, they found that because the integration of encryption into Outlook Express “was
a little too transparent,” users were often unsure
whether a given email was encrypted. Additionally,
they found that some users failed to read the instructions associated with various visual indicators,
leading to difficulties in understanding the interface.
Still, they found that automating key management
increased the overall usability of secure email.

Our main contributions are as follows:
1. We describe the interface modifications we used
to build Pwm 2.0. Our user study demonstrates
that these modifications had a significant impact
on the usability and security of Pwm 2.0, as compared to the original Pwm system. Moreover, we
discuss user reactions to these interface modifications and lessons learned from our study.

Fahl et al. [7] explored manual and automatic encryption in the design of a Facebook Chat system.
Here, automatic encryption refers to encrypting and
sending a message without explicitly demonstrating that encryption has occurred, whereas manual
encryption shows the user ciphertext and requires
them to manually send this ciphertext. Their user
study demonstrated that users reported preferring
automatic key management, but found no significant difference between automatic and manual encryption. Nevertheless, they raised the issue that
automatic encryption could impact users’ feelings
of trust and recommended the issue be addressed
in future work.

2. Pwm 2.0 scores an 80.0 on the System Usability
Scale (SUS), rating in the “excellent” category for
usability and receiving an “A” grade. This score
is in the 87th percentile for system usability [18]
and is the highest SUS score for secure email to
date. Moreover, over 80% of users wanted to immediately begin using Pwm 2.0, and over 90%
felt that their friends and family could use Pwm
2.0 with relative ease.
3. We show that with Pwm 2.0 users rarely send
plaintext messages when they meant to encrypt
the message. Out of 306 tasks, only six mistakes
were made using Pwm 2.0 (2%), a significant improvement to Pwm’s rate of about 10%. In addition, the majority of users understood the confidentiality, authenticity, and integrity Pwm 2.0
provided their messages (84%, 63%, 76%, respectively).

Ruoti et al. [16] conducted a series of user studies
with Private Webmail (Pwm), a secure email prototype that tightly integrates with Gmail. Even
though results showed the system to be quite usable, they found that some users made mistakes
and were hesitant to trust the system since the automatic encryption was too transparent. They also
conducted a study comparing Pwm to a desktop application (MP) that supported manual encryption.
They found that participants using MP’s manual
encryption made fewer mistakes and answered more
questions correctly on a quiz that tested their understanding of the system. However, there are significant differences between Pwm and MP, which

4. As part of our study, we split users into two
groups: one that used an automatic-encryption
version of Pwm 2.0, and one that used a manualencryption version of Pwm 2.0. Our results
demonstrate that, contrary to the findings of the
original Pwm study [16], requiring a user to view
their encrypted message before sending it (manual encryption) has no benefit over encrypting
2

are confounding factors in Ruoti et al.’s results. In
this paper, we also examine the differences between
automatic and manual encryption, but do so using
two variants of our Pwm 2.0 system that only differ in regards to the use of automatic and manual
encryption.

4. Adversary. The adversary is free to eavesdrop
on any communication between users, webmail
providers, and key servers.4 Additionally, the adversary can attempt to compromise the webmail
provider or key server. The adversary wins if she
is able to use these resources to access the plaintext contents of the encrypted email body.

Atwater et al. [1] have also examined the question
of automatic and manual encryption brought up
by Ruoti et al.’s study. They created two version
of a tool based on Mailvelope, and these versions
only differed in their usage of manual and automatic encryption. They found that manual encryption had no statistically significant effect on participants’ trust of their secure email system. Their
work differs from ours in that they examined the
question of trust whereas we are looking at understanding and mistakes, the two pivotal points from
the original Pwm study. In addition, though Atwater et al. demonstrate usability with a PGP-based
client, the system they simulated does not include
several practical key management steps that users
would be required to perform, limiting the applicability of its results.

We do not consider attacks directly against the
user or trusted computing base (i.e., phishing credentials, installing malicious software). Similarly,
we do not consider an attacker who can compromise fundamental networking primitives (i.e., TLS,
DNS). While these are valid concerns, if the attacker can accomplish these types of attacks, then
they can already do far more damage than they
could by breaking the secure email system. We also
note that data needed by the webmail provider to
transmit email (e.g., recipient addresses) cannot be
encrypted, and may be available to the adversary
(e.g., this information is passed over an unencrypted
channel). Our threat model instead focuses on ensuring the data in the encrypted body is safe from
an attacker.
To steal the user’s sensitive data, the adversary
must obtain both the encrypted email and the key
material needed to decrypt the email. The former can be accomplished by either compromising
the webmail provider, or intercepting an encrypted
email that is not transmitted using TLS. The latter
can be accomplished by compromising the IBE key
server. Just as the adversary must collect the data
from both the webmail provider and key server, neither of these parties alone has enough information
to unilaterally steal the user’s sensitive data. While
as honest-but-curious parties, these two entities will
not collude, a government could subpoena both organizations and compromise a user’s sensitive data.
If this is a significant concern, it is possible to apply a thresholding scheme to the IBE key server and
place the various key servers in different localities
that for political reasons will not cooperate.5

Threat Model

In our threat model there are four entities:
1. User. The user’s computer, operating system,
and secure email software are considered part of
the trusted computing base.
2. Webmail provider. We consider the webmail
provider as an honest-but-curious party.2 The
webmail provider has access to the users’ encrypted messages, but not to the keys that encrypt those messages.
3. IBE Key server. Key management in Pwm
uses Identity-Based Encryption (IBE) [20]. In
IBE, a user’s public key can be computed using
public parameters from the IBE key server and
the user’s identity (e.g., email address). To retrieve the private key for a given identity, a user
proves ownership of the appropriate identity, and
then the key server will generate and send the
private key to the user.3

While our threat model is more permissive than the
traditional PGP threat model, it is nonetheless useful in a variety of situations. For example, it satisfies the typical case where a small business or a
university has outsourced its email to a third-party
service provider such as Google, but does not trust
Google with sensitive data. The business or university does, however, trust a browser extension that it
has vetted and a key server that it operates. Alternatively, our threat model allows every-day users

We consider the IBE key server as an honest-butcurious party. While the key server is responsible
for generating a user’s private key, it does not
have access to the messages encrypted with those
keys.
2
An honest-but-curious party will gather any information available to them (e.g., Gmail scans email messages), but will not attempt to break the secure email
system (e.g., impersonating the user to the key server)
or collude with other honest-but-curious parties).
3
Private keys are not stored on the key server, but
rather generated on demand based on a master secret.
For added security, this secret can be stored inside of a
crypto-card.

4
In nearly all cases, this communication will be encrypted using TLS, and the adversary only has access
to the encrypted packets.
5
Alternatively, the IBE key server could roll over its
keys on a regular (e.g., daily) basis, limiting the amount
of time an adversary or a government has to steal the
user’s sensitive data.
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a per-message basis by clicking a lock icon inserted
next to the “Send” button at the bottom of the
compose interface.
In Pwm, users are authenticated to the IBE key
server using Simple Authentication for the Web
(SAW) [24], a form of email-based authentication
[9]. Since Pwm runs inside the user’s Gmail session, it is able to complete authentication automatically and does not need to prompt the user for
input. It should be noted that because Pwm authenticates to the IBE key server using email, if an
adversary were to compromise the user’s webmail
account they would also be able to authenticate to
the key server. This means that messages encrypted
with Pwm are only as secure as the user’s webmail
account. Ruoti et al. took this approach in order
to maximize usability and because it still provides
greater security than currently available to webmail
users [8, 6, 11]. If greater security is needed, the IBE
key server could be modified to authenticate users
by some other means (e.g., separate password, twofactor authentication).

Figure 1. The read interface for an encrypted email.

to easily encrypt sensitive email, preventing their
webmail providers from storing, scanning, or accidentally leaking sensitive information. Regardless,
the model provides greater assurance than currently
available through vanilla SMTP [6].
Private Webmail (Pwm)

Pwm implements secure email through tight integration with Gmail and leverages automatic key
management. When users read or compose secure
email, Pwm replaces portions of Gmail’s interface
with Pwm’s own secure interface. Pwm’s interfaces are styled differently than Gmail’s, providing a
clear demarcation of which information is being protected by Pwm. Pwm’s interfaces are implemented
using security overlays [25]. Security overlays allow
Pwm’s interfaces to be visually integrated within
Gmail’s interface, while still protecting the content
of Pwm’s overlays from Gmail.6

USABILITY IMPROVEMENTS

We used an iterative design methodology to address
problems with Pwm’s original interface. For each
problem, we brainstormed several potential solutions and evaluated each solution using cognitive
walkthroughs and heuristic evaluations. The most
promising solutions were then implemented in prototypes, and these prototypes were evaluated with
pilot usability studies conducted with a convenience
sample from friends, family, and students. Those
solutions that were rated as helpful in our pilot usability studies were then implemented in our Pwm
2.0 system. The source for Pwm 2.0 can be found
at https://bitbucket.org/isrlemail/pwm.

All secure email sent using Pwm includes instructions on how to setup Pwm for first-time users. The
setup instructions direct new users to the Pwm website, where they are able to add a bookmarklet to
their browser’s bookmark storage.7 The new user
then returns to Gmail and clicks on the Pwm bookmarklet to run Pwm. The benefits of using a bookmarklet to run Pwm include not requiring installation permission on the machine and also avoiding
any user worries related to installing extensions [16].
The drawback is that users are required to click
on the Pwm bookmarklet each time they reopen
Gmail.

In the remainder of this section, we describe the
most relevant solutions that were added to Pwm
2.0.
Delayed Encryption

One concern expressed by a significant portion of
participants in the original Pwm study [16] was that
Pwm encrypted email so quickly that participants
were unsure if Pwm had really done anything. Also,
participants indicated the encryption process was so
invisible that they were unsure who could read their
encrypted email message.

When Pwm is running, secure email messages are
automatically decrypted for users. The decrypted
contents of the message are displayed in place of the
instructions and ciphertext that were in the email
message’s body (Figure 1).8 Encrypted email messages in the user’s inbox are marked as Encrypted
(Figure 2). Pwm allows users to add encryption on

To address both of these problems we added an artificial delay after users click the Send encrypted or
Encrypt buttons. For each email recipient, users are
shown a message lasting 1.5 seconds that states the
email is being encrypted for that user (e.g., “Encrypting for bob@gmail.com”). This helps users
understand who will be able to read the encrypted

6

This prevents Gmail from being curious and scanning
the contents of encrypted emails.
7
A bookmarklet is a browser bookmark that contains
executable JavaScript. This JavaScript is run on the
page that users are viewing when the bookmark is
clicked.
8
Screenshots in this section are of Pwm 2.0.
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Figure 2. An encrypted email in the inbox

Figure 3. Gmail compose interface before enabling
encryption
Figure 4. Pwm’s compose interface

email and also lets them feel that something substantial has happened during the encryption process.9 Because most email messages have a small
number of recipients, this artificial delay does not
significantly impact the overall email experience.
Compose Interface

Figure 5. Style of the tutorial window

In the original studies, about 10% of users accidentally sent a sensitive email without first encrypting it. In each case, the user recognized that they
had made a mistake immediately after hitting the
send button, but unfortunately their sensitive information had already been transmitted in the clear.
Moreover, many users initially composed their sensitive emails in plaintext, only encrypting them
right before sending the message, allowing Gmail
to scan their message as it was being typed.

plaintext greetings that are included with the encrypted email (Figure 1 and Figure 4).10 The greeting can help engender trust in a new user that receives an encrypted email, giving them confidence
to setup and use Pwm 2.0. It also provides context for encrypted email messages before they are
decrypted.
Tutorials

To address both of these issues, we revised Pwm
2.0’s compose interface to better conform to the flow
of composing email messages in Gmail (i.e., moving
from top to bottom). As part of this process, we
added informative text at the top of the compose
interface (before the data entry sections) that indicates to users whether their message is being encrypted, then allows them to enable encryption before they begin composing their message (Figure 3).
When encryption is enabled, we modify the informative text to make it clear that the message is
now being encrypted (Figure 4). Furthermore, we
modified Gmail’s Send button to read Send unencrypted, to make it clear to users that by default
their messages are sent without encryption.

Several of the problems encountered by participants
in the original studies could have been avoided if
they had viewed the included video tutorial. As
participants were clearly uninterested in reading
the instructions or watching a video on the Pwm
website, we replaced these with integrated, contextsensitive tutorials in Pwm 2.0. These tutorials provide step-by-step instructions on how to use Pwm
2.0, are displayed the first time a user performs a
new action, and are shown directly to the side of
the interface the user is currently using. Each step
in the tutorials uses simple language and instructs
the user about a single feature of Pwm 2.0 (Figure 5). Some tutorial steps require explicit action
from users before they can move on to the next
step, helping users internalize correct behavior (Figure 6). The tutorials are as follows:

To help users better understand how Pwm 2.0 protects their emails, we modified the placeholder text
for the Recipients and Subject fields, explaining
how Pwm 2.0 uses these two fields (Figure 4). Also,
we added functionality allowing users to compose

1. Introduction. This tutorial is shown to users
the first time they run Pwm 2.0. It informs users
that Pwm 2.0 will help protect their email and

9
Future work could examine the effect of removing this
delay for experienced users who already have a correct
understanding of the system’s functionality.

10

This feature was first suggested by Ruoti et al. [16],
but was not actually implemented.
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Figure 6. Tutorial waiting for action from the user

tells them how to identify whether Pwm 2.0 is
running.
2. Read. The first time users read an encrypted
email message, they are shown this tutorial. The
tutorial shows users how to identify an encrypted
email, explains the plaintext greeting, and identifies which portions of the email message were
encrypted. Additionally, it informs them that
email messages encrypted with Pwm 2.0 are provided authenticity and confidentiality (even from
Gmail).

Figure 7. Ciphertext shown to users after manual
encryption

3. Compose. The first time users compose an
email message while Pwm 2.0 is running, they
are given the option to watch a tutorial describing how to compose encrypted email. This tutorial teaches users the correct order of operations
for composing an encrypted email. It also informs
them about who can read their message, the purpose of the optional greeting, and where to type
sensitive information.

This section gives an overview of our IRB-approved
user study that evaluated Pwm 2.0. This study
was also used to run a between-subjects A/B
test comparing automatic and manual encryption.
The data from this study is available at https:
//uist2016.isrl.byu.edu.
We were careful to design the study to test a generic
secure email system, rather than specifically testing
Pwm 2.0. This approach helps us to feel more confident that participants were interacting with Pwm
2.0 in a realistic fashion. To help with this goal,
we included researchers who are not involved in our
secure email research in designing the scenarios and
tasks. After creating scenarios and tasks that were
acceptable to all parties, we then conducted a pilot
study with three participants. We did not identify
any significant flaws during the pilot study.

Look and Feel

We designed a new website for helping users install
Pwm 2.0.11 This website has a more professional
look and feel than the original Pwm website. This
change was made in reaction to user comments that
they decide how much they trust a tool based on
how professional the tool’s website looks. To make
Pwm 2.0 also feel more professional, we standardized its look and feel to use the same colors and
styles as the website.

Study Setup

The study ran for two weeks (February 17, 2015
through March 3, 2015) and included 52 participants that were randomly assigned to test either
the automatic or manual encryption version of Pwm
2.0.12 Participants took 30 to 60 minutes to complete the study and were compensated $10 USD for
their efforts.

Automatic and Manual Encryption

The original version of Pwm automatically encrypts
and sends email as soon as the user clicks Send encrypted (Figure 4). We created a manual encryption version that splits this operation into two distinct steps. In the first step, instead of clicking the
Send encrypted button, the user instead clicks the
Encrypt button. Upon doing so, the user’s email
message is encrypted, and both the instructions for
decrypting the email message and the encrypted ciphertext are shown to the user inside Gmail’s compose interface (Figure 7). This allows the user to
confirm that encryption has actually taken place. In
the second step, the user then clicks Gmail’s Send
button to send the encrypted email.

Studies were conducted in a room dedicated for this
study. When participants first entered the room,
they were read a brief introduction to the study.
For the remainder of the study, all instructions
12

Our power analysis (α = 0.05, β = 0.80) indicated
that we would need 23 participants in each treatment
group to reasonably detect differences in SUS scores and
task completion time. In contrast, our power analysis revealed that detecting even medium sized (10%)
differences in our proportional measures would require
387 participants in each treatment group (far beyond
our group’s ability to recruit participants). As such,
the proportional measures should only be evaluated as
trends, and not as statistically significant.

METHODOLOGY
11

https://pwm.byu.edu
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were written and provided to them, either via a
printed information sheet or via email. Participants
completed all tasks on a virtual machine, ensuring
that the computer started in the exact same state
for all participants. We also recorded participants’
screens.

a new job, and (2) sending credit card information
to a spouse. Prior to beginning each scenario, participants were provided with a written description of
the scenario. This description included information
that participants should send in place of their own
personal information.15 Participants were asked to
treat this sensitive information with the same care
as they would treat their own information.

Two study coordinators were involved in the study.
One coordinator sat in the same room as the participant, within the participant’s peripheral vision.
This coordinator was instructed to avoid prompting
participants and to only assist participants if they
had not made any progress within five minutes. The
second coordinator sat in another room and corresponded with the participant over email as part of
the study tasks.

For each scenario we designed realistic tasks that
used as many email features as possible. Additionally, we designed the tasks without considering
Pwm 2.0’s feature set, to avoid biasing the tasks
to reflect favorably on Pwm 2.0. Participants completed tasks in the order shown below. Tasks were
completed entirely using email, and participants
used their own email accounts. If participants accidentally sent sensitive information without encryption they were notified of their mistake in an email
and asked to resend the information using encryption.

Quality Control

One participant was unable to use Pwm 2.0 with
their Gmail account. This participant had a special
Gmail configuration that was not compatible with
our tool. While this participant did complete the
study using a temporary email account we provided
them, we were worried that their increased interactions with the study coordinator might bias their
responses, and so we discarded their results. For
the remainder of this work, we report results based
on the 51 remaining participants.13

Being hired for a new job

Participants were told that they had recently returned from an interview at National Citadel, a fictitious company created for this study.
Task 1. Participants received an email from National Citadel containing instructions on how to be
reimbursed for expenses from their recent interview.
Participants were told to send their Social Security
number and a picture of their receipts. They were
informed that this information must be encrypted
as per National Citadel’s policies. This email also
instructed users to set up and use Pwm 2.0 to encrypt their email messages.
This task was designed to test whether participants
were able to set up and use Pwm 2.0 using only instructions that might be reasonably expected from a
company requesting information to be encrypted.16

Participant Demographics

We recruited Gmail users for our study at a local
university. Participants were evenly split between
genders: male (25; 49%), female (26; 51%). Participants skewed young: 18–24 years old (45; 88%),
25–34 years old (3; 6%), 35–44 years old (2; 4%),
55 years or older (1; 2%).
We distributed posters broadly across campus to
avoid biasing our results by any particular major.
All participants were affiliated with the university,14
with the overwhelming majority being undergraduate students: undergraduates (44; 86%), graduates
(2; 4%), faculty and staff (5; 10%). Participants
had a variety of majors, including both technical
and non-technical majors. No major was represented by more than three participants, with the
vast majority having only a single participant.

Task 2. Participants were first asked to close their
browser and then reopen Gmail. They were informed that this simulated several weeks passing
after the completion of task 1. Participants were
then sent an encrypted email that contained an offer letter. They were asked to reply with their acceptance. They were also asked to CC their new
manager.
This task was designed to test whether participants
would remember how to enable Pwm 2.0. It also
tested whether they could use Pwm 2.0 to CC a
new recipient.

Most participants indicated they logged into Gmail
on the web to check their email frequently: many
times a day (39; 76%), once a day (3; 6%), 2–3 times
a week (2; 4%), once a week (2; 4%), 2–3 times a
month (2, 4%).
Scenario and Task Design

15

We took this approach to avoid situations where sensitive information might have been leaked to Gmail.
16
This task also shows that we designed the tasks around
normal email usage and not Pwm 2.0. Pwm 2.0 does not
support attachments and only allows for images to be
inserted in line with the email body. This task could potentially be confusing to users as they cannot use their
normal work-flow for attaching an image.

During the course of the study, participants were
given two scenarios to complete: (1) being hired for
13

After analyzing the remaining data, we reviewed the
removed participant’s results and found that they were
in line with the results we analyzed.
14
We did not require this affiliation.
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Task 3. Participants were sent an email instructing
them to email information to a background check
company. They were instructed to encrypt the information.

We administered our study using the Qualtrics webbased survey software. Before beginning the survey, participants were read an introduction by the
study coordinator and asked to answer a set of demographic questions. Participants then completed
the six study tasks, following which they were asked
to complete a questionnaire regarding their experience.

This task was designed to test whether users could
enable encryption, either by forwarding the request
for information or by composing a new email message.

To measure perceived usability, we had participants
complete the ten System Usability Scale (SUS)
questions [4, 5]. Answers to these questions are
used to derive each version’s SUS score, a single numeric score from 0, the least usable, to 100, the most
usable, that provides a rough estimate of the version’s overall usability. Recent research has shown
that SUS scores are effective for comparing systems
across different study populations and that SUS
gives more reliable results than other usability metrics [23, 19, 17].

Task 4. Participants were instructed to send bank
account information to National Citadel’s payroll
department. They were not reminded to encrypt
this information.
This task was designed to test whether users would
remember to encrypt information if they were not
explicitly prompted to do so. Unlike the preceding
tasks, if they sent information without encryption,
we still considered this task complete.
Sending credit card information to a spouse

After completing the SUS questions, participants
were asked several questions regarding whether they
would want to use Pwm 2.0 in their day-to-day lives.
We then asked participants questions to examine
how well they understood the cryptographic properties of Pwm 2.0. To test understanding of confidentiality, they were asked to indicate which parties could read a message encrypted with Pwm 2.0.
Similarly, participants were asked whether Pwm 2.0
provided authenticity and integrity for secure email
messages composed with Pwm 2.0. Each question
was asked in language that would be approachable
to users and did not require a technical background.
Participants were given the option to indicate that
they were unsure whether a given property was provided by Pwm 2.0.

Participants were told that their spouse had texted
them asking for login information to a credit card
website.
Task 5. Participants were instructed to send login information to their “spouse” using encrypted
email. Participants were told that their spouse had
never before used secure email, so they should take
whatever steps they felt necessary to ensure their
spouse could read the encrypted email.
This task was designed to see how participants
would induct a new person into using secure email.
Regardless of what instructions were sent, we considered this task complete when the information
had been sent.17
Task 6. Participants received another email from
their spouse asking them for additional credit card
information. This request was not encrypted and
did not instruct the participant to send the additional credit card information encrypted.

Limitations

While our study included students with a diverse
set of majors and technical expertise, it may not
be representative of non-student populations. Likewise, Gmail users may also not be representative of
the general population’s preferences regarding secure email. Our study is short-term and is not
necessarily representative of how participants would
use secure email over a longer period of time. Further studies could address these limitations.

This task was designed to test whether users would
remember to encrypt information if they were not
explicitly prompted to do so. Unlike most of the
preceding tasks, if they sent information without
encryption, we still considered this task complete.
Using the video recording of participants’ screens,
we measured how long they took completing each
task and how often they sent sensitive email without
encryption (i.e., made a mistake).

Our study is a lab study and has limitations common to all studies run in a trusted environment [13,
22]. While there are indications that some participants treated the provided sensitive information as
they would their own (e.g., refusing to email the
provided social security number), there is no guarantee that participants’ reactions mimic their real
life behaviors. Additionally, our studies did not test
participants’ ability to resist attacks.

Study Questionnaire
17

Pwm 2.0 includes instructions by default, and since
they were sufficient to help the participant start using
Pwm 2.0, it was reasonable to assume that the participant believed they would be sufficient to help their
spouse start using Pwm 2.0.

RESULTS
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Overall

51

80.0

9.2

Original Pwm Study

72

74.2

13.7

Table 1. SUS scores

Task 4

Task 5

Task 6

Total

±3.69
±3.60

Task 3

Confidence
Interval
(α = 0.05)

9.6
9.0

Task 2

Standard
Deviation

79.1
81.1

Task 1

Mean

27
24

Count

Count
Automatic
Manual

Automatic
Manual

27
24

4:06
5:10

4:00
3:48

3:01
3:03

1:20
1:08

4:01
3:44

0:54
0:50

17:22
17:43

Overall

51

4:37

3:54

3:02

1:14

3:52

0:52

17:32

Table 2. Average task completion times (min:sec)

±2.52
±3.16

significant difference (two tailed student t-test, unequal variance—p = 0.04), but we caution against
overemphasizing this result. First, while the difference is significant, the 95% confidence interval
indicates that the actual effect size might be small
(64 ± 60 seconds). Second, any differences in task
completion times are amortized over the remaining tasks. Finally, a single statistically significant
difference could arguably be the result of alpha inflation [19].

In this section we report the quantitative results
from our user study.
Usability

We evaluated Pwm 2.0 using the System Usability
Scale (SUS). The automatic encryption version of
Pwm 2.0 had a SUS score of 79.1 and the manual
encryption version had a SUS score of 81.1. Further
breakdown of the SUS scores, along with SUS scores
from the original Pwm study [16], can be found in
Table 1. The difference between manual encryption
was not statistically significant (two tailed student
t-test, unequal variance—p = 0.43). The difference
between Pwm 2.0’s overall SUS score (80.0) and
Pwm’s SUS score (74.2) is statistically significant
(two tailed student t-test, unequal variance—p <
0.01).

Understanding

We asked three questions to determine whether each
participant understood the confidentiality, authenticity, and integrity properties provided by Pwm
2.0. The responses indicated whether each participant correctly understood the principle, had some
misunderstanding, or was unsure. Overall, our data
suggests that over 50% of users would likely understand the security provided by Pwm 2.0 (AdjustedWald binomial confidence interval [19], α = 0.05—
Confidentiality–83% ± 10%, Authenticity–62% ±
13%, Integrity–75% ± 12%). In all cases, the differences between manual and automatic encryption
were not statistically significant.

To give greater context for Pwm 2.0’s SUS score,
we leverage the work of several researchers. Bangor
et al. [3] analyzed 2,324 SUS surveys, and derived
a set of acceptability ranges that describe whether
a system with a given score is acceptable to users
in terms of usability. Bangor et al. also associated
specific SUS scores with adjective descriptions of
the system’s usability. Using this data, we generated ranges for these adjective ratings, such that a
score is correlated with the adjective it is closest to
in terms of standard deviations. Sauro et al. [18]
also analyzed SUS scores from Bangor et al. [2],
Tullis et al. [23], and their own data. They calculate the percentile values for SUS scores and assign
letter grades based on percentile ranges.

The proportion of users who understood how Pwm
2.0 was protecting their email was much higher than
the rate reported in the original Pwm study.18 Still,
it is interesting that even with tutorials that explicitly instruct participants on these three cryptographic properties, there are still a small number of participants who were unsure how their messages were protected. This indicates that more work
needs to be done to determine how to effectively
teach users about these properties.
Avoiding Mistakes

Using these contextual clues, Pwm 2.0’s SUS score
of 80.0 is rated as having “excellent” usability and
given an “A” grade. It is in the 87th percentile for
system usability.

During the study, we recorded all instances of a
participant taking an action that deviated from
the study parameters. Using this data, we identified several instances where a participant’s actions
leaked sensitive information. These results are reported by task in Table 3.

Task Completion Times

For each task, we calculated the average time between when the user could start a task and when
they finished that task. These are shown in Table 2. For Tasks 2–6, and for the study as a whole,
any differences between manual and automatic encryption were negligible. Task 1 had a statistically

18

We do not calculate statistical significance for these
two proportions as they were derived from different
questions. Note that the understanding questions for
Pwm 2.0 were stricter than those used in the original
Pwm study, emphasizing how much better understanding in Pwm 2.0 is likely to be.
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Count

Task 1

Task 2

Task 3

Task 4

Task 5

Task 6

Total

Automatic
Manual

27
24

0
1

0
0

1
0

0
1

0
0

0
0

1
2

Overall

51

3

0

2

1

0

0

6

82% of participants agreed with the statement “I
want to start using Pwm”20 (81% ± 11%).21 73%
of participants agree that “I would use Pwm with
my friends and family” (71% ± 12%). 92% of participants agreed that “My friends and family could
easily start using Pwm” (90% ± 8%). There were
no significant differences between participants who
used the automatic or manual versions of Pwm 2.0.
Due to the nature of the study, it is likely that
participant responses were overly positive, and that
the proportions are somewhat high. Nevertheless,
this data suggests that if introduced to Pwm 2.0,
a non-negligible number of participants would want
to continue using it, and would feel comfortable using it to send encrypted email to their friends and
family.

Table 3. Number of participants who sent sensitive
information without encryption

During the study, two participants sent sensitive information without ever running Pwm 2.0, and another refreshed the Gmail page but did not restart
Pwm 2.0 before sending sensitive information. In all
three cases, the mistakes were caused by the misuse of the tool and occurred before participants had
ever seen any differences in the two versions of Pwm
2.0. For this reason, they are reported in the overall number of mistakes, but not under automatic or
manual encryption. The differences between mistakes related to manual and automatic encryption
are negligible.

DISCUSSION

In this section we discuss noteworthy items, including participant experiences, opinions, and preferences regarding secure email and lessons learned
from improving Pwm. We refer to participants here
as R1–R52, with the number corresponding to the
order in which they participated in our study.

Overall the rate of mistakes was extremely low (2%,
6 tasks out of 306). This is lower than the mistake
rate reported in the original Pwm study of 10%,
and the difference is statistically significant (N − 1
two-proportion test for comparing two independent
proportions–p = 0.001).

Automatic and Manual Encryption

Our results indicate no significant differences between automatic and manual encryption. As such,
we hypothesize that the effect observed in the
original Pwm study was due to confounding factors between the two systems being studied (i.e.,
automatic encryption–Pwm, manual encryption–
MessageProtector).22 Alternatively, it is possible that manual encryption would have benefited
Pwm’s original implementation, but that the modifications we made while creating Pwm 2.0 were sufficient to provide those same benefits.

Tutorials

We recorded the number of participants that completed each tutorial. The video recording for one
participant’s session was corrupted, and we were
unable to determine if they had completed the tutorials. The data from the remaining 50 participants indicate that participants completed a significant number of tutorials: completed introductory
tutorial (46; 92%), completed tutorial on reading
secure email (46; 92%), completed the tutorial on
composing secure email (27; 54%). This is in stark
contrast to the original Pwm study where nearly all
participants ignored both the setup instructions and
a video tutorial included on the Pwm website [16].
This result indicates that participants are willing to
watch tutorials, though two criteria seem to be crucial: they appear in-page as participants need them
and they contain simple and direct wording.19

Pwm 2.0’s High Usability

Pwm 2.0’s SUS score of 80 falls in the 87th percentile
for system usability [19], and is the highest score
for secure email systems [16, 14]—Mailvelope (35,
4th percentile), Tutanota (52, ~15th ), Encipher.it
(61, ~30th ), Voltage (62, ~32nd ), Virtru (72, 63rd ),
original Pwm (74, 70th ).23
Additionally, most participants understood how
Pwm 2.0 was protecting their messages, only rarely
made mistakes, and were interested in using Pwm
2.0 with their friends and family. These positive

Acceptability of Pwm 2.0

20

In the study, Pwm 2.0 was referred to as just Pwm.
The confidence intervals reported here were calculated
using the Adjusted-Wald binomial confidence interval,
α = 0.05.
22
This hypothesis is supported by similar results in Atwater et al.’s work [1].
23
Neither Message Protector [16] or Atwater et al.’s system [1] had functioning key management, so their scores
are not reported here.

Overall, participants responded very positively to
the prospect of using Pwm 2.0 in their own lives:

21

19

We believe fewer participants watched the compose tutorial, which appeared the first time participants clicked
on Gmail’s “Compose” button, because it was not clear
they needed to see it at this point and because the tutorial drew attention to the option that they could skip it.
Better tutorial design could possibly address this issue.
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“It wasn’t rigid, I could write part of a message
and have the other parts encrypted if I wanted.
It was very clear what was encrypted and what
wasn’t [...]”

opinions were also reflected in numerous positive
qualitative responses. For example, R26, R39, and
R42 expressed, respectively,
“Pwm was very simple, but definitely carried
a [sic] aura of confidence in actually protecting your information. Now, how well it does is
something that I cannot determine due to my
lack of knowledge, but it was very well put together. It was very concise and user friendly
and did not require esoteric knowledge to operate. I would definitely feel more comfortable
sending sensitive information over email if I
were using Pwm versus just sending it via an
email provider.”

“That it lets me chose when to encrypt and
when not to. It’s also nice to have the option
of writing a message before the encrypted part
so others know it’s not spam.”
Look and Feel

Participants indicated that having a color-scheme
that was distinct from Gmail helped them more easily understand what information was encrypted and
what information was in the clear. This intuitive
understanding potentially helped participants avoid
mistakenly entering sensitive information where it
would not be protected. Additionally, participants
mentioned that it helped them feel more confident
in the system. Thus it is clear that when designing
tightly integrated systems, it is important to have
a distinct look and feel.

“I liked how I could encrypt sensitive information like bank account information, credit card,
and other things. It wasn’t that hard to use. I
didn’t have to download anything; all I had to
do was just save a bookmark and then click on
it. It was really easy to use.”
“I liked how it made encrypting important information so easy. The tutorial was fast and
easy. I like that it is easy and convenient to
use with day to day emails. I liked that the
background was blue so I knew when it was encrypting.”

Instructing New Users

Even though Pwm 2.0 automatically inserts instructions on how to setup and use Pwm 2.0 in every encrypted message, most participants were unaware
of this. During Task 5, participants would often
spend several minutes trying to open an old Pwm
2.0 message to grab the instructions, only to have
the message immediately decrypted and the instructions disappear. It would be helpful to make it more
clear that these instructions are always included or
to add an option that allows users to explicitly add
these instructions.

Delayed Encryption

While we did not specifically collect data regarding users’ opinions toward our delayed encryption
mechanism, we note that not a single participant
complained about encryption being too fast. This
is especially significant when compared to the original Pwm study, where over 33% of participants selfreported that encryption was too fast and therefore untrustworthy. The difference between these
two proportions is statistically significant (N − 1
two-proportion test for comparing two independent
proportions–p < 0.001). While this may not mean
that users’ concerns regarding the speed of encryption were eliminated, it is strongly suggestive that
they were reduced enough not to be a distraction.

CONCLUSION

Our modifications to Pwm’s interface have significantly increased its usability and security. In our
user study, Pwm 2.0 is rated with an 80.0 SUS score,
the highest reported SUS score for secure email systems. Over 80% of participants expressed a desire
to begin using Pwm, and over 90% of participants
believed that their friends and family could easily
start using Pwm. Pwm 2.0 also helped participants
avoid mistakenly sending their sensitive data in the
clear.

Mixed mode email

The optional plaintext greeting that can accompany email encrypted by Pwm 2.0 is intended to
help email senders give confidence to recipients who
have never used Pwm 2.0 that the email is authentic and not spam. Surprisingly, during our study
we noted that a small, but significant number of
users would include a plaintext greeting in many
of their encrypted email messages. For example,
in Task 4 eight participants (8; 16%) including a
greeting stating that they were sending their direct
deposit information. Interestingly, this was actually
a feature that seven participants (7; 14%) listed as
one of their favorite features of Pwm 2.0. R12 and
R51 stated, respectively,

This work represents an important step toward providing usable, secure email encryption. While Pwm
2.0 has lower theoretical security than PGP-based
systems, it provides higher practical security for an
ordinary user. Whereas in studies of PGP-based
systems most users were unable to encrypt their
emails [26, 21, 15], in Pwm 2.0 all users are able
to encrypt their emails. While there is little evidence that PGP-based systems will ever be sufficiently usable for the masses [12], techniques from
Pwm 2.0 could be applied to PGP-based systems to
raise their relative usability.
11
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Secure email is increasingly being touted as usable by novice users, with a push for adoption based on
recent concerns about government surveillance. To determine whether secure email is ready for grassroots
adoption, we employ a laboratory user study that recruits pairs of novice users to install and use several of
the latest systems to exchange secure messages. We present both quantitative and qualitative results from
25 pairs of novices as they use Pwm, Tutanota, and Virtru and 10 pairs of novices as they use Mailvelope.
Participants report being more at ease with this type of study and better able to cope with mistakes since
both participants are “on the same page.” We find that users prefer integrated solutions over depot-based
solutions, and that tutorials are important in helping first-time users. Additionally, hiding the details of
how a secure email system provides security can lead to a lack of trust in the system. Finally, our results
demonstrate that PGP is still unusable for novice users, with 9 out of 10 participant pairs failing to complete
the study.
CCS Concepts: rSecurity and privacy → Domain-specific security and privacy architectures; Usability in security and
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1. INTRODUCTION

In recent years there has been an increase in the promotion of secure email, with tools such as Tutanota, Virtru, Mailvelope, ProtonMail, StartMail, Hushmail and others being pitched for everyday use by
novice users. This interest is likely spurred by concern over government surveillance of email, particularly when third-party services such as Gmail and Hotmail store email in plaintext on their servers.
The Electronic Frontier Foundation has heavily promoted secure communication and has released a
security scorecard of secure messaging systems that includes several email tools [Foundation 2015].
While TextSecure, Signal, WhatsApp, and other secure instant messaging platforms are becoming
popular, it is unclear whether efforts to encourage users to likewise switch to secure email will succeed,
given that usable, secure email is still an unsolved problem more than fifteen years after it was first
formally studied [Whitten and Tygar 1999]. Moreover, widespread use of secure email partly depends
on whether it could be adopted in a grassroots fashion, where both parties of an email conversation
are novice users. All prior laboratory usability studies of secure email bring one novice user at a time
This work was completed while Scott Ruoti, Mark O’Neill, and Scott Heidbrink were interns at Sandia National Laboratories.
Sandia National Laboratories is a multi-program laboratory managed and operated by Sandia Corporation, a wholly owned
subsidiary of Lockheed Martin Corporation, for the U.S. Department of Energy’s National Nuclear Security Administration
under contract DE-AC04-94AL85000.
Permission to make digital or hard copies of all or part of this work for personal or classroom use is granted without fee provided
that copies are not made or distributed for profit or commercial advantage and that copies bear this notice and the full citation
on the first page. Copyrights for components of this work owned by others than ACM must be honored. Abstracting with credit is
permitted. To copy otherwise, or republish, to post on servers or to redistribute to lists, requires prior specific permission and/or
a fee. Request permissions from permissions@acm.org.
c YYYY ACM. 2471-2566/YYYY/01-ARTA $15.00
DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1145/0000000.0000000

A Usability Study of Four Secure Email Tools Using Paired Participants

A:2

into the lab and have him or her communicate with a study coordinator using a secure email system.
While this helps researchers understand how well a novice can start using secure email when paired
with an expert user, it does not shed light on whether a pair of novices can start using the system
independently.
In this work, we describe a novel paired-participant methodology for the study of secure email, in
which pairs of novice users were brought into the lab and asked to exchange secure email between
themselves. We asked participants to bring a friend with them, ensuring the participants already
knew each other, in the hope that participants would behave more naturally. Participants then used
one or more secure email systems without any specific training or instructions on how to use the
system other than what the system itself provided. The main difference between this type of study
and a traditional single-user study are that the participants played different roles (initiating contact
versus being introduced to secure email) and that they interacted with another novice user and not a
study coordinator.
In this paper we describe two different studies using this methodology. In our first study, 25 pairs
of participants tested three different secure email systems: Pwm, Tutanota, and Virtru. Each of these
systems represents a different philosophy related to the integration of secure email with existing email
systems. Pwm integrates secure email with users’ existing Gmail accounts, allowing them to compose
and receive secure email with a familiar interface. In contrast, Tutanota is a secure email depot that
requires users to log into Tutanota’s website to interact with their secure messages. Virtru is a hybrid of these two approaches, allowing users who install the Virtru plugin to use secure email that
is integrated with Gmail, but also allowing non-Virtru users to receive encrypted email through a
depot-based system on Virtru’s website.
In our second study, ten pairs of participants tested Mailvelope, a modern PGP tool that was designed
with usability in mind. Mailvelope is a browser extension that integrates with users’ webmail systems,
and is the only such tool that appears on the EFF’s secure messaging scorecard1 .
Our results and participant comments lead to the following contributions:
(1) Using pairs of novice users for an email usability study has several benefits. Having participants play different roles allowed us to gather data about different types of first-use cases (i.e.,
sending a secure email first vs receiving a secure email first). In addition, participants exhibited
more natural behaviors and indicated that they felt “more at ease”, that they and their friend
were “on the same page” or at the same level of technical inexpertise, and that they did not feel
discomfort from being “under the microscope.”
(2) Hiding the details of how a secure messaging system provides security can lead to a
lack of trust in the system. This phenomenon was first noted in some of our earlier work [Ruoti
et al. 2013], but those results are affected by multiple confounding factors [Atwater et al. 2015;
Ruoti et al. 2016]. This paper provides further evidence that when security details are hidden from
users, users are less likely to trust the system. For example, although Pwm and Virtru utilize
the same authentication method, Pwm completes authentication without user interaction, causing
several users to doubt Pwm’s security. Similarly, participants like that Tutanota requires that an
email be encrypted with a password, since this makes it clear that the message was protected,
unlike other systems that manage and use keys behind the scenes.
(3) Users prefer integrated solutions over depot-based solutions. While to some it may be intuitive that users would prefer to continue using their existing email accounts, a number of depotbased systems have appeared recently (e.g., Tutanota, ProtonMail, StartMail). Our results demonstrate that most everyday users strongly dislike using separate websites such as secure email
depots to read their email.
(4) Tutorials are very important for users of secure email. When asked what they liked about
Pwm and Virtru, participants often reported that it was the tutorials presented alongside these
systems. The efficacy of these tutorials is shown by the fact that while using Pwm and Virtru,
participants were able to quickly complete the study task, whereas while using Tutanota—which
lacks a tutorial—participants took on average 72% longer to complete the study tasks, often making
mistakes as they did so.
1 https://www.eff.org/secure-messaging-scorecard
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(5) Users want the ability to use secure email but are unsure about when they would use
it. Three-quarters of the participants in our study indicated that they wanted to be able to encrypt
their email, but only one-quarter indicated that they would want to do so frequently. Furthermore,
when asked to describe how they would use encrypted email in practice, most participants were
unsure, giving only vague references to how secure email might be useful. This demonstrates a
need for future research to establish whether the true problem facing the adoption of secure email
is usability or that day-to-day users have no regular need to send sensitive data via email.
(6) PGP still appears to be unusable for the masses. In our second study, nine out of the ten
participant pairs were unable to complete the study, and had not even made significant progress
in the hour allotted for the study. The only pair that completed the study took slightly longer than
the allotted hour, and reported that they were only successful at using PGP because one of them
had learned about public key cryptography in a college course. Moreover, all participants found key
establishment and sharing difficult.
(7) PGP-based secure email systems can be improved. Based on our observations during both
studies and participants’ feedback, we have identified several suggestions that would significantly
improve the chances that novice users could adopt PGP. First, integrated tutorials would be helpful
in assisting first-time users in knowing what they should be doing at any given point in time.
Second, an approachable description of public key cryptography could help users correctly manage
their own keys. Third, in line with previous work by Atwater et al. [Atwater et al. 2015], we find
that PGP-based tools would be well served by offering automatically generated emails for unknown
recipients asking them to install the PGP software, generate a public key, and share it with the
sender. Finally, the PGP block itself could be enhanced to help non-PGP users who receive an
encrypted email know how to work with their friend to get an encrypted message they will be able
to read.
2. BACKGROUND

In this section we provide background on the area of secure email. First, we describe the current state
of email security. We then describe approaches for securing email with end-to-end encryption. Finally,
we discuss related work; i.e., usability studies of secure email.
2.1. Email Security

When email was first designed in 19712 no meaningful attention was paid to security. As such, it was
originally trivial for an attacker to steal email during transit or to send messages with falsified sender
information. In recent years, there have been attempts to patch security into email. For example, TLS
is now used to protect email during transmission, and DKIM and DMARC are used to authenticate
the sender of an email. However, the deployment of these technologies is limited and they are often
misconfigured.
In an analysis of email delivery security (i.e., TLS, DKIM, DMARC, SPF), Durumeric et al. found
that a majority of email is still vulnerable to attack [Durumeric et al. 2015]. They showed that only
35% of SMTP servers are configured to use TLS, and even when TLS is enabled it is often vulnerable
to a downgrade attack. Similarly, they demonstrated that the adoption of DKIM and DMARC were so
low that they provide no practical benefits. These results were further confirmed by concurrent work
by both Foster et al. [Foster et al. 2015] and Holz et al. [Holz et al. 2016].
As such, email is still an easy target for attackers. For example, Durumeric et al. found that in seven
countries over 20% of inbound Gmail messages are being stolen [Durumeric et al. 2015]. Additionally,
the inability to authenticate the sender of an email increases the likelihood of email phishing, a multibillion-dollar problem.3 Perhaps most troubling, even if TLS, DKIM, and DMARC were to be widely
adopted and configured correctly, it would do nothing to protect email when at rest.4
2 http://openmap.bbn.com/∼tomlinso/ray/firstemailframe.html
3 http://krebsonsecurity.com/2016/04/fbi-2-3-billion-lost-to-ceo-email-scams/
4 At

rest, email can be stolen as the result of a breach (https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/
chinese-hackers-who-breached-google-gained-access-to-sensitive-data-us-officials-say/, a malicious insider (http://gawker.
com/5637234/gcreep-google-engineer-stalked-teens-spied-on-chats, or a subpoena (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/PRISM
(surveillance program), http://www.law360.com/articles/488725/post-snowden-google-report-shows-data-requests-growing).
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2.2. End-to-end Email Encryption

The problems afflicting secure email could be solved through the use of end-to-end encryption. A wellknown approach for providing end-to-end encryption is Pretty Good Privacy (PGP) [Garfinkel 1995]. It
was developed in 1991 by Phil Zimmerman, and allows users to encrypt and sign their email messages
using public key cryptography. In PGP, keys are generally validated using the web of trust—i.e., users
verify and sign their associates’ public keys; a user can check if they trust a key by seeing if they or
one of their associates has signed that key. Public keys can be shared in a number of ways, such as
sending the key directly to other users, posting the key to a personal website, or uploading the key to
a key directory.
Another end-to-end approach is Secure/Multipurpose Internet Mail Extensions (S/MIME [Ramsdell
and Turner 2010]). Similar to PGP, S/MIME uses public key cryptography to encrypt and sign email.
Unlike PGP’s web of trust, S/MIME certificates are authenticated using the certificate authority (CA)
system.5,6 Users still need to share public keys just as they do in PGP.
A third approach is identity-based encryption (IBE [Shamir 1984]). IBE is a public key system where
a user’s public key is simply their email address. Private keys are generated by a trusted third-party
server, which authenticates the identity of the user before providing them with their private key. Unlike PGP and S/MIME, users do not need to install secure email software, generate a key pair, and
share their private key before they can receive their first encrypted message.
In addition to public key cryptography, it is also possible to use symmetric key cryptography for endto-end encryption of email. One approach is for a user to select and share a password which will be
used to encrypt their email. Another approach is to have a trusted third-party key escrow server that
can generate and distribute symmetric keys for users.
In this paper, we analyze the usability of systems that represent a variety of end-to-end encryption
approaches: PGP, IBE, passwords, and a custom key escrow scheme.
2.3. User Attitudes Towards Secure Email

Gaw et al. [Gaw et al. 2006] interviewed users at a political activist organization that use secure email
and noted that adoption was driven by the organization deciding encryption was necessary due to
secrecy concerns. These interviews also showed that having IT staff set up the secure email software
was necessary to enable the successful adoption of secure email. Even with this support, there were
users who did not intend to use the software regularly, due to usability concerns and social factors. In
this work, we tested systems that help users begin using secure email without the support of IT staff.
Renaud et al. conducted a series of 21 interviews regarding users’ understanding of email [Renaud
et al. 2014]. They found that most users did not have an accurate mental model regarding how email
functioned, including how an attacker might steal their email. Renaud et al. suggested that this lack
of understanding made it difficult for users to understand the value of secure email, potentially explaining why users have not adopted it. Their research suggests that more work needs to be done to
build comprehensive mental models of email and secure email for end-users.
Tong et al. created a set of metaphors and descriptions that attempted to describe public key-based
secure email to users [Tong et al. 2014]. They found that even though these new metaphors and description only had a marginal effect on users’ mental models, when these metaphors and descriptions
were implemented into a mock secure email interface participants were able to more intuitively understand how the interface would function.
Bai et al. explored user attitudes toward different models for obtaining a recipient’s public key in
PGP [Bai et al. 2016]. In their study, they built two PGP-based secure email systems, one that used
the traditional key-exchange model7 and one that used a key directory-based registration model.8
Users were provided with instructions on how to use each tool and given several tasks to complete.
Afterwards, participants shared their opinions regarding the key exchange models. The results of this
5 The

CA system is the same mechanism by which websites are authenticated in TLS.
recent versions of PGP also support certificates validated using the CA system, but in our experience this feature is not
widely used for secure email.
7 In this model, users must manually exchange their public keys with each other. This model is based on the idea of a “web-oftrust.”
8 In this model, users prove their identity to a trusted third-party key directory, which will then host their public key. Senders
can then look up a recipient’s public key in this directory.
6 More
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study showed that, overall, individuals preferred the key-directory-based registration model, though
they were not averse to the traditional key-exchange model either.
2.4. Related Work

Whitten and Tygar [Whitten and Tygar 1999] conducted the first formal user study of a secure email
system (i.e., PGP 5), which uncovered serious usability issues with key management and users’ understanding of the underlying public key cryptography. They found that a majority of users were unable
to successfully send encrypted email in the context of a hypothetical political campaign scenario. The
results of the study served as a wake-up call to the security community and helped shape modern
usable security research.
Sheng at al. demonstrated that despite improvements made to PGP in the seven years since Whitten
and Tygar’s original publication (i.e., PGP 9), key management was still a challenge for users [Sheng
et al. 2006]. Furthermore, they showed that in the new version of PGP, encryption and decryption had
become so transparent that users were unsure if a message they received had actually been encrypted.
Atwater et al. evaluated the usability of PGP using a mock-up of a secure email tool that automatically generates key pairs for users, shares the generated public key with a key server, and retrieves
the recipient’s public key as needed. Their results showed that with these modifications, users could
successfully use PGP to send and receive secure email. Unfortunately, their mock-up did not correctly
simulate PGP’s key management, making their system unsuitable for inclusion in our own study and
calling into question the validity of their results.
Garfinkel and Miller created a secure email system using S/MIME and used this system to replicate Whitten and Tygar’s earlier study [Garfinkel and Miller 2005]. Their work demonstrated that
automating key management provides significant usability compared to earlier studies that burdened
users with key management tasks. Still, they observed that their tool “was a little too transparent”
in how well it integrated with Outlook Express, and sometimes users failed to read the instructions
accompanying the visual indicators.
Ruoti et al. developed Private WebMail (Pwm), a secure email tool that uses IBE to encrypt users’
messages [Ruoti et al. 2013]. Across three usability studies of Pwm, they demonstrated that all participants could use Pwm to send and receive encrypted email. However, they also found that some users
made mistakes and were hesitant to trust the system due to the transparency of its automatic encryption. They later revised Pwm to address these issues, and demonstrated that their modified system
receives the highest usability ratings of any secure email system tested in the literature [Ruoti et al.
2016].
Ruoti et al. also developed MessageProtector, a stand-alone, IBE-based encryption tool [Ruoti et al.
2013]. Unlike other secure email systems, MessageProtector is not integrated with an email tool, but
instead requires users to compose their messages in MessageProtector and then copy the resulting
ciphertext into their mail program. Two usability studies demonstrated that users approved of MessageProtector, though they wished that it could be implemented as part of the browser. Song created
a modified version of MessageProtector that was integrated into the browser, and found that it was
perceived as being more usable than the original version [Song 2014].
In Ruoti et al.’s work they also evaluated Voltage Mail, an IBE-based, secure email depot and Encipher.it, a password-based encryption tool [Ruoti et al. 2013]. In a usability study of both systems,
Ruoti et al. showed that while users could successfully send and receive encrypted email using these
systems, they also strongly disliked both systems. The primary reason for this dislike was that neither
tool was integrated with the user’s webmail system.
The methodology in this paper is unique in that it tests whether two novice users can collaboratively
begin using secure email. In contrast, all past studies involved a single participant interacting with
an expert user of secure email (i.e., the study coordinator). As discussed in this paper, using pairs of
novice participants has significant advantages over having a study coordinator simulate a user.
3. SECURE EMAIL

Two and a half decades after the invention of PGP, secure email still remains sparsely used. While some
businesses require the use of secure email by their employees, there is little use of secure email by the
population at large. While it is possible that secure email will eventually diffuse from the workplace, it
may be that if secure email is to flourish, it will do so because of grassroots adoption (i.e., if participants
are able to discover secure email on their own and easily begin using it with their acquaintances).
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To date, no secure email studies have tested the ability of two novices to begin using secure email;
instead, these studies have tested a single novice interacting with an expert user (i.e., a study coordinator). Both Whitten and Tygar’s study [Whitten and Tygar 1999] as well as Garfinkel and Miller’s
study [Garfinkel and Miller 2005] used a simulated political campaign, where the study participant
was the only individual in the campaign who did not already know how to use PGP. Similarly, studies by Sheng et al. [Sheng et al. 2006], Ruoti et al. [Ruoti et al. 2013], Song [Song 2014], Atwater et
al. [Atwater et al. 2015], and Bai et al. [Bai et al. 2016] involved participants sending email to study
coordinators, none of whom were instructed to simulate a novice user.
Even if the study coordinators had attempted to simulate a novice user, there are difficulties with
this approach. First, study coordinators are unlikely to make mistakes while using the encryption
software, which is atypical of a true novice. Even if study coordinators make use of scripted mistakes,
there is a strong risk that these mistakes might be seen as artificial by participants, thereby breaking
immersion for the participant. Second, in many tasks there is a high level of variability possible in
participant actions, making it difficult to script for all possible situations, and unscripted responses
from coordinators are likely to be biased by their experience with the system. Third, participants are
likely to attribute any problems they encounter to their own mistakes, and not to the coordinator,
whereas when interacting with a friend, participants are just as likely to attribute the mistake to their
friend as to themselves.9
To avoid these difficulties, our study uses two novice participants. This is the first study to test
whether two novice participants, who know each other beforehand, can successfully use secure email
in a grassroots fashion. Our observations, as discussed later in this paper, show that this approach
produces more natural behavior than when participants email a study coordinator. Moreover, this
approach allows us to examine how users perform when they are introduced to secure email in different
ways (i.e., installing and then sending an email vs. receiving an email and then installing).
To select which systems to test, we surveyed existing secure email systems, including those listed on
the EFF’s scorecard [Foundation 2015], and filtered them according to two criteria. First, we focused on
browser-based solutions, as previous work has shown that this approach is preferred by users [Ruoti
et al. 2013; Atwater et al. 2015]. Second, we required the systems to use automatic key management,
as research has shown that users are highly amenable to this approach [Garfinkel and Miller 2005;
Ruoti et al. 2013]. Of the systems that matched these criteria, we found that they could be grouped
into three types of secure email systems: integrated, depot-based, and a hybrid of integrated and depotbased systems. For each of these groups, we tested the systems in the group, and selected the system
that we felt had the best usability and included that system in our study. In addition to the above
systems, we also included a secure email system based on PGP, because this approach is viewed as
highly secure by the research community and a recent system claimed to significantly improve its
usability.
The remainder of this section describes the types of secure email that were tested, as well as the
representative system for each. Screenshots of each system can be found in Appendix A.
3.1. Integrated Secure Email (Pwm)

“Integrated secure email” refers to secure email systems that integrate with users’ existing email
systems. In this model, users do not need to create new accounts and are able to encrypt messages
within the email interfaces they are already accustomed to [Ruoti et al. 2013].
Private WebMail (Pwm)10 is the representative system for this type of secure email. Pwm was developed as part of our research [Ruoti et al. 2013; Ruoti et al. 2016] and has the highest usability11
of any secure email system tested in the literature [Ruoti et al. 2016]. In addition, because Pwm has
previously been the subject of several formal user studies, it provides a good baseline for comparing
the results of the other systems tested in this study.
Pwm is a browser extension that tightly integrates with Gmail’s web interface to provide secure
email. Users are never exposed to any cryptographic operation, including the verification of the user’s
identity, which are completed without user interaction. Pwm modifies the color scheme of Gmail for en9 In

some ongoing work, we have attempted to simulate a novice user and encountered these difficulties in practice [Ruoti et al.
2016]
10 https://pwm.byu.edu/
11 Based on the System Usability Scale [Brooke 1996].
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crypted emails in order to help users identify which messages have been encrypted. Pwm also includes
inline tutorials that instruct users on how to operate Pwm.
Pwm’s threat model is focused on protecting email from individuals who do not have access to the
sender’s or recipient’s email account. While this does not protect email against attackers who compromise the user’s email account, it does provide security during transmission and storage of the email.
Pwm is susceptible to a malicious email service provider.
3.2. Depot-Based Secure Email (Tutanota)

“Depot-based secure email” refers to secure email systems that use a separate website from users’
existing email systems. In this model, users have a separate account with the depot where they can
send and receive secure emails. When a user receives a new message in their depot account, many
depot-based systems will send an email to the user’s standard email address, informing them that they
have a new email to check in the depot system. Often, these systems do not allow users to send email
to individuals not already using the depot. Depot-based systems are commonly deployed by companies
and organizations for secure communication.
There are many depot-based systems to choose from. We chose Tutanota12 because it was the most
usable of the depot systems we tested, available for free, available to new users, and receiving positive
publicity on Twitter. Other popular systems charged an annual fee (e.g., Hushmail and StartMail) or
were currently not offering email addresses to new users (e.g., ProtonMail).
While there are many depot-based systems to choose from, most are either costly (e.g., Hushmail
and StartMail) or are currently not offering email addresses to new users (e.g., ProtonMail). We chose
Tutanota13 because it was the most usable of the depot systems we tested, is free, is currently available
to new users, and is receiving publicity on Twitter.
Tutanota assigns users an email address ending in @tutanota.com. Users can send and receive
email from this address as they normally would. During account creation, Tutanota generates a public/private key pair for the user. These keys are stored on Tutanota’s servers, with the private key
being encrypted with the user’s Tutanota account password. When Tutanota users send messages to
other Tutanota users, the messages are automatically encrypted and signed with the appropriate keys.
When a Tutanota user sends a message to a non-Tutanota user, they have the option of encrypting it
with a shared secret (i.e., password). When the non-Tutanota user receives the encrypted email, they
are redirected to Tutanota’s website, where they can enter the shared secret and decrypt the message.
Tutanota’s interface also allows the non-Tutanota user to respond to the message, and will encrypt the
message using the same shared secret.
The threat model for Tutanota is similar to Pwm, except that instead of having normal and secure
email stored in the same email accounts, they are stored in separate accounts. This means that if a
user’s normal email account is broken into, their sensitive messages are still secure. Users are still
susceptible to a malicious email service provider, or to having their secure email account password
guessed/stolen.
3.3. Hybrid Secure Email (Virtru)

Virtru14 is a hybrid of integrated and depot-based secure email. Once Virtru’s browser plugin is installed, it functions much the same as Pwm, including automatic key management and integration
with the webmail provider. If a Virtru user sends an email to a non-Virtru user, the sender still does so
through the webmail provider, but the recipient will receive an email informing them that they need
to log into Virtru’s website to view their message. At this point Virtru is similar to Tutanota in its
management of new users, except that instead of providing a password, non-Virtru users are asked to
prove that they own their email address. As such, the threat model for Virtru is identical to Pwm.
3.4. PGP (Mailvelope)

We chose Mailvelope15 , a modern PGP-based tool as our representative system. Mailvelope was our
preferred choice for several reasons: First, it is the only PGP-based secure email tool promoted by the
12 https://tutanota.com/
13 https://tutanota.com/

14 https://www.virtru.com/

15 https://www.mailvelope.com/
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EFF’s secure messaging scorecard16 that is browser-based. Second, Mailvelope is highly rated on the
Chrome Web Store, with 242 users collectively giving it 4.6 out of 5 stars. Third, Mailvelope claims to
be “easy-to-use”17 and focused on helping novice users begin sending encrypted email.18 Finally, in our
evaluation of other PGP-based secure email tools, we found Mailvelope to be at least as usable as the
alternatives (i.e., GPG Tools, Enigmail, Google’s End-to-End Encryption).
Like Pwm, Mailvelope integrates with the user’s webmail provider. Upon installation, users need to
generate a PGP key pair and select a password to encrypt their private key. To encrypt a message,
the user takes the following steps: (1) click on a button that opens Mailvelope’s compose interface in
a new window; (2) compose their message, click encrypt, and select the intended recipients; (3) click
the transfer button, which then sends their PGP-encrypted message back to the webmail provider’s
compose interface, where the user can then send the encrypted message. Upon receipt of an encrypted
email, the Mailvelope user take the following steps: (1) click a lock icon that is displayed over the
encrypted text; (2) enter the password for their private key.
Mailvelope has a stricter threat model than the other systems. In order to compromise a PGP encrypted message, the attacker must accomplish three things: (1) steal the user’s email; (2) steal the
user’s private key; (3) steal the password for the user’s private key. An attacker who gains access to
the user’s email account could attempt to convince the user’s contacts to encrypt messages with the
attacker’s public key instead of the user’s true public key. Still, this does not compromise the security
of messages previously encrypted with the correct public key.
4. FIRST STUDY–METHODOLOGY

We conducted two IRB-approved user studies wherein pairs of participants used secure email to communicate sensitive information to each other. Both studies ran concurrently, with participant pairs
assigned randomly to one of the studies upon arrival. For clarity’s sake, we first describe the methodology and results of our first study, and then the methodology of our second study. A full copy of the
surveys and recruitment poster can be found at https://tops2016.isrl.byu.edu.
This section gives an overview of our first study and describes the scenario, task, study questionnaire, and post-study interview. In addition, we discuss the development and limitations of the study.
4.1. Study Setup

The study ran for two weeks—beginning Tuesday, September 8, 2015 and ending Friday, September
18, 2015. In total, 25 pairs of participants (50 total participants) completed the study. Participants
took between forty and sixty minutes to complete the study, and each participant was compensated
$15 USD for their participation. Participants were required to be accompanied by a friend, who served
as their counterpart for the study. For standardization and requirements of the systems tested in the
study, both participants were required to have Gmail accounts.
When participants arrived, they were read a brief introduction detailing the study and their rights
as participants. Participants were informed that they would be in separate rooms during the study
and would use email to communicate with each other.19 Participants were also informed that a study
coordinator would be with them at all times and could answer any questions they might have.
Using a coin flip, one participant was randomly assigned as Participant A (referred to as “Johnny”
throughout the paper) and the other as Participant B (referred to as “Jane” throughout the paper).
The participants were then led to the appropriate room to begin the study; each room had identical
equipment. For the remainder of the study, all instructions were provided in written form. Participants
completed the task on a virtual machine (VM), which was restored to a common snapshot after each
study task, ensuring that the computer started in the same state for all participants and that no
participant information was accidentally stored.
During the study, participants were asked to complete a multi-stage task three times, once for each of
the secure email systems being tested: Pwm, Tutanota, and Virtru. The order in which the participants
used the systems was randomized. For each system, participants installed any necessary software and
were then given fifteen minutes to complete the task. If they were unable to complete the task in the
16 https://www.eff.org/secure-messaging-scorecard
17 https://www.mailvelope.com/faq

18 https://github.com/mailvelope/mailvelope/issues/14#issuecomment-11419791
19 The

study coordinators ensured that the participants knew each other’s email addresses.
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time limit, the study coordinators helped them move to the next system. In practice, this only occurred
a single time.
4.2. Demographics

We recruited Gmail users for our study at a local university. Participants were two-thirds female:
female (33; 66%), male (17; 34%). Participants skewed young: 18 to 24 years old (44; 88%), 25 to 34
years old (6; 12%).
We distributed posters across campus to avoid biasing our results to any particular major. All participants were university students,20 with the majority being undergraduate students: undergraduate
students (40; 80%), graduate students (10; 20%). Participants were enrolled in a variety of majors,
including both technical and non-technical majors. No major was represented by more than four participants, with the vast majority only having one or two participants.
4.3. Scenario Design

During the study, participants were asked to role-play a scenario about completing taxes. Each participant was shown the following text, respectively.
— Johnny. Your friend graduated in accounting and you have asked their help in preparing your taxes.
They told you that they needed you to email them your last year’s tax PIN and your social security
number. Since this information is sensitive, you want to protect (encrypt) this information when you
send it over email.
— Jane. You graduated in accounting and have agreed to help a friend prepare their taxes. You have
asked them to email you their last year’s tax PIN and their social security number.
Participants were provided with the information they would send (e.g., SSN and PIN), but were told
to treat this information as they would their own sensitive information.
4.4. Task Design

Based on the scenario, participants were asked to complete a three-stage task.
(1) Johnny would encrypt and send his SSN and last year’s tax PIN to Jane.
(2) Jane would reply to this sensitive information with a confirmation code and this year’s tax PIN.
This information would also be encrypted.
(3) Johnny would reply and let Jane know he had received the confirmation code and this year’s tax
PIN.
The instructions guiding the participants through the three stages are as follows:
— Johnny. In this task, you’ll be using {Pwm, Virtru, or Mailvelope}. The system can be found at the
following website: {Appropriate website}. Please encrypt and send the following information to your
friend using {Pwm, Virtru, or Mailvelope}: SSN: {Generated SSN}. PIN: {Generated PIN}.
Once you have received the confirmation code and PIN from your friend, send an email to your friend
letting them know you have received this information. After you have sent this confirmation email,
let the study coordinator know you have finished this task.
— Jane–Sheet 1. Please wait for your friend’s email with their last year’s tax PIN and SSN. Once you
have written down your friend’s SSN and PIN, let the study coordinator know that you are ready to
reply to your friend with their confirmation code and PIN.
— Jane–Sheet 2. You have completed your friend’s taxes and need to send them the confirmation
code and this year’s tax PIN from their tax submission. Since your friend used {Pwm, Virtru, or
Tutanota} to send sensitive information to you, please also use {Pwm, Virtru, or Tutanota} to send
them the confirmation code and PIN. Confirmation Code: {Generated code}. PIN: {Generated PIN}.
Once you have sent the confirmation code and PIN to your friend, wait for them to reply to you
and confirm they received the information. Once you have received this confirmation, let the study
coordinator know you have finished this task.
The instructions for Johnny and Sheet 1 of the instructions for Jane were given at the start of the
task. Sheet 2 for Jane was given once Jane had received and decrypted the sensitive information sent
20 We

did not require this.
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by Johnny in Stage 1. Participants completed this task once for each of the three systems being tested.
Each time, the instructions only included information relevant to the system being tested.
While participants waited for email from each other, they were told that they could browse the
Internet, use their phones, or engage in other similar activities. This was done to provide a more
natural setting for the participants, and to avoid frustration if participants had to wait for an extended
period of time while their friend figured out an encrypted email system.
Study coordinators were allowed to answer questions related to the study but were not allowed to
provide instructions on how to use any of the systems being tested. If participants became stuck and
asked for help, they were told that they could take whatever steps they normally would to solve a
similar problem. Additionally, when asked for help, if the study coordinator believed communication
between the two parties could help, he could remind participants that they were free to communicate
with their friend and that only the sensitive information was required to be transmitted over secure
email.
4.5. Study Questionnaire

We administered our study using the Qualtrics web-based survey software. Before beginning the survey, participants answered a set of demographic questions. Participants then completed the study task
for each of the three secure email systems.
Immediately upon completing the study task for a given secure email system, participants were
asked several questions related to their experience with that system. First, participants completed
the ten questions from the System Usability Scale (SUS) [Brooke 1996; 2013]. Multiple studies have
shown that SUS is a good indicator of perceived usability [Tullis and Stetson 2004], is consistent across
populations [Ruoti et al. 2015], and has been used in the past to rate secure email systems [Ruoti et al.
2013; Atwater et al. 2015]. After providing a SUS score, participants were asked to describe what they
liked about each system, what they would change, and why they would change it.
After completing the task and questions for all three secure email systems, participants were asked
to select which of the encrypted email systems they had used was their favorite, and to describe why
they liked this system. Participants were next asked to rate the following statements using a five-point
Likert scale (Strongly Disagree–Strongly Agree): “I want to be able to encrypt my email,” and “I would
encrypt email frequently.”
4.6. Post-Study Interview

After completing the survey, participants were interviewed by their respective study coordinator. The
coordinator asked participants about their general impressions of the study and the secure email systems they had used. Furthermore, the coordinators were instructed to note when the participants
struggled or had other interesting events occur, and during the post-study interview the coordinators
reviewed and further explored these events with the participants.
After the participants completed their individual post-study interviews, they were brought together
for a final post-study interview. First, participants were once again asked which system was their favorite and why. This question was intended to observe how participants’ preferences might change
when they could discuss their favorite system with each other. Second, participants were asked to describe their ideal secure email system. While participants are not system designers, our experience
has shown that participants often reveal preferences that otherwise remain unspoken. Finally, participants were asked to share their opinions related to doing a study with a friend. They were informed
that it was the first time that we had conducted such a study. This question was designed to learn
possible benefits and limitations of conducting such a two-person study.
4.7. Pilot Study

We conducted a pilot study with three pairs of highly-technical participants (six participants total).
The lessons learned during the pilot study motivated two minor changes to the study. First, in addition to the three systems included in this study, the pilot study also included Mailvelope. While task
completion times for Pwm, Tutanota, and Virtru averaged around five minutes, it took participants
fifteen to thirty minutes to complete the assigned task with Mailvelope. This made it clear that it was
unlikely that participants would be able to complete tasks for all the systems in the assigned hour.
Additionally, we also estimated that participants would likely need the whole hour to complete the
Mailvelope task, and so we split Mailvelope into its own study, detailed later in this paper. Second, in
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Count

Mean

Standard
Deviation

Confidence
Interval
(α = 0.05)

Pwm
Pwm
Pwm

Johnny
Jane
Both

25
25
50

76.3
69.1
72.7

15.3
17.2
16.5

Virtru
Virtru
Virtru

Johnny
Jane
Both

25
25
50

73.1
71.4
72.3

14.7
12.7
13.7

±6.3
±7.1
±4.7

Tutanota
Tutanota
Tutanota

Johnny
Jane
Both

25
25
50

50.0
54.3
52.2

18.2
17.4
17.8

±6.1
±5.2
±3.9
±7.5
±7.2
±5.1

Range

Participant

Table I. SUS Scores

70.0–82.6
62.0–76.2
68.0–77.4
67.0–79.2
66.2–76.6
68.4–76.2
42.5–57.5
47.1–61.5
47.1–57.3

the pilot study, participants were shown all instructions within the Qualtrics survey. After the pilot,
we printed out the task instructions and gave these to users for easier reference.
4.8. Limitations

During the study, a bug in the Qualtrics software led to an uneven distribution of treatments (i.e., order
the systems were used). Due to this problem, treatments where Virtru was the first system were used
in two-thirds (68%, n=17) of the study sessions. Other than this abnormality, treatment distribution
was as expected.
We examined our data to determine what effect this abnormality had on our quantitative results,
but found nothing that was statistically significant. In one case, we did discover an observable, but statistically insignificant difference in task completion times. This difference is mentioned in the Results
section.
Our study also has limitations common to all existing secure email studies. First, our populations are
not representative of all groups, and future research could broaden the population (e.g., non-students,
non-Gmail users). Second, our study was a short-term study, and future research should look at these
issues in a longer-term longitudinal study. Third, our study is a lab study and has limitations common
to all studies run in a trusted environment [Milgram and Van den Haag 1978; Sotirakopoulos et al.
2010].
Our study only examines the case where a single user sends email to one other user. While this is
the most likely scenario for secure email among the masses, future work could also explore alternative
scenarios (e.g., sending to multiple users, mailing lists).
5. FIRST STUDY–RESULTS

In this section, we report the quantitative results from our user study. First, we report on the usability
scores for each system. Next, we give the time taken to complete the task for each system as well
as the number of mistakes encountered while using each system. Finally, we report which system
participants indicated was their favorite.
The data from both studies is available at https://tops2016.isrl.byu.edu.
5.1. System Usability Scale

We evaluated each system using the System Usability Scale (SUS). A breakdown of the SUS score
for each system and type of participant (i.e., Participant A—Johnny, Participant B—Jane, or both) is
given in Table I. The mean value is used as the SUS score [Brooke 1996]. When evaluating whether a
participant’s role as Johnny or Jane affected the SUS score, we found the differences were small and
were not statistically significant (two-tailed student t-test, equal variance—Pwm–p = 0.12, Virtru–
p = 0.66, Tutanota–p = 0.40).
To give greater context to the meaning of each system’s SUS score, we leveraged the work of several
researchers. Bangor et al. [Bangor et al. 2009] analyzed 2,324 SUS surveys and derived a set of acceptability ranges that describe whether a system with a given score is acceptable to users in terms of
usability. Bangor et al. also associated specific SUS scores with adjective descriptions of the system’s
usability. Using this data, we generated ranges for these adjective ratings, such that a score is corre-
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Fig. 1. Adjective-based Ratings to Help Interpret SUS Scores

lated with the adjective it is closest to in terms of standard deviations. Sauro et al. [Sauro 2011] also
analyzed SUS scores from Bangor et al. [Bangor et al. 2008], Tullis et al. [Tullis and Stetson 2004],
and their own data. They calculated the percentile values for SUS scores and assigned letter grades
based on percentile ranges. These contextual clues are presented in Figure 1.
Pwm and Virtru’s SUS scores of 72.7 and 72.3, respectively, are rated as having “Good” usability.
Both systems fall right at the 65th percentile and on the line between a “B” and “C” grade. The difference between these two systems is not statistically significant (two-tailed student t-test, matched
pairs—p = 0.86). The scores for Pwm are roughly consistent with those seen in prior work [Ruoti et al.
2013; Ruoti et al. 2016], though our results exhibited more low outliers than prior studies. Whether
this difference is due to negative experience related to using these systems with a friend as compared
to a study coordinator or whether it is due to differences in the study populations is unclear.
Tutanota’s score of 52.2 is rated as having “OK” usability. It falls in just about the 15th percentile
and at just about the base of the “D” grade. The difference between Tutanota and the other systems
(i.e., Pwm and Virtru) is statistically significant (two-tailed student t-test, matched pairs—p < 0.001)
Finally, we note that Pwm’s SUS score in this study was significantly lower than in a prior study
of the same version of Pwm [Ruoti et al. 2016]. In the prior study, Pwm received a SUS score of 80.0
and had no low scoring outliers (there were six such outliers in this study). We note that the difference
between the two system’s SUS scores are statistically significant (two-tailed student t-test, unequal
variance—p = 0.01). We are unsure why such a large difference manifested itself between two studies,
especially when prior work has shown SUS is largely consistent between studies [Ruoti et al. 2013;
Ruoti et al. 2015]. Still, we conjecture that the paired-participants study might have revealed pain
points related to having two novice users communicate using Pwm, something which was only simulated in the prior study. Alternatively, it is possible that the earlier study, which was an in-depth,
hour-long study of Pwm, allowed users to become more acclimated to Pwm, thereby raising their opinions of it.
5.2. Time

We recorded the time it took each participant to finish the task. Completion times are split into two
stages:
(1) Timing for this stage started when Johnny clicked the “Install” (Pwm, Virtru) or “Sign Up” button.
Timing ended when Johnny had successfully sent an encrypted email with his SSN and last year’s
tax PIN.
(2) Timing for this stage started when Jane opened the encrypted email sent in the previous stage.
Timing ended after Jane had successfully sent an encrypted email with the confirmation code and
this year’s tax PIN. This stage included the time Jane spent determining how to decrypt the initial
message. In the case of Tutanota, this included obtaining the shared secret from Johnny.
Timings were calculated using the recorded video. There were two sessions with abnormalities in
the recording. First, the Virtru portion of a Jane session had become corrupted. Second, an entire Jane
session was also corrupted. This second session was of special note because this participant failed to
successfully complete Stage 2 using Tutanota. The remaining times are reported in Table II and are
graphically shown in Figure 2.
In line with the SUS scores, both Pwm and Virtru have completion times that are roughly the same,
with any differences failing to be statistically significant (two-tailed student t-test, matched pairs—
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Count

Mean

Standard
Deviation

Confidence
Interval
(α = 0.05)

Pwm
Pwm
Pwm

1
2
Both

25
24
24

2:29
2:59
5:28

0:49
0:52
1:22

Virtru
Virtru
Virtru

1
2
Both

25
23
23

2:39
3:06
5:48

1:09
1:53
2:55

±0:19
±0:21
±0:35

Tutanota
Tutanota
Tutanota

1
2
Both

25
24
24

3:49
5:49
9:41

1:04
3:38
3:54

±0:27
±0:46
±1:12
±0:25
±1:27
±1:34

Range

Stage

Table II. Time Taken to Complete Task (min:sec)

2:10–2:48
2:38–3:20
4:53–6:03
2:12–3:06
2:20–3:52
4:36–7:00
3:24–4:14
4:22–7:16
8:07–11:15

Pwm

Johnny
Jane

Tutanota
Virtru
0:00

2:00

4:00

6:00

8:00

10:00

16:00

18:00

Fig. 2. Individual Participant Task Completion Times

Stage 1–p = 0.58, Stage 2–p = 0.85, Total–p = 0.61).21 Participants using Tutanota took roughly one
minute longer to complete Stage 1 and almost three minutes longer to complete Stage 2. The differences between Tutanota and Pwm/Virtru in Stage 1, Stage 2, and the combined times are all statistically significant (two-tailed student t-test, matched pairs—each case–p < 0.001)
5.3. Mistakes

We defined mistakes as any situation in which sensitive information was sent in plaintext or was sent
encrypted along with the key to decrypt the sensitive information (i.e., the Tutanota shared secret
was sent as plaintext in email). Using Pwm, no participants sent their sensitive data in the clear.
With Virtru, only a single participant sent their sensitive information in the clear. In this case, the
participant had entered the sensitive information into an unencrypted greeting field that Virtru allows
participants to include with an encrypted email.
In contrast, participants were much more likely to make mistakes with Tutanota. Two-thirds of
the participant pairs (68%, n=17) communicated the Tutanota shared secret over clear text in email.
Additionally, half of the participant pairs (48%, n=12) selected shared secrets that had low entropy and
could be quickly guessed by a password-cracking system.
While Tutanota clearly performed worse than Pwm and Virtru, care should be taken in analyzing
this result. In the post-study interview several participants indicated that while they had transmitted
21 After

adjusting the data for the higher number of treatments in which Virtru was the first system tested, we found that on
average Johnny’s task completion time dropped by 15 seconds for Virtru and increased by 10 seconds for Pwm. These differences
are not statistically significant from the non-adjusted data, and the difference between Virtru and Pwm in the adjusted data is
not statistically significant.
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Table III. Participants’ Favorite Systems
Johnny

Jane

Total

Pwm
Virtru
Tutanota

48%
44%
4%

60%
28%
12%

54%
36%
8%

Disliked All

4%

0%

2%

their password over email in the study, they stated that in the real world they would be more likely to
send the data over a different channel.
5.4. Favorite System

At the end of the study, participants were asked which of the three systems was their favorite. Their
responses are summarized in Table III. Pwm was most frequently rated as the best system, with Virtru
also rated highly. Tutanota was rarely selected as the best system, and one participant indicated that
they disliked all of the systems. These results roughly correlate with the SUS score of each system.
Interestingly, we do see a difference in the choice of favorite system based on what role the participant played. While Pwm and Virtru are rated as the favorite system about equally by Johnny, Pwm
was most often selected as the favorite system by Jane. Based on participant responses, this disparity
is due to the fact that unlike Johnny, Jane had to leave Gmail to interact with Virtru messages, a
process that was frequently described negatively.
Similarly, Tutanota was more highly rated by Jane than by Johnny. Participant responses reveal
that this is likely due to the fact that Jane did not have to go through the Tutanota account setup
(which required a long, complex password) and selection of a shared secret for the email (which caused
nearly all participants to struggle).
5.5. Differences Based on Treatment

In Atwater et al.’s work [Atwater et al. 2015], they noticed that the order in which users tested systems
strongly affected the SUS scores for those systems. We analyzed our results to determine if we saw a
similar affect, but found that the order in which the systems were tested had no effect on SUS scores.
This is in line with our prior experience using SUS to evaluate secure email systems [Ruoti et al. 2013].
We also evaluated the data to see if the order in which users tested systems affected task completion
time, number of mistakes, or participants’ favorite systems. The only measurable difference was in
task completion times for Pwm and Virtru: whichever system was tested first would have a longerthan-average task completion time, and whichever system was tested second would have a shorterthan-average task completion time. This difference in times was not statistically significant, but this
is likely because the sample population was too small.
6. SECOND STUDY–METHODOLOGY

Using the same methodology as the first study, we conducted a second IRB-approved user study
wherein pairs of participants used Mailvelope to transmit sensitive information to each other.
6.1. Study Setup

The study ran for two weeks, beginning Tuesday, September 8, 2015 and ending Friday, September
18, 2015. In total, 10 pairs of participants (20 total participants) completed the study. Unlike the first
study, participants only used a single system, Mailvelope. Participants were allocated sixty minutes to
complete the study, with about 35-40 minutes spent using Mailvelope.
6.2. Demographics

We recruited Gmail users for our study at a local university. Participants were two-thirds male: male
(13; 65%), female (7; 35%). Participants skewed young: 18–24 years old (18; 90%), 25–34 years old (2;
10%).
We distributed posters broadly across campus to avoid biasing our results to any particular major.
All participants were university students,22 with the majority being undergraduate students: under22 We

did not require this.
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Standard
Deviation

Confidence
Interval
(α = 0.05)

10
6
16

30.5
41.3
34.5

16.6
10.9
15.3

±10.3
±8.7
±7.5

Range

Mean

Johnny
Jane
Both

Count

Table IV. Mailvelope SUS Scores

20.2–40.8
32.6–50.0
27.0–42.0

graduate students (17; 85%), graduate students (3; 15%). Participants were enrolled in a variety of
majors, including both technical and non-technical majors. No major was represented by more than
four participants, with the vast majority only having one or two participants.
6.3. Limitations

Our study only included twenty participants, all of whom were students. While this was enough to show
difficulties associated with Mailvelope it is not indicative of all possible outcomes. It would be especially interesting to rerun this study using different populations (e.g., technical professionals, computer
scientists, security professionals).
7. SECOND STUDY–RESULTS

Overall, participants were unable to use Mailvelope to send encrypted email, with only one in ten
participant pairs completing the assigned task. This is in stark contrast to the results of our first
study in which all participant pairs completed the assigned task. As such, it is clear that Mailvelope is
not suitable for helping novices send secure email between themselves.
In the remainder of this section, we detail Mailvelope’s failure rate, report on its SUS scores, and
list mistakes made by participants.
7.1. Failures

The study lasted an hour, with roughly 45 minutes allocated to complete the assigned task. If, after
installing Mailvelope, Johnny made absolutely no progress for 30 minutes, study coordinators were instructed to end the task and continue to the post-study interview. If instead participants were making
some progress, study coordinators would allow them to continue until there were ten minutes left in
the hour, reserving the last ten minutes for the post-study interview.
Of the ten participant pairs, nine were unable to successfully complete the task. In two of those nine
pairs, Johnny never figured out how to use Mailvelope to send any message.23 In another two pairs,
Jane was completely mystified by the encrypted PGP message and was unaware that she needed to
install Mailvelope to read it. Only one of the nine pairs actually traded public keys, though this pair
was still confused about what to do after sharing their public keys.
The one pair that completed the task actually required more than the full forty-five minutes to do so.
At their request, we allowed 10 extra minutes to complete the task. We did so because this was the only
pair that appeared close to finishing the task and we were interested in observing a successful trial.
Interestingly, in this pair, Jane indicated having had previously learned about public key cryptography
in a college class and attributed their success to this prior knowledge. Based on our observation of this
pair, we agree that Jane’s knowledge of public key cryptography was instrumental to the pair’s success
at completing the assigned task.
7.2. System Usability Scale

We evaluated Mailvelope using the System Usability Scale (SUS). While Johnny always completed the
SUS evaluation for Mailvelope, in four instances Jane never progressed far enough in the assigned
task to install the system, and so we did not have her complete the SUS questions. A breakdown of
the SUS score for each type of participant is given in Table IV. Similar to the first study, the difference
between Johnny and Jane’s SUS scores were not statistically significant (two-tailed student t-test,
equal variance—p = 0.18).
23 In

these two instances the study was stopped after 30 minutes as no progress had been made by Johnny. The other eight pairs
were given the full 45 minutes to complete the task.
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Mailvelope’s SUS score of 34.5 is rated as having “Poor” usability. It falls in the 4th percentile, is
given a letter grade of “F” and is labeled as “Not acceptable.” The differences between Mailvelope and
the three systems tested in the first study are all statistically significant (two-tailed student t-test,
equal variance—p < 0.001)
7.3. Mistakes

All participant pairs made mistakes. The most common mistake was encrypting a message with the
sender’s public key. This occurred for seven of the participant pairs, including the participant pair
that was eventually successful. Three of the participant pairs generated a key pair with their friend’s
information, and then tried to use that public key to encrypt their message. One participant modified
the encrypted message after encryption (while still in the PGP compose window), adding their sensitive
information to the area before the PGP block. Finally, one participant eventually exported his private
key and sent it along with his key ring password to his friend so that his friend could decrypt the
message he had received. In this case, even though the participants had transmitted the required
information, they were informed that they needed to try some more and accomplish the task without
sending the private key.
8. DISCUSSION

In this section we discuss themes that we noticed across both studies, especially the qualitative feedback provided by participants on the study survey and in the post-study interview. Participants in the
first study have been assigned a unique identifier R[1–25][A,B], while participants in the second study
have been assigned a unique identifier M[1–10][A,B]. The final letter refers to which role the participant played during the study, and participants with the same number were paired with each other
(e.g., R1A and R1B were Johnny and Jane, respectively, in the same study session).
8.1. Paired-participant Methodology

During the studies, we noticed several clear benefits of our paired-participant methodology.
First, by having participants play different roles, we were able to gather data about users’ experiences both when they are introduced to secure email and when someone else is introducing them. For
example, in Tutanota, messages need to have a shared secret to be encrypted. Johnny’s experiences
revealed the difficulty in discovering that a password is required and that it needs to be communicated
to the recipient, Jane. Similarly, Jane’s experience showed the aversion participants felt to leaving
their current email system to view a sensitive message. While these same experiences might have
been elicited by running two different studies, it was convenient to obtain them in a single study, and
it was helpful to be able to correlate the experiences of participant pairs. Furthermore, showing that
a participant can successfully use a new secure email system when inducted by another novice user is
stronger than only showing that a new user can be inducted by an expert.
Second, our study design led to more natural behaviors by participants. In past studies, we observed
that participants expected study coordinators to immediately respond to emails. Even after being informed that a response would take a couple of minutes, participants would constantly refresh their
inbox to see if a message had arrived, and if a response took longer than fifteen to thirty seconds to
arrive participants would often complain. In contrast, participants in our studies were content to wait
to receive their email and did not appear agitated when their friends took a long time to respond. Also,
instead of constantly refreshing their inbox, participants would browse the Web or check their phones,
which is likely more representative of how they use email in practice.
In addition to the observations by study coordinators, participants also noted that they felt more
natural interacting with a friend than with a study coordinator. For example, participants R24B and
R25A stated, respectively,
“I was more at ease probably than I would’ve been if it was someone random on the other
end.. . . It would’ve felt more mechanical, robotic, whereas I know [her] and I was calling my
wife, ‘Hi wife! What’s the password?’ It felt a lot more personable for me I think.”
“It was good in that you saw the troubles, like the third system [Tutanota], I didn’t even know
how it worked, so I ended up sending an email to myself on Gmail so then I could see what
was happening on her end, to know like how it works on the other end. So I think it’s good to
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have two people on each end that don’t know what’s going on, because if it weren’t I’d assume
the person on the other side had done it before.”
Third, participants indicated that because they were working with their friends, they felt more relaxed. For example, participants R11B and R14B indicated, respectively,
“I thought it was good, I dunno, might’ve taken the pressure off too, where it’s like, ‘Okay, he’s
figuring this out too’, so I can just, y’know, I don’t have to feel as ‘under-the-microscope’ in the
study.”
“I felt like neither of us knew what we were doing, but if I knew that someone else knew what
was going on, I’d be like, ‘K, hopefully I’m not doing it wrong,’ so it’s kind of like, ‘K, we’re on
the same page, neither of us know what we’re doing.’ ”
Fourth, we were pleased to note that requiring participants to bring a friend with them resulted in
a much lower missed-appointment rate than we have seen in the past.
Based on our observation of participants’ behavior and the participants’ qualitative feedback, we feel
that there is significant value in conducting two-person studies. Still, future research should examine
in greater depth the differences between one- and two-person studies. For example, an A/B study
comparing these two methodologies could be conducted which compares differences in system metrics
(e.g., SUS, task completion time) as well measures differences in users’ agitation during the study (e.g.,
heart rate, eye tracking). Similarly, research could compare how participant experiences differ when
both roles are filled by a novice, as opposed to having one simulated by a coordinator.
8.2. Hidden Details and Trust

Providing further evidence to prior work [Fahl et al. 2012; Ruoti et al. 2013], participants’ experiences
demonstrated that when security details were hidden from them, they were less likely to trust the
system. This was most clearly demonstrated when examining Pwm and Virtru. Both systems use
email-based identification and authentication [Garfinkel 2003] to verify the user’s identity to a key
escrow server (i.e., they send an email to the user with a link to click on to verify their identity). The
difference is that while Virtru requires users to manually open this email and click on the link, Pwm
performs this task automatically for users. While this difference might seem small, it was cause for
concern for several participants. For example, participants R6B and R10B expressed, respectively,
“I liked the way that one [Virtru] and the last one [Tutanota] both had ways to confirm that
it was you and no one else could see the information.”
“(Interviewer: But you didn’t think that [Pwm] was as secure [Virtru]?) [Pwm] said that
it was, but I liked how the other ones had additional ’send-you-an-email’ verification or a
password between you and the other person in the email. Just an added measure to feel like
there really is something different. ’Cause Pwm for all I know, like, I’m just taking their word
for it. There’s not really anything extra that shows that it really is secure.”
In contrast, the shared secret used by Tutanota made it clear that only the recipient who had the
password would be able to read the message. This made a large number of participants feel that
Tutanota was the most secure system, even if usability issues prevented it from being their favorite
system. R17B’s response demonstrates this principle:
“Like the order of the programs was interesting ’cause I thought the Virtru one was great,
like until I saw this [Tutanota], ‘Oh, this one [Tutanota] requires a password—why did I
think that one [Virtru] was great?’ And I wish, it would have required a password because
anybody that has your email password can just see [everything].”
The sentiment regarding passwords was so strong that several participants stated that they wished
Pwm and Virtru would also allow them to password-encrypt messages. For example, R17B, R10A, and
R10B expressed, respectively,
“I like that [Pwm] encrypted the info so that Gmail couldn’t read it. I think Pwm would be
the best one if it required passwords.”

A Usability Study of Four Secure Email Tools Using Paired Participants

A:18

“R10B: I would say exactly the second one [Pwm], just with a password (R10A: ’Yeah’) per
conversation is what I would do. Just because it’s so simple, right there. R10A: Stay on Gmail,
but then have a password to get to that encrypted email. (R10B: ’Yeah’)”
Still, not all participants were enamored with using a shared password, seeing it as an added memory burden or hassle. As stated by participants R10A, R5A, and R25A, respectively,
“I will never remember my crazy password.”
“I don’t know if I loved the password idea, just because if I was sending a secure password
over something, then why didn’t I just send the information over that anyways?”
“How do you send a password safely if your encrypting program requires a password?”
Some participants were concerned that it was impossible to verify if any of the systems were truly
encrypting their data. This likely stems from two facts: first, that participants are not security experts
and lack the means to truly verify the security of a tool, and second, that the tools themselves—once
working—never show the user any indication that they are actually receiving encrypted email. While
results from Atwater et al. suggest that showing ciphertext does not address this issue [Atwater et al.
2015], the fact that participants are concerned indicates that this problem needs more research. For
example, participants R14A and R17B stated, respectively,
“It would be kind of cool to see what it would look like as an encrypted message.. . . Seems
kind of weird. Like ‘it’s encrypted now, trust us.’ ”
“I would like to know exactly how the encryption happens—I understand that it is encrypting
it, but how do I know it’s completely safe?. . . There are too many programs that are not what
they seem, and I would not want this to be one of those.”
8.3. Integrated vs Depot

Participants overwhelmingly preferred secure email to be integrated into their existing email systems
and not require a second account (i.e., a depot). This preference was expressed through the low SUS
scores of Tutanota and the fact that only four participants rated it as their favorite system. Additionally, participant comments made it clear that they were not interested in using depot-based secure
email. For example, participants R10A, R25A, and R16A respectively stated,
“I hate having so many emails. Gmail is enough for me.”
“No one wants another email system.”
“It is just not my type. I don’t want to set up another account and send a password to my
friend.”
However, several participants felt that Tutanota was more secure than other systems, precisely
because it required the creation of an account separate from Gmail. Participants noted that in Pwm
and Virtru, access to the user’s Gmail account was all that was required to decrypt sensitive email. For
example, participants R4B, R25A, and R25B stated, respectively,
“[I like it,] I dunno, just because I leave my email up a lot, someone could just go on to my
email and look at it. I don’t sign out of my email.”
“I just kinda feel like anybody could go into your email and look at those secure ones if it is
inside your email.”
“How strong is your Gmail password, you know? If you can get in there, then it defeats these
other encryption. So, really, you’re just trying to hide your stuff from Google, which, they
already know everything, so.”
Users’ preference for integrated secure email is also shown in participant interactions with Virtru.
When users have Virtru installed on their machine, they can read and compose messages within Gmail.
In contrast, when non-Virtru users receive a Virtru-encrypted message, the message does not prompt
recipients to download and install the Virtru plugin but instead takes them to an external webpage
with message-depot functionality, bypassing the Gmail integration that participants were so fond of.
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This was disliked by several participants, with participant R13B stating, “I don’t like being taken to
another website to send a message in Gmail. I would prefer to just stay in Gmail.”
8.4. Tutorials

Tutorials were a significant factor in participants’ experiences. Pwm was rated by participants as
having the best tutorials, with a fourth of participants (24%, n=12) bringing up tutorials when asked
what they liked about Pwm. Participants largely liked the style of the tutorials as well as their content.
For example, participant 8B expressed, “I also really liked the tutorial. It was similar to tutorials Apple
or Google/Gmail give you to learn things.”
Virtru also has tutorials, but praise for these tutorials was not as common as it was with Pwm, with
Jane participants criticizing the tutorials more than Johnny participants. This result can likely be
attributed to the fact that the Virtru plugin walks new users through a tutorial upon installation, but
someone who receives a Virtru-encrypted message without the plugin is simply presented with a blue
button labeled “Unlock message” without additional instruction beyond what the sender of the email
has personally and manually added. This is in contrast to Pwm, which prefaces incoming encrypted
email with instructions on what encrypted email is and how the recipient should go about decrypting
the message.
Tutanota had no tutorials, and this clearly led to confusion. Nearly all participants failed to notice
that they needed to set a password to encrypt their email, and just as many didn’t realize that they
needed to communicate this password to the other participant. Additionally, some participants didn’t
understand that they couldn’t just use Tutanota to communicate the password Many of these problems
could have been alleviated by a simple tutorial.
8.5. Reasons to Use Encrypted Email

The majority of participants (72%) agreed with the survey statement, “I want to be able to encrypt my
email,” although only a much smaller fraction (20%) agreed with the idea that they would “encrypt
email frequently.” Still, when asked to describe how they would use encrypted email in practice, many
participants were unsure. The range of opinions are summarized in responses from participants R22A,
R24A, R20A, and R23B, respectively, on how they would use secure email in practice:
“Um, I’ve never really used it before because I didn’t know it was so accessible through Gmail
so now that I know I can, I will use it more often. (Interviewer: Do you actually plan to use
it?) Yeah, I will.”
“Like, just the other day I needed [my husband’s] social security card number for something
and then didn’t feel like there was any way I could ask him and if I had known about this, I
would have done that.”
“Well, I’m trying to think when I would need to. It would be nice to have it, in case, but I don’t
know if there’s anyone I would need to send that information to.”
“Knowing that I could encrypt email I probably could find uses for it. . . ”
These responses indicate that more research needs to be done to discover under what circumstances
users would employ secure email.
8.6. Guidelines for Usable PGP

Mailvelope clearly failed to help the majority of participants encrypt their email. All participants expressed frustration with Mailvelope, with the most comical expression of this frustration coming from
M3A: “Imagine the stupidest software you would ever use, and that was what I was doing.” The difficulty also led several participants to indicate that in the real world they would have given up trying to
use Mailvelope long before they did during the study. For example, M3A also said, “After five minutes,
I would have just given up and called.”
While our study’s results are specific to Mailvelope, our experimentation with other PGP-based tools
suggest that Mailvelope is at least as usable as those other tools. As such, it is still an open question
whether PGP-based secure email can be made sufficiently usable for the masses. Still, there are clearly
some areas where existing PGP-based secure email tools could be improved. Based on our analysis of
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all four systems studied and participant responses, we have derived the following guidelines that we
believe will help PGP-based secure email tools be significantly more usable for novice users.
8.6.1. Integrated Tutorials. When using Mailvelope, participants were constantly flipping between Mailvelope’s website and Gmail, looking for instructions on what to do next. At no stage was it intuitive
how they should proceed based on Mailvelope’s UI. Nearly all participants indicated that they wished
Mailvelope had provided instructions that were integrated with the Mailvelope software, and would
walk them through, step-by-step, in setting up Mailvelope and sending their first encrypted email. As
seen for Pwm and Virtru, tutorials likely could greatly assist first-time users in acclimating to PGP.
Important steps that could be addressed by tutorials are: (1) helping participants generate their
PGP key pair, (2) discussing how to share public keys, (3) inviting their friends to set up a secure email
tool, (4) importing their friend’s public keys, (5) sending their first encrypted email, and (6) decrypting
their first encrypted email.
8.6.2. Explanation of Public Key Cryptography. The only participant pair that successfully completed the
study task likely did so because one of the participants in the pair had previous knowledge related
to public key cryptography. Additionally, the only other pair that made progress did so because they
realized that they needed each other’s public keys, but even that pair did not know how to then use
those shared public keys. For the remaining eight participant pairs, the post-study interview made it
clear that they did not understand how public and private keys were used.
To help address this, a simple explanation of PGP needs to be developed that is accessible to the
masses. Several participants indicated that they would prefer these concepts to be displayed in a simple video. Ideally, whatever form the description takes, it would be integrated with the tutorials, allowing new users to be introduced to public key cryptography as a natural extension of their usage of
the secure email tool.
8.6.3. Automatic Key Generation. Johnny participants struggled to generate their own PGP key pair,
with much of the confusion tied to their lack of understanding regarding public and private keys. Often participants were unsure whose information they should input into the key generation dialog, their
own or that of the intended participants.24 An easy way to address this problem would be to automatically generate a user’s private key, retrieving necessary information from the webmail provider (i.e.,
name and email address), and during installation only prompt the user for the private key’s encryption
password.
8.6.4. Better Text to Accompany PGP Block. During Johnny’s attempts to send Jane an encrypted email,
Johnny often encrypted a message for himself, and then sent that encrypted message to Jane. Upon
seeing the PGP ciphertext block, Jane was unclear what she was supposed to do with it. One participant noted that she thought it was an image that had gotten garbled during email transmission.
While Johnny had obviously made a mistake, it also represented an opportunity for Jane to recognize
that Johnny was trying to use secure email. To take better use of this opportunity, the PGP ciphertext
block could be modified to include plaintext instructions detailing the nature of the encrypted email,
how to obtain a PGP-based secure email tool, and how to start sending encrypted email [Ruoti et al.
2013]. While this wouldn’t allow Jane to read the email from Johnny, it would allow her to better
collaborate with Johnny in discovering how to use secure email. An indication that this approach could
be successful is given by participant M9B, the only Jane participant who finished the study task. In
referring to the PGP ciphertext block, she said, “It was like a puzzle, I only got a link to Mailvelope. I
then had to go there and explore.”
8.6.5. Automatic Key Discovery and Email Invites. Similarly, Johnny participants were confused about what
Jane needed to do in order to receive an encrypted email. Much of this confusion was centered around
how to share keys. To address this, we recommend the use of automated key discovery—for example,
the key lookup service provided by keybase.io or other public key directories. While there are security
implications to this approach, based on our studies we feel that this would addresses a significant
hurdle for adoption of PGP-based secure email. This is corroborated in recent work by Bai et al. [Bai
24 This

was only compounded by the fact that Mailvelope showed users their own public key in the list of “recipients” the message
was encrypted for.
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et al. 2016], which found that users consider automatic key discovery more usable than manually
exchanging keys.
We also recommend that PGP clients detect when recipients don’t have a public key, and help the
sender take the appropriate steps to resolve this problem. For example, a PGP client could generate an
email for the recipient stating that the sender wants to communicate with them using PGP. This generated email could also include instructions on how to set up the PGP client. This technique was first
explored by Atwater et al. [Atwater et al. 2015], and our experience leads us to strongly recommend
it.
9. CONCLUSION

In this work, we conducted the first two-person study of secure email where two novice users are
brought into the lab together and asked to exchange secure email between themselves. Our study
analyzed Pwm, Tutanota, Virtru, and Mailvelope. Using a two-person study enabled us to see participants under different first-use experiences. In addition, participants exhibited more natural behaviors,
seemed less agitated, and indicated that they felt less like they were “under the microscope.”
Our results indicate several observations about secure email systems. First, we found further evidence that hiding security details can lead to a lack of trust in secure email systems. This gives further
credence to similar results from earlier work [Ruoti et al. 2013]. Second, we found that participants
largely rejected depot-based secure email systems. Third, participant success in using a system without mistakes is heavily influenced by the presence of well-designed tutorials. Lastly, while participants
are interested in using secure email, few express a desire to use it regularly and most are unsure of
when or how they would use it in practice.
Our results also demonstrate that after two and half decades, PGP-based secure email is still unsuitable for novice users. Still, in comparing results from the successful secure email systems (Pwm
and Virtru) with results from Mailvelope, we derived several guidelines to help make PGP tools more
suitable for novice users.
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A. SYSTEM SCREENSHOTS

Full resolution screenshots can be found at https://tops2016.isrl.byu.edu.
A.1. Pwm

Fig. 3. Pwm’s Integrated Tutorial

Fig. 4. Pwm’s Secure Composition Interface
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Fig. 5. Pwm’s Secure Read Interface

A.2. Tutanota
Fig. 8. Tutanota’s Password-Encrypted Email

Fig. 9. Tutanota’s Password-Encrypted Email Password Entry Interface

Fig. 6. Tutanota’s Sign Up Page

Fig. 7. Tutanota’s Secure Compose Interface

Fig. 10. Tutanota’s Secure Read Interface
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A.3. Virtru

Fig. 14. Virtru’s Depot-based Encrypted Email

Fig. 11. Virtru’s Integrated Tutorial

Fig. 15. Virtru’s Depot-based Secure Read Interface

A.4. Mailvelope

Fig. 12. Virtru’s Secure Composition Interface

Fig. 13. Virtru’s Integrated Secure Read Interface

Fig. 16. Mailvelope’s Enable Encryption Button
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Fig. 17. Mailvelope’s Secure Composition Interface

Fig. 20. Mailvelope’s Encrypted Message in the Webmail
Provider’s Compose Interface

Fig. 18. Mailvelope’s Public Key Selection Interface

Fig. 19. Mailvelope’s Transfer Encrypted Message Interface

Fig. 21. Mailvelope’s Encrypted Message in the Webmail
Provider’s Read Interface
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Fig. 23. Mailvelope’s Secure Read Interface

Fig. 22. Mailvelope’s Private Key Password Entry Interface
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Abstract—This paper describes MessageGuard, a
browser-based platform for research into usable
content-based encryption. MessageGuard is designed to
enable collaboration between security and usability
researchers on long-standing research questions in this
area. It significantly simplifies the effort required to
work in this space and provides a place for research
results to be shared, replicated, and compared with
minimal confounding factors. MessageGuard provides
ubiquitous encryption and secure cryptographic
operations, enabling research on any existing web
application, with realistic usability studies on a secure
platform. We validate MessageGuard’s compatibility and
performance, and we illustrate its utility with case
studies for Gmail and Facebook Chat.

1. Introduction
Users share private information on the web
through a variety of applications, such as email,
instant messaging, social media, and document
sharing. HTTPS protects this information during
transmission, but does not protect users’ data while at
rest. Additionally, middleboxes can weaken HTTPS
connections by failing to properly implement TLS or
adequately validate certificate chains [1]. Even if a
website correctly employs HTTPS and encrypts user
data while at rest, the user’s data is still vulnerable to
honest-but-curious data mining [2], third-party library
misbehavior [3], website hacking, protocol attacks [4],
[5], [6], and government subpoena.
This state of affairs motivates the need for
content-based encryption of user data. In
content-based encryption, users’ sensitive data is
encrypted at their own computer and only decrypted
once it reaches the intended recipient, remaining
opaque to the websites that store or transmit this
encrypted data. The best known examples of
content-based encryption are secure email (e.g., PGP,
S/MIME) and secure instant messaging (e.g., OTR). In
addition to protecting communication, content-based
encryption can protect any data users store or
distribute online; for example, files stored in the cloud

(e.g., DropBox, Google Drive) or tasks in a web-based
to-do list.
Unfortunately, while there is a large body of work
on messaging protocols and key management schemes
for content-based encryption [7], too little of it has
been subjected to formal usability evaluation. This is
problematic as experience has shown that many
proposals with strong theoretical foundations are
either unfeasible in real-world situations [8] or have
problems that are only apparent when studied
empirically [9], [10], [11]. As a result, there are many
open HCI and security questions regarding
content-based encryption [12].

1.1. MessageGuard
To address these concerns, we have developed
MessageGuard, a platform for usable security research
focused on content-based encryption. Currently,
participating in research of this area has been a costly
affair, requiring researchers to either build a system
from scratch [13], [14] or to make substantial
modifications to one of the existing open source
tools [15].1 MessageGuard is designed to greatly
simplify the effort required to develop usable
content-based encryption Ultimately, we hope that
MessageGuard will enable collaboration between
applied cryptography and usability researchers,
allowing them to solve the long-standing open
questions in this field, such as the creation of usable
and secure key management.
The benefits of MessageGuard include:
1) Accelerates the creation of content-based
encryption prototypes. MessageGuard provides a
fully functional content-based encryption system,
including user interfaces, messaging protocols,
and key management schemes. The modular
design of MessageGuard allows researchers to
easily modify only the portions of the system
they wish to experiment with, while the
remaining portions continue operating as
intended. This simplifies development and allows
1. Substantial modifications are needed because existing open
source content-based encryption tools are unusable [16].

researchers to focus on their areas of expertise —
either usability or security.
2) Provides a platform for sharing research results.
Researchers who create prototypes using
MessageGuard can share their specialized
interfaces, protocols, or key management schemes
as one or more patches,2 , allowing other
researchers to leverage and replicate their work.
Additionally, successful research that would
benefit all MessageGuard prototypes can be
merged into MessageGuard’s code base, allowing
the community to benefit from these advances
and reducing fragmentation of efforts.
3) Simplifies the comparison of competing designs.
MessageGuard can be used to rapidly develop
prototypes for use in A/B testing [17]. Two
prototypes built using MessageGuard will only
differ in the areas that have been modified by
researchers. This helps limit the confounding
factors that have proven problematic in past
comparisons
of
content-based
encryption
systems [2], [15], [18]. The usability studies
reported in this paper provide a baseline for
comparison against future work built on
MessageGuard.
4) Retrofits existing web applications with
content-based encryption. Because MessageGuard
works with all websites, in all browsers, and on
both desktop and mobile platforms, it enables
researchers to design usable content-based
encryption for a wide variety of applications.
Researchers do not need to cooperate with
application developers or service providers,
allowing them to easily work on systems that
have large, installed user bases. This removes a
confounding factor when conducting user studies,
since users will be familiar with the application
they are using. It also enables long-term usability
studies, with users interact with encryption as
part of their daily habits.
5) Provides secure cryptographic operations for all
applications. MessageGuard uses security
overlays [2] to isolate a user’s sensitive content
from web applications, ensuring that only an
encrypted copy of the user’s data is available to
those web applications. Thus MessageGuard
enables HCI researchers to easily test their ideas
with applications that are actually secure, rather
than relying on mock-systems, which could run
the risk of invalidating their results.
In this paper we describe the MessageGuard
platform, including our threat model, system goals,
and implementation details. Our contributions include
the following items. (1) A description of the
MessageGuard platform and a guide for how
2. Specifically, we are referring to a diff-based patch of
MessageGuard’s code base.

researchers can use it to develop usable, content-based
encryption for existing web applications. (2)
Development of the first content-based encryption
system that is designed to work with all websites, in
all browsers, and on both desktop and mobile
platforms. (3) A validation of MessageGuard’s
compatibility and performance, showing that it
supports all of the Alexa Top 50 (e.g., Facebook,
Instagram, Twitter) websites with little impact on page
load times. (4) Two case studies that illustrate how
MessageGuard meets its design objectives, including
six usability studies with 203 participants
demonstrating that users find the prototypes we built
using MessageGuard to be highly usable.

1.2. Areas of Potential Research
MessageGuard enables researchers to examine
diverse applications of content-based encryption in
web applications. For example, MessageGuard can be
used to improve existing forms of content-based
encryption such as secure email or secure chat.
Alternatively, researchers could use MessageGuard to
evaluate the feasibility of adding content-based
encryption to web applications in novel contexts, such
as signing Tweets for highly-targeted Twitter accounts
or securing cloud storage.
Researchers can use MessageGuard to implement
new interfaces, protocols, algorithms, and key
management
schemes
while
leveraging
MessageGuard’s existing usable interfaces and security
features. Prototypes built with these new research
features can be evaluated empirically, measuring the
effect that they have on the user experience.
Potential areas of exploration and collaboration for
security and HCI researchers include, but are not
limited to: (a) designing content-based encryption
interfaces that are resilient to spoofing; (b) exploring
messaging protocols and key management schemes for
content-based encryption; for example, certificate
revocation, certificate transparency, key ratcheting,
puncturable encryption; (c) developing instructive
interfaces that help users build correct mental models
of content-based encryption; (d) investigating key
escalation, which starts users on an easy-to-use, but
less secure form of key management (e.g., passwords)
and then migrates them to a more secure key
management scheme (e.g., PGP) as they gain
expertise; (e) creating interfaces that help users avoid
mistakenly sending sensitive data in the clear; (f)
supporting easy-to-use key discovery for traditional
public key cryptography (e.g., PGP); (g) notifying
users of potential insecurities regarding their
encrypted content; and (h) assisting users in migrating
their encryption keys between devices they own.

2. Related Work
Unger et al. [7] provide a comprehensive overview
of secure messaging protocols, which use
content-based encryption, and discuss a variety of key
management schemes. Unger et al.’s work
demonstrates that there is strong interest in
content-based encryption within the security
community. Still, examining the systems highlighted
by Unger et al.’s survey makes it clear that few
proposals have ever undergone user studies, making
clear the need for a platform to easily prototype and
test these proposals.

2.1. Security Overlays
There have been several systems that have used
security overlays [2], [19] to enhance existing web
applications with content-based encryption: Fahl et
al. [13] describe Confidentiality-as-a-Service (CaaS), a
system designed to make it easy for users to encrypt
their sensitive data stored in the cloud. CaaS uses
Greasemonkey, a Mozilla Firefox extension, to add
encryption capabilities to existing web pages. The
paper describes proof-of-concept implementations of
CaaS for Dropbox, Facebook, and email.
He et al. [14] proposed ShadowCrypt, a Google
Chrome extension that sits between the user and their
web services and allows the users to create and
consume encrypted content without revealing the
content to the web service. ShadowCrypt displays
encrypted contents using the Shadow DOM, an
upcoming HTML5 standard.3 Unfortunately, as
discussed in Appendix §1, several flaws compromise
the security of this approach.
Lau et al. [20] present Mimesis Aegis (M-Aegis),
a privacy-preserving system for mobile platforms.
M-Aegis places a transparent window on top of the
application GUI in order to intercept and encrypt data
before it reaches the native application. M-Aegis uses
a novel design that utilizes features of the accessibility
layer of the operating system in order to overlay the
interface of any application. To our knowledge,
M-Aegis is the first system that attempts to provide
ubiquitous and integrated encryption outside of the
browser. A prototype implementation of M-Aegis
overlaying Gmail was part of a study with 15
participants that showed most of the participants did
not report any noticeable difference between the
original app and the app with M-Aegis enabled.
In comparison to these systems, MessageGuard is
the first system that is capable of supporting
content-based encryption using security overlays
across all desktop and mobile platforms. A more
in-depth evaluation of these systems, their strengths
and weaknesses can be found in Appendix A.
3. Only blink-based browsers support the Shadow DOM.

2.2. Other approaches
In contrast to using security overlays, there are
systems that attempt to provide content-based
encryption through a combination of modifying the
browser and modifying existing web applications.
In this first category, COWL modifies the
JavaScript runtime to provide confinement between
different scripts, enforcing mandatory access
control [3]. For example, this allows untrusted
JavaScript, such as a third-party library, to compute
over sensitive data but not to transmit that data to an
untrusted server. This provides powerful capabilities to
the browser, enabling content-based encryption to be
widely supported, but requires modifications to
JavaScript and cooperation from the application
provider. Hails provides a similar confinement system,
written in Haskell [21]. Approaches that require a new
runtime are still largely theoretical and may struggle
to cope with complex web applications.
In this second category, Content Cloaking provides
a browser extension recognizes and intercepts AJAX
requests that the web application makes to the content
provider. The extension then encrypts data as it leaves
the browser and is sent to a content-provider, and then
decrypts data when it arrives from the provider and
before it is displayed by the browser. This must be
customized for each web application, and was only
demonstrated for Google Docs. Similarly, Beeswax
requires tight cooperation between application
developers and the security platform [22]. Developers
must indicate which DOM elements should be kept
private and which users can share the contents of
those elements, and then the platform provides
cryptographic operations and key management.
In comparison to these systems, MessageGuard
does not require cooperation from web applications.
This is an important distinction for two reasons: (1)
modifying individual applications does not scale with
the explosive growth of web applications, and (2)
requiring cooperation from web developers severely
limits the ability of researchers to explore
content-based encryption in the applications that most
interest them. For these reasons, in this paper we
focus on adding content-based encryption using secure
overlays.

3. Ubiquitous, Content-Based Encryption
In this section, we give the threat model that
motivates our work. Next, we describe how security
overlays can be used to enhance existing web
applications with content-based encryption. Finally,
we discuss our goals for MessageGuard, that are
necessary to support research of content-based
encryption in a usable, secure, and extensible manner.

3.1. Threat Model
In content-based encryption, sensitive content is
only accessible to the author of that data and the
intended recipient. In contrast to transport-level
encryption (e.g., TLS), which only protects data
during transit, content-based encryption protects data
both during transit and while it is at rest. In our threat
model, we consider web applications, middleboxes
(e.g. CDNs), and the content they serve to be within
the control of the adversary. The adversary wins if she
is able to use these resources to access the user’s
encrypted data. While it is true that most websites are
not malicious,4 in order to support ubiquitous,
content-based encryption, it is necessary to protect
against cases where websites are actively trying to
steal user content. Users’ computers, operating
systems, software, and content-based encryption
software5 are all considered part of the trusted
computing base in our threat model.
Our threat model is concerned with ensuring the
confidentiality, integrity, and authenticity of encrypted
data, but does allow for the leakage of meta-data
necessary for the encrypted data to be transmitted
and/or stored by the underlying web application. For
example, in order to transmit an encrypted email
message, the webmail system must have access to the
unencrypted email addresses of the message’s
recipient. Additionally, the webmail provider will be
able to inspect the encrypted package and learn basic
information about the encrypted package (e.g.,
approximate length of message, number of
recipients).6
While our threat model is necessarily strict to
support the wide range of web applications that
researchers may wish to investigate, we note that
research prototypes built using the MessageGuard
platform are free to adopt a weaker threat model that
may be more appropriate for that particular research.

3.2. Security Overlays
To encrypt user data before it reaches web
applications, we leverage a technique known as
overlaying [2], [19]. In this technique, MessageGuard
replaces portions of the web application’s interface
with secure interfaces known as overlays (see
Figure 1).7 While a security overlay appears to be a
part of the web application, the security overlay itself
is inaccessible to the web application.
There are several approaches for implementing
overlays: iFrames [2], [19], the ShadowDOM [14],
4. Many websites are best described as honest-but-curious.
5. This includes the software’s website and any web services the
software relies upon (e.g., a key server).
6. This type of leakage also occurs in HTTPS.
7. The overlayed elements are not actually removed, but visually
occluded by the secure overlays.

Portions of the web application (shown on the left) have
been overlayed with secure interfaces (shown on the
right).
Figure 1. Overlaying a web application

Greasemonkey [13], and the operating system’s
accessibility framework [20]. An in-depth analysis of
each of these approaches can be found in Appendix
§1. Based on our analysis of each of these
approaches, iFrames are the implementation strategy
best suited to work across all operating systems and
browsers
(including
mobile).
Additionally,
iFrame-based security overlays have security and
usability that are greater than or equal to that of other
approaches. As such, we designed MessageGuard
using security overlays based on iFrames.
Relying
on
iFrames
largely
restrict
MessageGuard to supporting only web applications
deployed in the browser. Still the browser is an ideal
location for studying content-based encryption: (1)
There are a large number of high usage browser-based
web applications (e.g., webmail, Google Docs). (2)
Traditional
desktop
and
mobile
application
development increasingly mimics web development,
allowing lessons learned in browser-based researcher
to also apply to these other platforms. (3) There is
already a substantial amount of research into adding
content-based encryption to web applications, both
academic (e.g., [2], [13], [14], [15]) and professional
(e.g., Virtru, Mailvelope, Encipher.it).

3.3. Platform Goals
We examined the existing work on content-based
encryption (e.g., [7], [9], [23], [24]) in order to establish
a set of design goals for MessageGuard. These goals
are centered around enabling to researcher to conduct
research into usable, content-based encryption.
3.3.1. Secure. MessageGuard should secure users’
sensitive content from web applications and network
adversaries.
MessageGuard should protect data in its overlays
from being accessed by the web application. Sensitive
data that is being created or consumed using
MessageGuard should be inaccessible to the web

application which MessageGuard has secured. A
corollary to this rule is that no entities that observe
the transmission of data encrypted by MessageGuard
should be able to decipher that data unless they are
the intended recipients.
MessageGuard’s interfaces should be clearly
distinguishable from the web application’s interfaces.
In addition to protecting content-based messages from
websites, it is important that systems clearly delineate
which interfaces belong to the website and which
belong to the content-based encryption software. This
helps users to feel assured that their data is being
protected and assists them in avoiding mistakes [2],
[17]. Additionally, visual indicators should be
included that can help protect against an adversary
that attempts to social engineer a user into believing
they are entering text into a secure interface when in
reality they are entering text directly into the
adversary’s interface [10], [25].
3.3.2. Usable. MessageGuard should provide a usable
base for future research efforts.
MessageGuard should be approachable to novice
users. Easy-to-use systems are more likely to be
adopted by the public at large [7]. Furthermore,
complicated systems foster user errors, decreasing
system security [2], [9]. While some systems need to
expose users to complex security choices, basic
functionality (e.g., sending or receiving an encrypted
email) should be approachable to new users. At a
minimum this includes building intuitive interfaces,
providing integrated, context-sensitive tutorials, and
helping first time recipients of encrypted messages
understand what they need to do in order to decrypt
their message.
MessageGuard should integrate with existing web
applications. Users enjoy the web services and
applications they are currently using and are
disinclined to adopt a new system solely because it
offers greater security. Instead, users prefer that
content-based encryption be integrated into their
existing applications [2], [15]. Equally important,
content-based encryption should have a minimal effect
on the application’s user experience; if encryption gets
in the way of users completing tasks it is more likely
that they will turn off content-based encryption [26].
MessageGuard’s interfaces should be usable at
any size. Current web interfaces allowing users to
consume or create content come in a wide variety of
sizes (i.e., height and width). When MessageGuard
integrates with these web services, it is important that
MessageGuard’s interfaces work at these same sizes.
To support the widest range of sizes, MessageGuard’s
interfaces should react to the space available,
providing as much functionality as is possible at that
display size.

3.3.3. Ubiquitous. MessageGuard should support most
websites and platforms.
MessageGuard should work with most websites
MessageGuard should make it easy for researchers to
explore adding end-to-end encryption into whichever
web applications they are interested in. While it may
be impossible to fully support all web applications
(e.g., Flash applications or applications drawn using
an HTML canvas), most standard web applications
should work out-of-the-box. For those applications
which don’t work out-of-the-box, MessageGuard
should allow researchers to create customized
prototypes that handle these edge cases.
MessageGuard should function in all major
desktop and mobile browsers. Prototypes built with
MessageGuard should function both on desktop and
mobile browsers, allowing researchers to experiment
with both of these form factors. Furthermore,
MessageGuard should work on all major browsers,
allowing users to work with the web browser they are
most familiar with, obviating the need to restrict study
recruitment to users of a specific browser.
3.3.4. Extensible. MessageGuard should be easily
extensible and contribute to the rapid development of
content-based encryption prototypes.
MessageGuard
should
be
modular.
MessageGuard’s functionality should be split into a
variety of modules, with each module taking care of a
specific function. Researchers should also be free to
only change the modules that relate to their research,
and have the system continue to function as expected.
Similarly, MessageGuard’s modules should be
extensible, allowing researchers to create new custom
modules with a minimal amount of effort.
MessageGuard
should
provide
reference
functionality. As a base for other researchers’ work,
MessageGuard
should
include
a
reference
implementation of the various modules that adds
content-based encryption to a wide range of web
applications. This reference implementation should be
able to be easily modified and extended to allow
researchers to rapidly implement their own ideas.
3.3.5. Reliable. The usability and security of
MessageGuard should be reliable, protecting
researchers from unintentionally compromising
MessageGuard’s security or usability.
Reducing the security of MessageGuard should
require deliberate intent. HCI researchers should feel
comfortable customizing MessageGuard’s interface
without needing to worry that they are compromising
security. To facilitate this, MessageGuard should
separate UI and security functionality into separate
components. As long as researchers limit themselves
to changing only UI components, there should be no
effect on security.

Figure 3. Generic Read overlay.
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Figure 2. Overview of MessageGuard architecture.

Modifying the cryptographic primitives should
have minimal effect of MessageGuard’s usability. As
above, MessageGuard should separate its UI and
security functionality into separate components. This
will allow security researchers to modify the
cryptographic primitives without worrying about how
they will affect MessageGuard’s usability. The one
caveat to this is if a new key management scheme
requires a user interface that MessageGuard does not
already make available. In this case, researchers will
need to provide this key management scheme’s
interface, which could affect usability, but other
interfaces should remain unaffected.

4. MessageGuard
Based on our design goals and using iFrame-based
security overlays we created MessageGuard. Figure 2
shows an overview of MessageGuard’s architecture.
All source code related to MessageGuard can be
found at https://bitbucket.org/isrlemail/messageguard.
An example secure email prototype built using
MessageGuard
can
be
found
at
https://messageguard.io.8
In the remainder of this section, we first describe
MessageGuard’s workflow. We then detail the design
of MessageGuard’s core components, and describe
MessageGuard’s default functionality.9 We then
discuss several web service (i.e., key server, encrypted
file server) we have created to further aid researchers
in building solutions using MessageGuard. Finally, we
give a brief overview of MessageGuard’s
implementation.

4.1. Workflow
MessageGuard’s workflow is as follows:
8. This prototype secures email sent and received through Gmail
and uses PGP-based key management. Similar prototypes that secure
email using passwords or identity-based encryption are also available
upon request.
9. Per-application customization is discussed in §5.

Figure 4. 4

Generic Compose overlay.
1) MessageGuard injects the front end component
into the website’s front end. MessageGuard’s
front end component scans for encrypted
payloads and data entry interfaces. When found,
it replaces these items with an overlay. After this
initial scan, changes to the page are tracked and
only elements that have been modified are
scanned.
2) Read overlays are used to display sensitive
information to the user, and a compose overlay
allows users to encrypt sensitive information
before sending it to the website. Each overlay is
displayed within an iframe and uses the
browser’s same-origin policy to protect its
contents from the website. Overlays use the
packager component to handle the actual
encryption/decryption and packaging of data.
3) In conjunction with the key management
component, the packager encrypts and decrypts
data. The packager also encodes encrypted data,
making it suitable for transmission to and from
the website’s front end.

4.2. Front End
MessageGuard’s front end component is injected
into every website. The front end has three
responsibilities:
1) Identify encrypted payloads. The front end
identifies encrypted payloads, overlays these
payloads with a read overlay, and sends the
payloads to the overlay so that they can be
decrypted and displayed to the user (Figure 3).
2) Identify data entry interfaces. The front end
identifies interfaces where the user may wish to
enter
encrypted
data
(e.g.,
[contentEditable]
and
textarea
elements). Each of these interfaces are then
modified to display a button that users can click

Figure 5. Generic read overlay in constrained space.

to replace the interface with a compose overlay
(Figure 4).The front end also creates an overlay
manager for each overlay that handles passing
data between the the compose overlay and the
website (e.g., sending the overlay the encrypted
payload, saving drafts).
3) Displaying context-sensitive tutorials. The front
end displays tutorials that instruct new users how
to
use
MessageGuard.
These
are
all
context-sensitive, appearing as the user performs
a given task for the first time.
The front end is the only MessageGuard
component that runs outside of MessageGuard’s
protected origin. For this reason, MessageGuard is
designed to treat the front end as untrusted. Since the
front end component does not exist as part of
MessageGuard’s protected origin, it cannot directly
access the packager, key management, or overlay
components. Instead, it is limited to communicating
with the overlay component using the web messaging
API [27]. Additionally, the overlay always encrypts
user data before transmitting it to the front end
component and sanitizes any data it receives from the
front end.
4.2.1. Default Functionality. MessageGuard’s default
front end modifies all web applications to allow for
content-based encryption. The default front end will
create a read overlay for encrypted payloads found
anywhere on the page. It will also allow encryption in
all larger textual entry interface elements (i.e.,
[contentEditable] and textarea elements).
The front end also contains generic tutorials, which
are shown when users first encounter new
functionality in MessageGuard.

4.3. Overlays
MessageGuard’s overlays are designed to mimic
the placement and dimensions of the content they
overlay and to be visually appealing and intuitive.
Overlays have a distinctive, dark color scheme that
stands out from most websites, allowing users to
easily identify secure overlays from insecure website
interfaces. Finally, overlays sanitize the plaintext
contents of encrypted messages in order to prevent
malicious messages from compromising the overlay.
4.3.1. Default Functionality. MessageGuard includes
two standard overlays: a read overlay (Figure 3) and a

Figure 6. Generic compose overlay in constrained space.

compose overlay (Figure 4).10 Read overlays are
responsible for decrypting and displaying sensitive
information to users. Compose overlays allow users to
compose rich text messages and encrypt these
messages before sending them to the website. Both
overlays are reactive and modify their layout based on
available space. For example, at small sizes, the
compose overlay no longer shows tools for formatting
text, but still allows their use through keyboard
shortcuts (see Figure 5 and Figure 6).

4.4. Packager
The packager encrypts/decrypts user data and
encodes the encrypted data to make it suitable for
transmission through web applications. The packager
uses standard cryptographic primitives and techniques
to encrypt/decrypt data (e.g., AES-GCM). Ciphertext
is packaged with all information necessary for
recipients of the message to decrypt it.
4.4.1. Default Functionality. MessageGuard’s default
packager is based on the Cryptographic Message
Syntax (CMS) [28] used in S/MIME. It differs from
CMS in that all non-essential attributes (e.g.,
versioning information) are removed. This was done
to reduce the package size, which is necessary for
MessageGuard to support web applications that
constrain the size of packages (e.g., chat applications).
The one downside to this approach is that messages
encrypted with this default packager cannot be read
by existing secure email clients; though, customized
packagers could be developed to support existing
secure email standards (e.g., PGP, S/MIME).

4.5. Key Management
MessageGuard’s key management component
provides a UI (displayed in MessageGuard’s options
page) that lists the keys currently available to the user
and allows the users to create, register, and delete
keys. The key management component also manages
storage for the various key management schemes. It
includes encrypted storage for sensitive information
(e.g., private keys), that is protected by a master
password set by the user when first running
MessageGuard. Finally, we note that while all the
prototypes we have built with MessageGuard have
only used a single key management scheme at a time,
MessageGuard supports prototypes that permit users
10. Support for a file upload overlay is also nearing completion.

inter-operate with MessageGuard: a key server and a
file server. The code for both servers is in
MessageGuard’s code repository, and researchers are
welcome to have their prototypes point at our key
server and file server, or deploy their own.

Figure 7. Interface for creating keys using a shared password.

to pick and choose which key management schemes
they want to use for which messages.
4.5.1. Default Functionality. We have created three
reference key management schemes for use in
MessageGuard:
• PGP. We have created a standard-compliant
implementation of PGP. This implementation
generates 2048-bit keys for users, and publishes
these keys for discovery on the MessageGuard’s
key server web service. The PGP private key pair
is stored in the user’s browser, but is encrypted
using the key manager’s master password.
• Identity-based encryption (IBE). We have
implemented the Boneh-Boyen IBE scheme [29]
for use in MessageGuard. The key server web
service is responsible for storing the system
parameters
and
master
secret.
Clients
automatically generate public keys based on
recipient identifiers. The private key is retrieved
from the key server and stored in the user’s
browser, but is encrypted using the key manager’s
master password.
• Shared Password. Finally, we have created a key
management scheme where emails are encrypted
using passwords shared between users. These
passwords are transformed into key material
through the use of the PBKDF2 function. This
key management scheme does not use the key
server, and users are responsible for sharing their
passwords out of band. The derived key material
can either be stored in the user’s browser and
encrypted by the key manager’s master password,
or users can re-enter their shared passwords each
time they want to encrypt or decrypt a message.11
Figure 7 is an example of the interfaces users see
when adding a key to MessageGuard.

4.6. Web Services
To help researchers in creating systems using
MessageGuard, we have created two web services that
11. We have created one key management scheme for each
behavior.

4.6.1. Key Server. To facilitate key management
schemes that require discovery of public keys (e.g.,
PGP, S/MIME) or require key escrow (e.g., IBE) we
have created a key server. The key server requires that
users create an account with a username and a
password. After account creation, users prove their
ownership of other accounts (e.g., email, Twitter,
Facebook). Once a user has established ownership of
an account, ownership cannot be transferred to another
owner unless first released by the original owner.
This key server exposes two sets of REST
endpoints: public and private. The public endpoints
are used to retrieve public data (e.g., public keys, IBE
system parameters). The private endpoints are limited
to users that have proved ownership of the appropriate
account (e.g., setting a public key for a given email
address, retrieving private IBE keys, etc.).
Both the PGP and IBE key management schemes we
have included with MessageGuard make use of the key
server. For the PGP scheme, users upload their public
keys to the key server (via private endpoint), and other
users download those public keys as needed (via public
endpoint). For IBE, users can query the key server for
the system parameters (via public endpoint), and also
retrieve their private keys (via private endpoint). We
welcome other researchers to use our publicly available
key server, but they can also deploy their own as needed
with the code hosted in the repository.
4.6.2. File Server. We have created a file server that
allows for capability-based storage of files. Currently,
the file server allows anyone to upload a file, after which
they are given a capability (i.e., UID) that can be used
to access that file. While we currently do not require
authentication to the key server, that is something that
could easily be added.
In practice, we use the file server to enable
attachments in encrypted email. In our work using
MessageGuard to build a secure integrated email
prototype, we were not able to use the underlying
email application’s native file attachment functionality,
and instead relied upon the file server to store
encrypted attachments. This was done by encrypting
the attachment with a random key, and storing the
encrypted file sans key on the file server. The
encryption key, a cryptographic hash of the
attachment, and the capability for the attachment are
stored in the encrypted email. As such, only
individuals who can decrypt the email message are
able to access and decrypt the attachment.

Front End

4.7. Implementation
We implemented MessageGuard so that it would
run on all major desktop browsers (i.e., Chrome,
Firefox, Internet Explorer, Opera, Safari) and mobile
browsers (i.e., Android, iOS, Windows Phone). We
employed only standard JavaScript functions that were
confirmed to work on all major browsers.12 We
avoided injecting polyfills into the web application
and polluting the window object in an effort to
ensure that MessageGuard did not break existing web
applications. MessageGuard is implemented as both a
browser extension and as a bookmarklet (i.e., user
script).
MessageGuard has a single codebase, with only a
small portion of code that is used to address
differences in various browsers (< 1%). This codebase
is implemented in JavaScript, Sass, and HTML. The
code is compiled into browser extensions and a
bookmarklet using NodeJS and Gulp. The code itself
is split into a number of JavaScript modules which are
bundled together at compile time using Browserify.
Browserify also allows MessageGuard to leverage a
large number of quality NodeJS modules (e.g.,
CryptoJS, jQuery, Bootstrap). The build system also
generates source maps to facilitate debugging, runs
style checking on the code, and generates
documentation using JSDoc. Instructions for setting
up and building MessageGuard are available in
MessageGuard’s repository.
Further details regarding the technologies used to
implement MessageGuard can be found in Appendix
§2.

Main
ControllerBase
OverlayManagerBase
Overlay
HTML

JavaScript
OverlayBase
PackagerBase
Key Management

Figure 8. MessageGuard’s customizable framework.

global functionality of MessageGuard, researchers
need to change the aforementioned default
implementations. If researchers desire to implement
new functionality (e.g., create a new overlay, support a
new application), they can instead subclass these base
classes. All classes, both base classes and default
implementations, can be extended, but only allow
researchers to override the methods that are unique to
their functionality.

5.1. Frontend

In this section, we describe the ways researchers
can employ MessageGuard as a platform for their own
research. In addition to the details described in this
section, we invite researchers to download
MessageGuard’s source code. To help researchers
quickly familiarize themselves with MessageGuard’s
code base, we have included instructive comments
throughout the code and have provided a reference
implementation that supports most websites.13 that
researchers can refer to as they build their own
systems.
MessageGuard was designed to minimize the
amount of code that must be changed in order for
researchers to build new prototypes. The customizable
classes enabling this rapid prototyping are shown in
Figure 8. MessageGuard includes a default
instantiation for each of the base classes (e.g.
ControllerBase) seen in the figure. To change the

The main class is responsible for parsing the URL
and instantiating the appropriate controller (i.e.,
classes extending ControllerBase). Frontend
controllers are responsible for the actual operations of
the frontend, including detecting when overlays are
needed and placing those overlays. Every overlay is
created by and coupled to an overlay manager, which
is responsible for handling communication between
the overlay and MessageGuard’s frontend. Currently,
MessageGuard provides overlay managers for both
reading and composing encrypted content.
The simplest way to modify the frontend is to
change the elements that it will overlay. This can be
done by changing the CSS selector that is passed to
ControllerBase’s constructor.14 The controller
can also be configured to support additional types of
overlays (i.e., creating a unified read and compose
overlay for instant messaging clients). In this case, it
will also be necessary to create an overlay manager to
communicate with the new overlay.

12. http://caniuse.com/.
13. The code base also includes an implementation of secure email
as an additional reference.

14. Though unlikely to be necessary, it is also possible to modify
the controller to do more complex selection that does not rely on CSS
selection.

5. MessageGuard as a Research Platform

Using these base classes, MessageGuard’s default
functionality was implemented using less than 200 lines
of JavaScript.

5.2. Overlays
Overlays are composed of both HTML interfaces
and JavaScript code. Researchers can either modify the
existing overlays (read and compose), or create their
own overlays. The steps for creating a new overlay on
a per application basis are as follows:
1) Create a new HTML file for each overlay. This
will define the visual appearance of the overlay.
2) Create a custom read, compose, or entirely new
overlay (e.g., file upload) by extending either the
OverlayBase class or one the reference
overlays (read and compose). These parent
classes provide basic functionality (e.g.,
positioning, communication with the frontend).
3) Connect the overlay’s HTML interface to its
controlling code by referencing this new
JavaScript class in the new HTML.
4) Create a new overlay manager to work with the
new overlay. You can extend any of the existing
overlay managers, or create a new one by
extending OverlayManagerBase.
5) Add any custom communication code to both the
new overlay and overlay manager.
MessageGuard’s default read overlay required 70
lines of HTML and 150 lines of JavaScript to
implement. The default compose overlay needed 190
lines of HTML and 670 lines of JavaScript, most of
which was responsible for setting up the HTML5
rich-text interface and allowing users to select a
specific key for encryption.

5.3. Packager
By overriding PackagerBase, it is possible to
create
custom
message
packages,
allowing
MessageGuard to support a wide range of
content-based encryption protocols. This functionality
can be used to allow prototypes developed with
MessageGuard to inter-operate with existing
cryptographic systems (e.g., using the PGP package
syntax in order to be compatible with existing PGP
clients). It could also be used to experiment with
advanced cryptographic features, such as key
ratcheting [7].

5.4. Key Management
Key management is one of the most poorly
understood areas of usable, content-based encryption.
While there are many advocates of particular key
management schemes (e.g., PGP), there has been little
work to actually analyze the empirical usability of

these schemes. One key goal of MessageGuard is to
allow existing proposals for key management to be
implemented in a real system, and then compared
against alternative schemes. As such, we took special
care to ensure that MessageGuard would be
compatible with all key management schemes we are
currently aware of.
In order to create a new key management scheme,
the following two classes must be implemented:
KeyScheme. The KeyScheme is responsible for
handling scheme-specific UI functionality for the key
manager (e.g., importing public/private keys,
authenticating to a key server). The KeyScheme
methods are:
• getUI Retrieves a scheme-specific UI that will be
included with the KeyUIManager’s generic UI.
This method is provided with the KeySystem
being created/updated and a callback which
notifies the KeyUIManager that the KeySystem is
ready to be saved.
• handleError Modifies an existing KeySystem’s
UI to allow it to address an error. This method is
provided with details about the error, the
KeySystem UI to modify, and a callback which
notifies the KeyUIManager that the error has
been resolved. Examples of errors include not
having a necessary key or expired authentication
credentials.
• create
Creates a KeySystem from the
scheme-specific UI provided to this method.
• update Updates a KeySystem from the schemespecific UI provided to this method.
KeySystem. A KeySystem is an instantiation of a
key management scheme that allows the users to
decrypt/sign data for a single identity and
encrypt/verify data for any number of identities.15 A
KeySystem
is
responsible
for
performing
cryptographic operations with the keys it manages.
Every KeySystem has a fingerprint that uniquely
identifies it. The KeySystem methods are:
• serialize/deserialize Prepares data that is not a
part of the KeyAttributes type for storage by the
KeyStorage class.
• encrypt Encrypts data for the provided identity.
Returns the encrypted data along with the
fingerprint of the KeySystem that can decrypt it.
• decrypt Decrypts the provided data.
• sign Signs the provided data.
• verify Verifies that the provided signature is valid
for the provided data.
By default, MessageGuard will allow users to use
all available key management schemes, though this can
be overridden on a per-prototype basis.
15. Key systems which don’t support recipients set
canHaveRecipients to false and ignore the identity
parameters.

6. Validation

Stage
n

100

Static
500

1000

100

We evaluated MessageGuard ability to support
usable, content-based encryption research on a wide
range of platforms. Additionally, we measured the
performance overhead that MessageGuard creates. Our
results indicate that MessageGuard is compatible with
most web applications and has minimal performance
overhead.

Chrome1
Firefox1
Safari1

1.14
1.06
0.45

0.84
0.99
0.63

0.95
0.96
0.53

3.17
2.26
3.73

6.49
3.15
12.8

11.0
4.45
25.5

Chrome2
Chrome3
Safari3

4.27
5.68
2.57

4.39
5.97
2.46

4.60
5.94
1.79

12.9
12.4
15.1

30.2
32.0
25.2

51.1
61.2
39.5

6.1. Ubiquity
We tested MessageGuard on major browsers and it
worked in all cases: Desktop – Chrome, Firefox,
Internet Explorer, Opera, and Safari. Android –
Chrome, Firefox, Opera. iOS – Chrome, Mercury,
Safari.
We tested MessageGuard on the Alexa top 50 web
sites. One of the sites is not a web application (t.co)
and another requires a Chinese phone number in order
to use it (weibo.com). MessageGuard was able to
encrypt data in 47 of the 48 remaining web
applications. The one site that failed (youtube.com)
did so because the application removed the comments
field when it lost focus, which happens when focus
switched to MessageGuard’s compose overlay. We
were able to address this problem with a customized
front end that required only five lines of code to
implement.
These results indicate that researchers should be
able to use MessageGuard to research content-based
encryption for the web applications of their choice
with little difficulty.

6.2. Performance
We profiled MessageGuard on several popular web
applications and analyzed MessageGuard’s impact on
load times. In each case, we started the profiler,
reloaded the page, and stopped profiling once the page
was loaded. Our results show that MessageGuard has
little impact on page load times and does not degrade
the user’s experience as they surf the Web: Facebook
– 0.93%, Gmail – 2.92%, Disqus – 0.54%, Twitter –
1.98%.
Since MessageGuard is intended to work with all
websites, we created a synthetic web app that allowed
us to test MessageGuard’s performance under extreme
load. This app measures MessageGuard’s performance
when overlaying static content present at page load
(Stage 1) and when overlaying dynamic content that is
added to the page after load (Stage 2). The application
takes as input n, the number elements that will be
overlayed in each stage. Half of these elements will
require read overlays and half will require compose
overlays.
Using this synthetic web application, we tested
MessageGuard with six browsers and three values of

Dynamic
500
1000

1

MacBook Air (OSX 10.10.3, 1.7GHz Core i7, 8GB RAM).
Chrome – 42.0.2311.135, Firefox – 37.0.2, Safari – 8.0.5.
2
OnePlus One (CyanogenMod 12S, AOSP 5.1, 64GB).
Chrome – 42.0.2311.47.
3
iPad Air (iOS 8.3, 1st gen, 64GB).
Chrome – 42.0.2311.47, Safari – 8.0.
TABLE 1. AVERAGE TIME TO OVERLAY AN ELEMENT ( MS )

n. We averaged measurements over ten runs and
report our findings in Table 1. These results show that
the time taken to overlay static content does not
significantly vary based on the number of overlays
created. In contrast, the time taken to overlay dynamic
content is superlinear in the number of overlays
created.16 Regardless, even in extreme cases (dynamic
- n = 1000) overlaying occurs quickly (max 61 ms).
MessageGuard’s low performance overhead
indicates that it is suitable for building responsive
prototypes. Moreover, if performance problems arise,
researchers can be reasonably sure that the problems
are in their changes to MessageGuard.

7. Case Studies
While developing MessageGuard, we developed
two content-based encryption prototypes using
MessageGuard: a secure Facebook Chat prototype and
a secure email prototype. In this section we describe
these prototypes, the effort taken to build them, and
IRB-approved usability studies of these prototypes.
These case studies demonstrate that MessageGuard
enables building high quality research prototypes that
are well-liked by users.

7.1. Private Facebook Chat
Using an early version of MessageGuard, we
created Private Facebook Chat (PFC), a system that
adds content-based encryption to chat on
Facebook [30]. PFC leverages identity-based
encryption (IBE) in order to transparently manage
encryption keys, removing the need for users to
establish shared secrets or obtain public keys in before
sending chat messages.
PFC uses a custom controller that detects the
Facebook Chat interface. Instead of having separate
16. The time taken to overlay dynamic content is linear for Firefox.
This indicates that our approach is not inherently superlinear, and will
scale linearly as browsers become more optimized.

Figure 10. Customized MessageGuard front end for email.
Figure 9. A unified overlay for Facebook Chat.

read and compose overlays, PFC uses a single unified
overlay that handles displaying and composing
encrypted messages (see Figure 9). Using a single
overlay was advantageous because it was more space
efficient and better mimicked a typical instant
messaging interface.17
We conducted an IRB-approved user study of PFC
involving 17 participants. Almost all users were able
to use PFC to encrypt their chat sessions, except two
extremely novice users that were unable to complete
any tasks. Additionally, users indicated that they were
generally satisfied with PFC and that they would be
interested in using it in practice.
The Facebook Chat prototype took a single student
working part-time one month to complete (about 80
hours). Most of this time was spent designing the
interface for the unified overlay and modifying
MessageGuard’s IBE key management scheme to
support authentication through Facebook Connect. In
total, PFC’s implementation required 50 lines of
HTML and 350 lines of JavaScript.

7.2. Private Webmail (Pwm)
The design of MessageGuard was guided by our
development of a series of secure email prototypes for
Gmail [2], [16], [17] that we used to study usable,
secure email for the masses. These prototypes all go
by the name Private Webmail (Pwm). Pwm uses
identity-based encryption (IBE) to allow users to send
encrypted email to recipients who have not yet
installed Pwm, something that is not possible with
PGP or S/MIME. In addition, Pwm focuses on
helping first time users understand how to decrypt
their first secure email and how to use Pwm to
encrypt messages.
17. In general, we recommend this approach for instant messaging
clients.

In order to maximize Pwm’s integration with
Gmail we created a customized front end that
annotates Gmail’s interface. Our specialized front
annotates Gmail’s interface to help users understand
better how their email is protected (see Figure 10). We
also added the ability for users to include a plaintext
greeting with their encrypted emails, helping
recipients feel safe when receiving encrypted email.
Additionally, we added context-sensitive, inline
tutorials that instructed users on how to use Pwm and
what protections it affords their email.
We have evaluated Pwm across five different
IRB-approved usability studies, including a total of
186 participants. Each of these studies utilized a
standard usability metric, the System Usability Scale
(SUS) [31], [32], which generates a single score
between 0 and 100 that is an indication of a system’s
usability. SUS consists of ten discriminating questions
that users answer after completing tasks using
MessageGuard.
The first three user studies all involved the same
version of Pwm, with the first study (25 participants)
having participants install Pwm using a bookmarklet,
and the second (32 participants) and third study (28
participants) having participants install Pwm using an
extension [2]. In each of the three studies, recipients
were told to wait for an email containing information
needed to continue the study, though they were not
informed that this email would be encrypted. They
were then sent the encrypted email, and were required
to decrypt this email, before continuing to send and
reply to several more encrypted emails. Overall, Pwm
averaged a SUS score of 73.8, putting it in the 70th
percentile of systems tested with SUS — first study
(75.7), second study (70.7), third study (70.7).
Qualitative feedback from these three studies
revealed that we had made the encryption and key
management details too transparent and users were
unsure whether or not to trust the system. This caused
us to modify our design to make some encryption
details more apparent in the interface [17]. Using this

modified version of Pwm, we conducted our fourth
usability study. It involved 51 participants that
experimented with the bookmarklet version of
MessageGuard and incorporated changes based on the
results of prior studies. The results of this test was a
SUS score of 80.0, falling in the 88th percentile of
systems tested with SUS. More importantly, our
modifications to Pwm (which were also incorporated
into MessageGuard’s reference implementation)
succeeded in addressing user concerns. Nearly all
participants (92%) believed that their friends and
family could easily start using it.
Our fifth study examined whether Pwm could be
adopted in a grassroots fashion [18]. To test this, we
brought in pairs of novice users, and instructed the
first participant to send an encrypted email to the
second participant. The first participant was only
given a link to Pwm, while the second user was not
informed that they would be using encrypted email. In
this study, Pwm received a SUS score of 72.3, falling
in the 63rd percentile of systems tested with SUS.18
Furthermore, all users successfully used Pwm to begin
transmitting encrypted emails between themselves, and
most users praised Pwm’s tutorials and intuitive
interfaces.
As Pwm was developed in lock-step with
MessageGuard, it is difficult to know exactly how
much time was spent specifically on Pwm specific
functionality, though we estimate around 150 hours.
Most of this time was spent reverse engineering
Gmail’s interface, which is difficult because is
dynamically generated and minimizes both HTML and
JavaScript. We also spent significant time creating and
refining Pwm’s tutorials. In total, Pwm includes
approximately 1300 news lines of JavaScript.

7.3. Lessons Learned
Both case studies demonstrate that it is possible to
rapidly build content-based encryption prototypes
using MessageGuard. While these prototypes still
required some time to implement (80 and 150 hours),
this pales in comparison to the nearly 2000 hours that
have already gone into the development of
MessageGuard. Our work with Pwm especially helped
us see the value of comparing competing systems; lab
usability studies have been particularly helpful in
helping us to differentiate between the usability of
several different secure email systems. Finally, these
case studies demonstrate that MessageGuard can be
used to build prototypes that are rated by users as
being highly usable. This is especially important in
the case of Pwm, as Pwm’s interfaces are highly
similar to the interfaces used in MessageGuard’s
default functionality.
18. In this study we also examined other systems, all of which
received uncharacteristically low scores, suggesting that Pwm’s true
SUS score is much closer to the 80 found in our fourth study.

8. Conclusion
We described MessageGuard, a platform for usable
security research focused on content-based encryption.
MessageGuard is designed to encourage collaboration
between the security and usability research
communities to solve longstanding usability problems
in this space. It simplifies development of prototypes
and comparison of competing designs, while also
providing a platform for sharing and replicating
research results. MessageGuard retrofits existing
applications, providing broad utility to developers, and
includes secure cryptographic operations so that
usability is tested on functioning systems. We
validated the performance and deployability of
MessageGuard and shared several case studies
demonstrating its utility for the field. Our hope is that
MessageGuard will help security and usability
researchers to cooperate in solving numerous pressing
problems and speed the adoption of usable,
content-based encryption.
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Appendix
1. Implementation Strategies
To determine the appropriate implementation
strategy for MessageGuard, we examined approaches
for enhancing web applications with content-based
encryption. In this section, analyze these approaches
with respect to their deployability, security, and
usability. We group the implementation strategies into
two categories: integrated strategies and non-integrated
strategies. We also propose two new hybrid strategies
that address limitations in the existing strategies and
are better suited to meet our system goals.
1.1. Integrated Strategies. Integrated strategies
attempt to add content-based encryption directly to the
interfaces of existing websites. In a process known as
overlaying [19], the browser can replace portions of
the website’s interface with secure interfaces known as
overlays.These overlays are displayed as if they were
a part of the web application, but their contents are
inaccessible to the web application. Often, there are
different overlays for different functions, such as
composing textual content, uploading files, and
decrypting content.
iFrame. The oldest integrated strategy is to create
overlays using HTML iFrames [2], [19]. Since
iFrames are a part of the browser’s DOM, it is trivial
to integrate them with websites. Further, iFrames are
protected by the browser’s same-origin policy. There
are three methods for overlaying websites with
iFrames:
1) Browser extension. Extensions are desktop only,
except in the case of Firefox on Android.
2) Bookmarklet. Bookmarklets are user scripts that
are stored as browser bookmarks. When a user
clicks a bookmarklet, the associated script is
executed on the current page. Bookmarklets are
supported on all platforms, both desktop and
mobile, and do not require users to install any
software.

When using bookmarklets, the iFrame’s src
attribute will need to reference a trusted remote
domain. To maximize security, this domain
should only host the contents needed by the
bookmarklet’s
user
script.
This
limited
functionality makes it easier to lock down the
domain’s servers in order to prevent an intrusion
by the adversary.
Bookmarklets are affected by the browser’s
Content Security Policy (CSP), which can be
used to limit the source of frames and scripts.
Still, this limitation has been marked as a bug in
Chromium19 and Firefox,20 and it is possible that
in the future this limitation will be removed. In
practice, only a small number of websites use
CSP.
3) Proxy application. A proxy application can be
used to augment the bookmarklet approach. First,
it can modify the CSP settings of a website to
allow iFrame’s to reference the system’s trusted
domain. Second, a proxy can automatically inject
the bookmarklet script into a webpage, obviating
the need for the user to click the bookmarklet.
Third, a proxy can allow the iFrame strategy to
work with non-browser applications that display
HTML interface elements retrieved from the web.
A proxy application can work on any platform,
except for Windows on mobile devices. Still,
there are two significant drawbacks to this
approach: (1) for non-rooted phones, the proxy
must be implemented using the phone’s VPN
service and (2) it must proxy HTTPS connections
in order to modify their contents.
In prior work, we used iFrames to develop Pwm, a
secure email client for the masses [2]. Pwm tightly
integrated with Gmail and was designed to maximize
usability. Pwm focused on helping first time recipients
of an encrypted email understand how to install Pwm
and decrypt their message. Pwm was rated as highly
usable by participants in several usability studies.
Since our work on Pwm, additional systems in both
research [15] and industry (e.g., Virtru, Mailvelope)
have also used the iFrame strategy to secure email.
Shadow DOM. Shadow DOM is a new feature
proposed in the HTML5 specification, and currently
has a partial implementation in Blink-based browsers
(e.g., Chrome). The Shadow DOM allows for the
creation of a “shadow” DocumentFragment (i.e.,
ShadowRoot) that will be rendered in place of
another fragment (i.e., host) on the website. Elements
contained in the ShadowRoot are invisible to the
rest of the DOM and must be accessed through their
parent
ShadowRoot.
For
example,
document.getElementById cannot find children
of a ShadowRoot.
19. https://code.google.com/p/chromium/issues/detail?id=233903
20. https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show bug.cgi?id=866522

Overlays can be implemented using a
ShadowRoot. However, while ShadowRoot objects
and their contents should only be accessible to the
entity that created the ShadowRoot object, in
practice this is not the case:
1) The Shadow DOM allows for an element to have
multiple ShadowRoots, with the newest
ShadowRoot
having
access
to
older
ShadowRoot
objects
through
their
olderShadowRoot property.
2) There are two CSS selectors that “pierce” the
Shadow DOM. First the “>>>” selector can be
used to grab any element that matches the
selectors to the right of “>>>”, regardless of
whether that element is inside a ShadowRoot.
Similarly, the “::shadow” pseudo-selector can be
used to select the ShadowRoot attached to any
element.
3) The
Element.prototype.createShadowRoot
method
can be replaced by the web application with a
version that saves references to the created
ShadowRoots, allowing the web application to
access the contents of these ShadowRoots.
In order to implement overlays using a
ShadowRoot, it is necessary to modify the
JavaScript environment to address these access
methods [14]. Because of this limitation,
ShadowDOM cannot be implemented using a
bookmarklet, which cannot guarantee that the
JavaScript environment is modified before the website
has the ability to store pointers to these access
methods. Instead, a Shadow DOM strategy must be
implemented using either an extension or a proxy
application.
He et al. used the Shadow DOM to implement
ShadowCrypt, a Chrome extension that attempted to
add secure communication to arbitrary websites [14].
In our experience, usability issues keep ShadowCrypt
from working with most websites. Moreover, flaws in
ShadowCrypt’s implementation allow the website to
retrieve the user’s sensitive data.21 This demonstrates
the danger of relying on non-standard security models
created by developers.
Greasemonkey. Greasemonkey is a Firefox plugin
that allows for websites to be modified with custom
interface elements defined using XUL. XUL interface
elements can be used for overlays, and the contents of
these interfaces are protected by the browser’s
sandboxing of websites [33].
Fahl et al. used Greasemonkey to create a Firefox
extension that added content-based encryption to
Dropbox, Facebook, and email [13]. Their plugin used
Confidentiality-as-a-Service (CaaS) to automate key
21. A detailed description of this problem is given later in the
appendix.

management. Usability studies demonstrate that their
system was highly usable.
Accessibility. Most operating systems have an
accessibility layer that is used by accessibility tools to
modify apps to make them usable by individuals with
disabilities. Lau et al. proposed using the accessibility
layer to implement secure overlays [20]. In this
strategy, the content of secure overlays is protected by
the browser’s sandbox. While our work is concerned
with encrypting content within the browser, the
accessibility layer is interesting in that it has the
potential to secure non-browser applications. While
iFrames implemented using a proxy application can
also
support
non-browser
applications,
the
accessibility layer has the potential to be more
universal and reliable.
Lau et al. used this strategy to develop Mimesis
Aegis (M-Aegis), a system for enhancing Android
apps with content-based encryption. Their system
secured several communication apps (e.g., Gmail) and
also provided a method for support to be added for
additional apps.22 A usability study of the Android
Gmail app secured with M-Aegis showed that most
participants did not report any noticeable difference
between the original Gmail app and the Gmail app
with M-Aegis enabled.
1.2. Non-integrated Strategies. In contrast to
integrated strategies, non-integrated strategies use
separate applications to provide encryption, relying on
the user to copy-and-paste encrypted content in and
out of the original application. Because these
applications are not integrated with websites, they are
free to make UI design choices that maximize
usability, without any concern that these choices will
clash with a website’s UI.
Standalone website. A standalone website can be
used to handle encryption and decryption. While it is
not integrated with websites, it is integrated with the
browser. Since a browser is used to run the website,
no installation is required. Security is provided by the
browser’s same-origin policy. This approach is not
common, but there have been a few standalone
websites that provide PGP encryption.23
Standalone Application. A standalone application
is the traditional strategy for implementing
content-based encryption. Security is provided by the
operating system’s app separation policies.
The earliest example of a standalone content-based
encryption application is Pretty Good Privacy (PGP).
PGP was created in 1991 by Phil Zimmerman and is
used to protect a wide range of data. Since then, many
similar programs have been created.
22. This method is not generic and requires custom logic for each
supported application.
23. For example, https://www.igolder.com/pgp/encryption/ and
http://www.hanewin.net/encrypt/PGcrypt.htm.
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TABLE 2. C OMPARISON OF IMPLEMENTATION STRATEGIES

1.3. Comparison. We have analyzed and compared
each of the above strategies based on their
deployability, usability, and security. The results are
summarized in Table 2.
Deployability. There are three key areas of
deployability: which browsers are supported, which
desktop operating systems are supported, and which
mobile devices are supported. Both the Greasemonkey
and Shadow DOM strategies are limited to a single
type of browser, Firefox and Blink-based, respectively.
On mobile, Greasemonkey only works with Firefox on
Android and the Shadow DOM requires the use of a
proxy application, which as mentioned earlier is less
than ideal (marked as “Partial support” in Table 2).
Greasemonkey uses XUL, which is slated for
deprecation. On the other hand, Shadow DOM is part
of the HTML5 specification and there is a good
chance that sometime in the future it will become
standard in more browsers.
The deployment challenge faced by both the
accessibility and standalone app strategy is that every
platform, both desktop and mobile, requires its own
implementation. For standalone apps, this burden
could be reduced through the use of a cross-platform
framework (e.g., Java, Mono), though these
frameworks commonly lead to systems with a poor
look-and-feel. Unfortunately, there is not a
cross-platform accessibility layer and each platform
does require a unique implementation. These
limitations have been marked in Table 2 using the
“Partial support” symbol.
Both iFrames and standalone websites are built on
commonly deployed approaches, and work on all
platforms and browsers. iFrames on mobile can be
implemented using either bookmarklets or an
application proxy. In the case of bookmarklets,
iFrames are limited by websites’ CSP policies, and in
the case of a proxy application on mobile devices,

there is the degradation of user experience (marked as
“Partial support” in Table 2).
Usability. The standalone strategies suffer from a
lack of integration, which is disliked by users [2],
[15]. On the other hand, because the standalone
strategies are not tied to the website’s interface, the
standalone strategies support non-standard interfaces
(e.g., input field drawn using an HTML canvas).
While the integrated strategies could contain logic to
handle website-specific interfaces, this approach is a
significant engineering effort (marked as “Partial
support” in Table 2).
The standalone website strategy does not require
installation. When the iFrame strategy is implemented
using bookmarklets, there is also no installation.
Security. The Greasemonkey, accessibility, and
standalone app strategies all rely on the browser’s
sandbox for security [33]. The sandbox prevents
websites from being able to access any resources
outside of the websites DOM, including the browser
chrome (Greasemonkey) and other applications
(accessibility, standalone app). While the browser’s
sandbox has been compromised in the past, such
attacks are quickly patched [35].
The iFrame and standalone website strategies rely
on the browser’s same-origin policy for security [36],
[37]. As part of this policy, browsers ensure that code
executing on an arbitrary website is unable to access
or modify content hosted on a different domain (i.e.,
iFrame, standalone website). This is an important model
that provides security for much of the web [3].
Similar to compromises of the browser sandbox,
from time to time the same-origin policy is partially
broken. For example, in 2013 Paul Stone described an
attack that used CSS and measurements of render
times to leak the contents of an iFrame [38]. After
disclosure of this flaw, the browser vendors worked
with Stone and quickly addressed the issue. This is

1 var e l e m e n t s = document .
q u e r y S e l e c t o r A l l ( '[
contentEditable]' ) ;
2 f o r ( var i = 0 , l e n = e l e m e n t s .
l e n g t h ; i < l e n ; i ++) {
3
var newShadowRoot = e l e m e n t s [ i ] .
createShadowRoot ( ) ;
4
newShadowRoot . innerHTML = '<
shadow></shadow>' ;
5
i f ( newShadowRoot .
olderShadowRoot )
6
c o n s o l e . l o g ( newShadowRoot .
olderShadowRoot .
q u e r y S e l e c t o r ( 'textarea' ) .
value ) ;
7 }

Attack 1. Steals content from ShadowCrypt elements
by creating a new ShadowRoot and using it to access
ShadowCrypt’s ShadowRoot. ShadowCrypt stores
content in a TextArea and so we extract it from
there. This attack is possible because ShadowCrypt
deletes
the
Document.createShadowRoot
function
instead
of
the
Document.prototype.createShadowRoot
function.
1 var t e x t A r e a = document .
q u e r y S e l e c t o r A l l ( '*::shadow
textarea' ) ;
2 f o r ( var i = 0 , l e n = t e x t A r e a .
l e n g t h ; i < l e n ; i ++) {
3
console . log ( textArea [ i ] . value ) ;
4 }

Attack 2. Steals content from ShadowCrypt elements
by using the ::shadow pseudo-selector. This attack
is possible because ShadowCrypt does not filter the
“::shadow” pseudo-selector. Due to frequent changes in
the Shadow DOM specification, it is likely this selector
did not exist when ShadowCrypt was implemented.
Figure 11. Attacks on ShadowCrypt

the advantage of relying on a security model actively
supported by browsers: problems are quickly fixed.
Shadow DOM is the one approach that does not
rely on a standard security model, but instead requires
developers to modify the JavaScript environment to
prevent websites from accessing the contents of a
ShadowRoot. The dangers of this approach can be
seen through a security analysis we conducted of
ShadowCrypt. We downloaded the latest version of
ShadowCrypt24 and found two attacks that allowed
web applications to read plaintext data stored in the
24. Version 0.3.3, released February 4, 2015.

secure overlays. The JavaScript to run these attacks

and explanation of why they work are given in
Figure 11
These attacks demonstrate two problems with
relying on developers to add security to the Shadow
DOM. First, it is difficult for developers to correctly
identify all attack vectors and correctly close them
(Figure 11 – Attack 1). Second, as browsers are
updated, it is possible that new attack vectors are
added, and developers must be constantly vigilant
(Figure 11 – Attack 2).
JavaScript-based Cryptography. The iFrame,
Shadow DOM, Greasemonkey, and standalone website
strategies all rely upon cryptographic primitives
implemented in JavaScript. There have been concerns
that in certain cases JavaScript-based cryptography is
untrustworthy [39]. These arguments reduce to two
different concerns. First, if cryptography is being used
because TLS is not trusted by the website, then the
website cannot guarantee that the JavaScript is
delivered to the user’s browser unmodified. Second, if
cryptography is being used to encrypt the data so that
it is opaque to the website, then you cannot trust the
website to send you JavaScript that will encrypt this
data.
Both of these are valid concerns, but are
orthogonal to the strategies that use JavaScript-based
cryptography. First, the strategies do trust TLS to
correctly deliver the content-based encryption
software. Second, the strategies do not trust the
website, and that is precisely why the encryption
software is separate from the website. Finally, except
in the case of iFrames implemented using
Bookmarklets, the cryptographic JavaScript code is
only downloaded once, at installation (iFrame,
Shadow DOM, Greasemonkey) or on first run
(standalone website).
1.4. Hybrid
Strategies.
The comparison of
implementation strategies shows that the iFrames and
accessibility strategies best match our goals of
retrofitting the web with content-based encryption.
Still, both of these approaches struggle with
non-standard interfaces. To address this, we suggest
that each of these strategies be modified to fall back
to a standalone strategy when users encounter a
non-standard interface that the system was unable to
overlay. We pair strategies that have the same security
model: i.e., iFrame + standalone website (same-origin)
and Accessibility + standalone app (browser sandbox).
The capabilities of these new hybrid approaches are
summarized in Table 3.
Using the hybrid strategies, a bookmarklet
implementation of iFrames can protect websites that
don’t employ CSP, and for those websites that do use
CSP, the implementation can fall back to the
standalone website. This standalone website could be
displayed in either a new window or tab. Alternatively,
when a user encounters a non-standard interface that

Accessibility +
Standalone App

No install

Non-standard
Interfaces

Usability
Integration

Windows

iOS

Mobile OS
Android

Windows

Mac OS

Linux

Others

Desktop OS

Safari

Opera

IE

Firefox

Strategy
iFrame +
Standalone website

Chrome

Browsers

Security Model
Same-origin

G
#

#

G
#

#
G

G
#

#

#

App Separation

TABLE 3. C OMPARISON OF HYBRID STRATEGIES

is not overlayed, they could click a button to launch
the standalone website. This allows iFrames to fully
support mobile platforms without using a proxy
application. Additionally, this means that the no-install
implementation of iFrames (i.e., bookmarklets) is
available for all browsers and platforms.
1.5. Best Strategy. Based on our goal of retrofitting
the web with content-based encryption, the hybrid
strategy iFrames + standalone website is the best
strategy. It works with all current browsers and
platforms, both mobile and desktop. Furthermore, in
most situations it provides tight integration with
websites, but can fall back to a standalone website
when non-standard interfaces are encountered.
Moreover, using bookmarklets, this strategy can be
run on systems where the user does not have install
permissions.

2. Implementation
In this section, we describe in greater depth the
technical implementation of MessageGuard.
2.1. Front End. When initialized, the front end
immediately scans the page using the documents
querySelectorAll and a TreeWalker. After
this initial scan, changes to the page are tracked using
a single MutationObserver and only elements
that have been modified are scanned. This process
allows MessageGuard to have a minimal effect on
page load times and application execution.
Where possible, the front end uses the Shadow
DOM to position overlays (i.e., styling, not security).
When the Shadow DOM is unavailable, as is the case
in most browsers, we instead set the overlay’s style to
match the position and size of the overlayed element,
and then set the overlayed element’s display style
to none. This alternative approach has some potential
to interfere with the underlying application (e.g.,
:nth-child()) and is not as desirable as using the
Shadow DOM.
2.2. Cryptography.
Where
ever
possible
stark2009symmetric used Node.js’s Crypto library. For

functionality not provided by this library, we used the
Stanford Javascript Crypto Library [40] (SJCL). The
only cryptographic primitives that we had to develop
ourselves were for the implementation of
Boneh-Boyen IBE. This was necessary as there no
publicly available implementations IBE that were
suitable for inclusion in MessageGuard.
2.3. Browser
Extension.
We developed the
MessageGuard browser extension using Kango, a
cross-browser extension framework. Kango packages
MessageGuard and makes it available as a browser
extension for Chrome, Firefox, Opera, and Safari.
Within a browser extension, the front end is injected
into a web application before the web application is
loaded. The overlays, packager, and key management
components operate within the extension’s trusted
origin, protecting them from the web application.
In Safari, browser extensions are subject to the
Content Security Policy (CSP), which prevents
MessageGuard from functioning on sites that set a
frame-src CSP attribute. Until March 10 of this
year, the CSP specification explicitly disallowed
applying CSP policies to extensions and bookmarklets,
but the language has since been weakened to allow
browsers to choose whether CSP protections apply to
extensions and bookmarklets [41]. Since Safari’s
broken functionality existed before March 10 and
because all other browsers exempt extensions from
CSP, we believe it is likely Safari will eventually
exempt extensions as well.
2.4. Bookmarklet. Bookmarklets are user scripts that
are stored as browser bookmarks. When a user clicks
a bookmarklet, the associated script is executed on the
current page. We have implemented MessageGuard so
that it can be executed from a bookmarklet. This is
helpful since mobile browsers do not currently support
extensions but do support bookmarklets.
The browser extension and bookmarklets share the
same codebase and are nearly identical. The only
significant difference is that MessageGuard’s
components are hosted from a standard web origin
(e.g., https://messageguard.com) instead of the local
extension origin. If MessageGuard’s origin was

compromised, it would be possible for an attacker to
inject malicious scripts into user’s browsers. To help
mitigate this, we recommend that MessageGuard’s
bookmarklet be hosted on an origin with no other
responsibilities, allowing this origin to be significantly
locked down.

Bookmarklets are not currently exempted from CSP
protections, but this has already been marked as a bug
in Chromium25 and Firefox.26
25. https://code.google.com/p/chromium/issues/detail?id=233903
26. https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show bug.cgi?id=866522
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Abstract—The number of instant messages sent per year
now exceeds that of email. Recently users have been moving
away from traditional instant messaging applications and
instead using social networks as their primary communications platform. To discover attitudes related to instant
messaging and its security, we have conducted a user
survey. This paper also presents the design of PFC (Private
Facebook Chat), a system providing convenient, secure
instant messaging within Facebook Chat. PFC offers endto-end encryption in order to thwart any eavesdropper,
including Facebook itself. Finally, we have conducted a
usability study of a PFC prototype.
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I. I NTRODUCTION
Instant messaging is an increasingly popular form
of synchronous communication over the Internet. Every
year the instant messaging user base grows by 200
million people, and the number of instant messages sent
per year now exceeds that of email. A recent report
shows that users are moving away from traditional instant messaging applications and are instead using social
networks as their primary communications platform.1
Facebook Chat was introduced in 2008 and already
has a large user base. Unfortunately, Facebook Chat is
not secure. For example, Facebook can read all messages
sent through the system. Even if we trust Facebook
with our messages, Facebook does not transmit data
over HTTPS by default. This means eavesdroppers on
the network have potential access to Facebook Chat
conversations. Additionally, Facebook Chat is susceptible to session hijacking attacks as demonstrated by
Firesheep [1]. Facebook users need to explicitly turn on
HTTPS in Facebook’s account settings for the browser to
communicate with Facebook over an encrypted channel.
Even if a user secures their own connection to Facebook,
there is no way to guarantee that the other party in a chat
session also has HTTPS turned on.
This paper first presents the results of a survey concerning the awareness and attitudes of users regarding
the security and privacy of instant messaging. The paper
1 Email Statistics Report, 2009-2013, http://www.radicati.com/?p=
3229

then presents PFC (Private Facebook Chat), a system
that enables convenient, secure instant messaging within
Facebook Chat.
The system prevents Facebook from accessing the
plaintext of a chat session. The design and implementation of PFC represents the first system that provides
end-to-end security in a browser-based instant messaging
service. PFC uses a security overlay that is placed over
the current Facebook Chat interface to allow users to
easily secure chat sessions that contain sensitive information. PFC also uses an automated key escrow system
to transparently manage encryption keys, removing the
need for users to establish shared secrets or obtain public
keys in advance. The paper includes the results of a
usability study to determine whether users could easily
use the system to accomplish specific tasks.
Facebook manages the storage and transmission of
chat messages while the key server manages and distributes encryption keys. Assuming these parties do
not collude with each other, they each have too little
information during normal operation to be able to access
the contents of an encrypted chat message. There is also
a server that provides the client-side software necessary
to encrypt and decrypt chat messages. This server is
in a more powerful position to unilaterally compromise
the system. Since the software it provides runs on the
user’s machine, it can be audited and monitored to detect
attacks.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows:
Section 2 contains the results of a user survey regarding
attitudes and opinions about secure chat. Section 3
describes the design and implementation of PFC. Section
4 contains the results of a usability study of the PFC
prototype. Section 5 discusses related work. And Section
6 provides conclusions and future work.
II. U SER S URVEY
We conducted a three-part survey to determine user
awareness and attitudes regarding the privacy of instant
messaging. Part one gathers information about the chat
systems users are currently using. Part two seeks to
determine how users feel about transmitting sensitive
information over chat. Finally, part three gathers information about opinions on the privacy of chat. The survey
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TABLE I
C HAT SYSTEM USAGE
System
Google Talk
Facebook Chat
Skype
Windows Live Messenger
Yahoo Instant Messenger
AIM
IRC
ICQ
Others

Fig. 1.

TABLE II
T YPE OF INFORMATION SENT OVER CHAT

Percent of Users
67%
50%
41%
19%
19%
12%
3%
2%
19%

Frequency of use

Group

Type of information

Percent

Non-sensitive personal info
Moderately sensitive personal info
Highly sensitive personal info
Non-sensitive business info
Moderately sensitive business info

84%
44%
15%
56%
24%

Group 2 (24%)

Non-sensitive personal info
Moderately sensitive personal info
Any business info

93%
36%
<15%

Group 3 (17%)

Non-sensitive personal info
Moderately sensitive personal info
Non-sensitive business info
Moderately sensitive business info

90%
40%
50%
30%

Group 1 (59%)

frequent users predominantly used Google Talk, Skype,
Facebook Chat, and other commercial products.
B. Trust

was distributed via word-of-mouth, email, and various
social networks and resulted in 65 responses.
A. Chat Systems
Table I lists chat systems users reported to have used
regularly. The survey allowed for users to select more
than one option. Most users reported that their personal
preference in which chat system to use is based on how
easy it is to learn and use. Multiple users also stated that
they use a particular system because their work mandates
it or it integrates with other online services they use
regularly, such as email or social networks. Google Talk,
Facebook Chat, and Skype are the predominant chat
platforms used by the survey participants. Google Talk
and Facebook Chat are used primarily in the browser.
The users that selected the Others option used commercial products regularly (e.g., Microsoft Lync, Microsoft
Communicator, and IBM Sametime).
Figure 1 shows how frequently respondents use chat
to communicate. Seventy-seven percent of respondents
indicated they use chat at least once a week, with the
majority of them using it multiple times a week. These

In this portion of the survey we asked questions to
gauge how safe users feel sending information through
a chat system. We then compared those answers with
what types of information respondents send via chat. We
provided the users with a list of sensitivities ranging from
non-sensitive to highly sensitive and asked them to select
the options that describe the kinds of information they
have ever sent via chat in both a personal and business
setting. Fifty-nine percent (Group 1) of respondents
reported they feel safe or very safe when using chat,
24% (Group 2) admitted they have never thought about
how safe they felt and were uncertain, and 17% (Group
3) reported they feel unsafe when they chat. Table II
breaks down what percentage of each group have sent
what type of information.
Of those in Group 1, 15% say they send highly sensitive personal information (e.g., social security number,
credit card, bank information). Those who send highly
sensitive personal information report they use Google
Talk, Skype, and Facebook Chat to do so. This is of particular interest because Google Talk and Facebook Chat
do not enforce secure connections to communicate via
their chat systems. With Google Talk, secure connections
are available when connecting through Gmail, Google+,
or third party software, but that does not guarantee the
other party is connected securely. Facebook defaults to
unencrypted HTTP connections for most of their online
services. There is a greater risk of an eavesdropper seeing
sensitive information sent through the Google Talk or
Facebook Chat networks.
Those in groups 2 and 3 reported to have never sent
highly sensitive information of any kind over chat. It is
interesting that even though those in group 3 indicated
that they felt unsafe or very unsafe about the security of

3

Fig. 2. More likely to send sensitive information to trusted friend or
family member

Fig. 4. Question: I’m confident that my chat conversations are private

Fig. 3. Would reply with sensitive information to trusted friend or
family member

chat, most of them still reported using chat systems on
a daily basis.
The feeling of safety that a user has is not only
affected by the system they are using but also the context
in which it is being used. We asked a set of questions
to ascertain how users would react to communicating
sensitive information to their trusted friends or family
members.
When asked if they were more likely to send sensitive information to a trusted friend or family member
(see Figure 2), 68% answered in the affirmative, 24%
answered negatively, and 9% answered that it would
depend on the kind of information. Most of the 9% who
answered Depends identified information relevance and
security of the communication medium as their deciding
factors. However, one respondent was more concerned
with the speed of the medium rather than the security of
it.
When asked if they would reply over chat with sensitive information requested by a trusted friend of family

member (see Figure 3), 41% answered that it would
depend on the kind of information, 29% answered that
they would use the phone instead, 12% answered yes,
10% answered they would use email, 3% answered yes
if there was a need to know, and the remaining 5%
responded no.
Users’ responses in this part of the survey have been
positive towards chat systems. Most feel safe chatting
over their service of choice. This could be because their
feeling of safety has never been challenged. It is apparent
that users seem to have preconceived notions about
which communication mediums are “safe” and which
are not. The respondents mentioned email and phone
systems as more secure alternatives to chat. However,
email suffers from many of the same vulnerabilities
as chat and the phone system has a long history of
compromises [2].
C. Privacy
Some services, such as Google Talk, offer the ability
for users to connect to the service using an HTTPS
connection. HTTPS allows data to be transmitted in
encrypted form, preventing eavesdroppers from reading
the data. While this transport security is important, it
does not offer full privacy because each communique
is stored unencrypted and mined for data by Google.
In addition, an HTTPS connection with Google does
not guarantee that the other chat party is connected to
Google with an HTTPS connection. We asked a set of
questions to gauge the respondent’s awareness of privacy
and security issues.
There was a lack of agreement among users when
asked if they were confident that their chat conversations were private (see Figure 4). Approximately half
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disagreed or strongly disagreed that chat conversations
were private, approximately a quarter did not know and
the remaining quarter agreed or strongly agreed. These
results suggest that many users lack an understanding
of privacy. Those who agreed or strongly agreed were
also in the group that indicated they felt safe or very
safe when using a chat system. Additionally, 71% of
those that answered I don’t know indicated they felt
safe or very safe when using a chat system. We further
tried to assess respondents’ inclination toward verifying
the identity of the person with whom they are chatting
beyond the facilities provided by the chat provider. Only
5% of the respondents did not feel confident in the
identity of the opposite party. This suggests a possible
entry point of attack where someone malicious could
assume the identity of another trusted person.
We then asked two questions to ascertain the respondents’ awareness and concern about what chat providers
do with their conversations after having sent and stored
them. Fifty-seven percent of respondents showed concern that chat providers may mine the text of their chat
conversations to provide better targeted advertising. The
remaining 43% were either indifferent or not concerned.
Forty-nine percent of respondents showed concern that
chat providers permanently store their messages while
51% were indifferent or not concerned.
The final question attempted to assess how responsive
users might be if their standard way of chatting was
found to be vulnerable. We specifically asked about the
chat client. Fifty-five percent answered affirmatively that
they would be inclined to move to another client, and
29% preferred not to move but rather that the client be
fixed. The remaining 16% were indifferent.
III. D ESIGN AND I MPLEMENTATION
A. Design Goals
The primary design goal is ease of use. Usability
issues have been a barrier in previous secure communication systems and have prevented wide spread
adoption [3], [4]. PFC extends Facebook Chat so that
users can continue to use their existing chat system that
they are already familiar with instead of switching to a
new secure chat system. Users will read and compose
messages with the added ability to designate when a
chat session should be secure. The interface will clearly
illustrate the difference between a standard chat session
and a secure chat session. The low-level details of how
the secure chat is implemented (e.g., key management,
encryption algorithms) are handled transparently.
PFC is designed to be adopted in a grass roots fashion.
The system spreads incrementally as users engage in
secure chat sessions. In order to facilitate a simple
installation procedure, the PFC client is implemented as

a bookmarklet. A bookmarklet is a browser bookmark
that runs JavaScript in the browser window rather than
navigating to a webpage. Because the bookmarklet is
just JavaScript, we can reach a greater audience because
all major browsers support JavaScript. In addition, the
user does not have to be an administrator to install a
bookmarklet since it is just a bookmark. It is also easy
and highly usable because the “install” is the same as
adding any other bookmark or favorite in the browser.
The threat model that PFC is designed to address is to
prevent an eavesdropper from accessing Facebook chat
messages. PFC uses end-to-end encryption to prevent
network eavesdroppers and Facebook itself from from
reading chat messages. PFC uses a key escrow system
to handle all key management so that users don’t need
manage their own keys. The key server uses Facebook’s
authentication mechanism to reliably hand out keys to
the proper Facebook user. This approach means that
users don’t need another account password in order to
use PFC.
B. Prototype Implementation
We created a prototype implementation of PFC. This
section describes the significant innovations of the prototype and describes the client interface that users experience while using PFC.
1) Security Overlays: PFC uses security overlays. An
overlay is a frame that rests directly on top of another
part of the page. Its purpose is to hide parts of the original page to prevent the user from interacting with it. The
user interacts with the overlay while the overlay interacts
with the obscured parts of the original page on behalf of
the user. An overlay provides security features that the
original page does not. Since the content in the secure
overlay is served from a domain that differs from the
original page, the browser’s same origin security policies
prevents the original page from accessing content in
the overlay. PFC overlays Facebook Chat windows with
an overlay frame where users read and compose chat
messages while the normal Facebook Chat window only
sees encrypted content.
2) Usage Scenario: Suppose Alice wants to chat
securely with Bob and already has the PFC bookmarklet
installed in her browser. She opens a Facebook Chat
dialog to Bob and clicks on the bookmarklet to enable
the secure chat feature. This executes the Javascript
associated with the bookmarklet and activates PFC for
the duration of her Facebook session.
PFC overlays the Facebook Chat dialog with a security
overlay and displays a lock icon to inform Alice that the
chat session is secure (see Figure 5).
Alice now waits for Bob to enter secure chat before
she can send a message to Bob. If Alice tries to send
a message before Bob is ready, the overlay system will
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Fig. 5.

Secure chat window with closed lock

inform her that Bob is not yet ready to receive secure
messages (see Figure 6).
Fig. 6.

Fig. 7.

Standard greeting

Fig. 8.

PFC website

Pending setup notification

The PFC client on Alice’s machine sends Bob a chat
message from Alice stating that she would like to chat
securely (see Figure 7).
The message directs Bob to a website containing
instructions on how he can install the bookmarklet and
chat securely with Alice (see Figure 8).
The website contains instructions and a short PFC
video tutorial that directs Bob to install the secure chat
bookmarklet by dragging it to his browser’s bookmark
bar. He then goes back to Facebook where the chat session with Alice is pending and clicks on the bookmarklet

to secure the chat session in his browser. Alice and Bob
are then both presented with the Facebook authentication
dialog (Figure 9) that requests they authenticate with
Facebook.
When they click on the Login with Facebook button,
they are presented with a dialog from Facebook asking
them if it is okay that the PFC Secure Messaging
Facebook application access basic user information from
their Facebook user profile (see Figure 10).
Upon choosing Allow, both Alice and Bob will receive
a ready signal. Alice and Bob can now begin chatting
securely via Facebook Chat (See Figure 11).
IV. U SABILITY S TUDY
A usability study of PFC was conducted involving
17 experienced Facebook Chat users (59% male, 41%
female). The participants included BYU students and
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Fig. 9.

Authentication window

The study consisted of 5 tasks designed to exercise
a specific system feature along with some survey questions. The users had no advance notice that the study
would focus on the security of Facebook Chat. We
created 4 dummy Facebook accounts for participants to
use during the study to help segregate tasks and to pose
no privacy risks to the users. Each account had a friend
named Steve that the participants would chat with for
testing purposes. The average completion for each user
was approximately 25 minutes.
A. Task #1

Fig. 10.

Service provider authentication

Fig. 11.

Secure chat window after bookmarklet is used

employees from a local software company. Eight participants (47%) were students and had no technical
background. Of the nine participants from the local
software company, three of them (33%) had no technical
background.

The purpose of this task is to the determine the usability of the bootstrapping process — can a participant who
receives a request to chat securely successfully obtain
the software and launch a secure chat session. Each
participant was instructed to log in to Facebook and wait
for Steve to contact them and send them some passwords.
We purposefully avoided mentioning explicitly that this
information should be exchanged securely because we
wanted to measure the effectiveness of our bootstrapping
prompts.
Each user received the PFC standard greeting (see
Figure 7) inviting them to the PFC website to learn how
to chat securely. All the users went to the website except
one that said they never click on links unless they are
sent by a friend they know extremely well.
Overall, users were successful in completing the task.
14 of the 17 of the participants (82%) found the standard
greeting and the PFC website helpful in getting them
started. In addition, these 14 participants found the
bookmarklet very easy to install. The three participants
who struggled with installing the bookmarklet provided
feedback on how to improve the bootstrapping process.
This feedback included how to order the instructions on
the PFC website, areas where additional feedback can be
given to the user, and portions of the process that could
be further simplified. The overall success of this task
shows that most users can bootstrap into the system with
just a short greeting, provided the link in the standard
greeting is trusted.
The PFC website was generally successful in helping
the participants learn to install and use the bookmarklet.
We found that participants’ attention was drawn to the
bookmarklet link before they read the short instructions
or watched the video tutorial. Slightly less than half of
the participants tried installing or using the bookmarklet
without instruction. 6 participants (35%) attempted to
directly click the link to enable secure chat. Others
tried dragging the link into the address bar. The term
bookmarklet seemed to confuse a few participants. We
observed them being unsure how to create the browser
bookmark. Eventually these participants abandoned their
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efforts and proceeded to read the provided instructions
and watch the video tutorial.
Since PFC uses Facebook authentication, we had to
create a Facebook application. Users were prompted to
allow the application access to their personal information. 9 participants (53%) were very wary of trusting the
application. Some participants tried to continue the task
without allowing that application. Most users reported
that they normally do not allow any Facebook applications.
B. Task #2
For task 2, the users were instructed to securely send
a checking account number to set up direct deposit
(we provided a dummy account number) to Steve using Facebook Chat. The purpose of this task was to
determine whether a user that had already installed the
PFC bookmarklet would be able to easily initiate a new
secure chat. 15 out of 17 participants (88%) completed
the task and reported that they found the bookmarklet to
be intuitive and easy to use.
Six participants (35%) said that clicking on the lock
icon was an unnecessary step, that the bookmarklet
should automatically default to a secure chat rather than
require a two-click process. One participant reported they
would never send a bank account number in chat, but
would prefer to use the phone. Finally, 3 participants
sent their checking numbers insecurely because they
forgot the bookmarklet was there and needed reminding.
This highlights a weakness of the bookmarklet approach
since bookmarklets are unable to execute without direct
interaction from the user. A browser plug-in approach
would be able to better intervene and remind users of
the need to use secure chat.
C. Task #3
The goal of this task is to get the reaction of the
participants when they see cipher text in their chat
histories and measure the usability of resuming a secure
chat session. The task asks the user to re-assume the
identity in task #1 and securely chat with Steve again.
By resuming a conversation, the chat history in Facebook
will contain the cipher text of the previous conversation.
We posit that the cipher text might be a point of
confusion for participants unfamiliar with it.
5 participants (29%) did not notice the cipher text during the task. Most of these participants did not complete
the previous tasks that were needed for cipher text to
appear in this task. Another 5 participants (29%) said
that they understood the significance of the cipher text
and it did not bother them. The remaining 7 participants
(42%) who saw the cipher text had mixed reactions. One
of the side effects of sending text that contains a valid

URL is that Facebook converts them into links so that
they are clickable. The ciphertext package contains a
URL to the key server that provided keys to encrypt the
message. Because of the link in the standard greeting,
some participants, when they saw this new link in the
cipher text, assumed they were supposed to click on it,
which took them to an error page.
Other participants tried clicking on the link in the
standard greeting again. Some participants reported that
they were confused when they saw it or thought that the
secure chat system was broken. Overall, 14 participants
(82%) eventually used the bookmarklet and successfully completed the task. These participants agreed that
resuming a secure chat conversation was easy. More
participants reported this task as easier than the previous
task. We hypothesize that this is because the process of
resuming a secure chat only requires a single click of
the bookmarklet whereas the previous task also required
the participants to click the lock icon.
D. Task #4
The goal of this task is to highlight the feature that
helps a user maintain a secure chat session with the
opposite party. The task instructs the participant to have
a secure conversation with Steve, but that he is having
problems with his computer. The instructions warn that
Steve might jump in and out of secure communication.
The participant is supposed to do all that they can to
maintain a secure communication with Steve.
During this task, 15 of 17 participants (88%) agreed
that it was easy to distinguish the difference between
secure and insecure messages. These participants successfully completed the task. When interacting with the
option to invite the opposite party to continue secure
chat, some participants were expecting a Ready! notification when the opposite party rejoined. Overall, the
participants were able to easily maintain a secure chat
session with the other party.
E. Task #5
The goal of this task is to have participants switch in
and out of a secure chat session during a conversation.
The task instructs the participant to conduct a casual,
insecure conversation with Steve. At some point during
the conversation the participant must enter a secure chat
session to send a bank account number. After sending
that number, the participant must exit secure chat and
finish the casual conversation they were having before.
At this point in the study, the participants should be
familiar with all aspects of PFC.
One of the features of the secure chat history is
that messages are displayed as users would have received them. For example, if an insecure conversation
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is transitioned to a secure conversation, all previous
insecure messages sent from the opposite party will be
displayed as though they were received insecurely in
secure mode. Eight participants (47%) clicked on the
action items presented in the insecure messages. These
past messages seemed to cause a moment’s confusion.
However, as soon as the other party started chatting
securely, all participants ignored the previous messages
and continued with the task.
Fifteen participants (88%) reported that distinguishing
the difference between secure and non-secure mode was
easy. These participants referenced the lock icon as
their primary means of demarcation. Fifteen participants
(88%) also said that using the lock icon to transition
between secure and non-secure mode was easy and
intuitive. Six participants (35%) commented that clicking
the lock icon was an unnecessary step to enter secure
mode because by clicking on the bookmarklet, they are
already signaling their intention of chatting securely.
Nine participants (53%) reported that once in secure chat
they would continue in secure chat rather than leaving it,
even if the topic of conversation becomes non-sensitive.
F. Survey
Following completion of the tasks, the participants
answered some follow-up questions including several
questions from the initial user survey. We also include
questions that help us assess what the participants
learned from the usability study. We try to assess the
participants’ inclination toward using PFC and their
understanding of why using it is important.
Twelve participants (71%) said that after using PFC
they were less inclined to send sensitive information
over normal Facebook chat. The remaining 5 participants
(29%) reported that they already do not send sensitive
information through chat. Nine participants (53%) stated
that they would be more inclined to send sensitive
information via chat if PFC were available. Most of the
other participants wanted more information about the underlying system before they would make a commitment
to use it.
The success of the bootstrapping mechanism depends
on users following the link sent in the standard greeting.
We asked the participants if they trust links sent in chat,
and Figure 12 shows their responses.
Those who answered It Depends, stated that their trust
of the link was dependent on their trust of the party who
sent it. If trust of the standard greeting link is an issue
for most users, the alternatives would be to change the
standard greeting or rely on users to introduce the system
to their contacts by giving them the link out-of-band.
Thirteen participants (76%) agreed they would be
likely to start using this system with friends, family,
or acquaintances if it were available. The remaining

Fig. 12.

Question: Do you trust links sent to you over chat?

4 participants (24%) were undecided. A previous task
has shown that some users forgot the bookmarklet was
present. This lack of decision could be due to the lack of
need or reminders to use this kind of secure system. Most
participants reported that if they did use this system in
the real world, they would, at the very least, enable it for
sensitive topics of conversation. Eight of the participants
(47%) said their awareness about the security of chat
systems changed as a result of their participation in this
study.
G. Lessons Learned
Overall, PFC is usable. Everyone except two extremely novice users were able to successfully engage
in secure chat sessions without training or human assistance. Two older, non-technical participants failed to
complete any task. They use Facebook and Facebook
Chat solely to stay in touch with family and close friends.
They are only comfortable learning new technology with
human guidance, so the current system was unable to
meet their needs.
Users may be reluctant to bootstrap into the system
by following the link contained in the standard greeting.
In practice, this means a user wanting to initiate a secure
chat session with someone unfamiliar with PFC may
first have to chat insecurely and introduce them to the
process.
The user study uncovered ways to improve the PFC
bootstrapping web page to be more informative and
easier to follow. During the study we observed that many
participants were drawn immediately to the bookmarklet
link before watching the video tutorial. As a result,
many assumed they were supposed to click on the link,
whereas if they had first watched the tutorial, they would
have created a bookmark instead. Some users ignore the
video and attempt to use the system immediately. A short
list of steps included on the web page that summarizes
the video content will be helpful. For instance, this
information can alert the users that they will need to
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trust the associated Facebook application in order to use
PFC.
Participants quickly picked up the bookmarklet during the course of the study and recognized a way to
streamline the process by having the one-click of the
bookmarklet automatically opt the user into a secure
chat session. Finally, the user study illustrated that the
chat history is confusing when it contains links. Some
participants assumed they were supposed to click on
them. This can be improved by presenting the actions
items in a dialog instead so that the actions do not display
in the chat history.
V. T HREAT A NALYSIS
This section contains a threat analysis of the PFC
prototype. First we list the passive attacks against the
system, and then give several active attacks that can be
attempted against PFC.
A. Passive Attacks
PFC thwarts passive eavesdropping by Facebook. It
also thwarts other eavesdroppers on the network. PFC
chat sessions are encrypted end-to-end, and protection
from eavesdropping is effective even if some of the
transmission links are not protected with HTTPS.
B. Key Compromise
One way to attack the system is to compromise the
encryption keys. This could be done by attacking the
key escrow server directly or by stealing encryption keys
from the users. Attackers could attempt to steal secret
keys or key material from the key server. This attack can
be mitigated by storing these values in secure hardware.
Alternatively, the attacker could attempt to compromise
the key server to hand out encryption keys online, but
this is much easier to detect and shut down. Another way
to mitigate the risk of stolen encryption keys is to limit
the lifetime of a key. Our implementation derives keys
that are only valid for the month in which they were
derived.
An important factor in the system design is that
compromising the key server or a specific user’s keys is
not enough for an attacker to recover plaintext messages.
If an attacker is unable to eavesdrop on encrypted content
sent across a network, the attacker must compromise
the Facebook accounts of either the sender or receiver
to acquire the encrypted content. This second layer of
defense helps to mitigate the threat of key compromise.
C. Impersonation
PFC relies on Facebook’s OAuth system to authenticate a user and provide a unique Facebook identifier for

use in deriving encryption keys. This means Facebook
can impersonate a user to the key server to obtain
that user’s encryption keys. Users trust Facebook not to
impersonate them, an attack that Facebook could already
launch in it’s Facebook Connect system. If Facebook
were to launch such an attack in PFC, they would risk
detection and a loss of reputation. The risk of this attack
can be mitigated by adopting a multi-factor authentication mechanism at the key server, such as adding a userspecific password in addition to Facebook’s authentication. This would prevent Facebook from easily impersonating users, at the expense of making the system less
useable. Our initial PFC design favored usability over
strong authentication. These properties can be adjusted
to tailor the system to specific user’s needs.
D. Social Engineering
During the user study, users were hesitant to click on
the link provided in the standard greeting. However, once
they accepted that the study required them to click on
links, they assumed any link presented by PFC was trustworthy. In practice, an attacker can exploit users who
trust PFC messages. For instance, a malicious service
provider or an active attacker on an insecure link could
inject a malicious link into the standard greeting (or any
other PFC message) in order to exploit an unsuspecting
user that already trusts PFC messages.
The system is designed so that users who already
have a trust relationship in Facebook can chat privately.
We don’t make any assumptions about user’s likelihood
to click on PFC links because research has shown that
participants in user studies may be more likely to trust
experimental software in a user study compared to actual
use [5].
VI. R ELATED W ORK
Mannan and van Oorschot [6] surveyed the security
features and threats to instant messaging protocols in
an effort to spark future security improvements. They
observe that the greatest threat is insecure connections,
and almost a decade later this is still the case because
Facebook uses HTTP by default. This threat was a
primary motivation for developing PFC.
Jennings et al. [7] discuss three popular chat protocols
from 2006: AOL Instant Messenger, Yahoo! Messenger,
and Microsoft Messenger. Although these systems provide modest improvements beyond plaintext passwords,
their security features are limited and make no effort to
provide confidentiality.
Significant research has been focused on instant messaging protocols with advanced security features. Offthe-Record Messaging (OTR) allows private conversations over instant messaging by providing encryption,
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authentication, deniability, and perfect forward secrecy.
Borisov et al. [8] introduces an Off-the-Record Messaging protocol for secure instant messaging. The protocol uses the Diffie-Hellman key exchange protocol
to establish short-term keys that are impossible to rederive from the long-term key material. These keys are
then discarded after a period of use, making any past
messages permanently unrecoverable. The messages in
this protocol are not digitally signed. It is thus impossible
to prove who sent a message. Because of the frequent
key exchanges necessary for secure communication, it
is vulnerable to replay attacks that allow an attacker to
impersonate the sender to any other party in the system.
Now that PFC has proven its usability, researchers can
explore ways to incorporate stronger security properties
while still maintaining usability.
Raimondo et al. [9] analyzes the key features presented in Borisov et al. [8] and examines security vulnerabilities. They propose a series of change recommendations for Off-the-Record Messaging in an attempt to
fix the vulnerabilities. Their recommendations include
replacing the authenticated key exchange protocol with
stronger exchange protocols.
Other research in Goldberg [10] and Jiang [11] addresses Off-the-Record group conversations, such as
public chat rooms or other multi-party scenarios. Alexander [12] applies the socialist millionaire’s problem to
OTR to improve user authentication. OTR has also
become publicly available as a Pidgin plug-in. Stedman
et al. [13] conducted a usability study of this Pidgin plugin to determine if it is easy to use and successful at hiding
computer security details from the user. They discuss
flaws in the user interface that cause confusion and
decreased security. They also discuss possible solutions
to these errors.
Kikuchi et al. [14] present a secure chat protocol
that extends the Diffie-Hellman key exchange in order
to thwart a malicious administrator. PFC could also be
implemented using a Diffie-Hellman key exchange. We
chose a key server approach instead to prevent an active
man-in-the-middle attack on the basic Diffie-Hellman
protocol.
Mannan and van Oorschot [15] present the Instant
Message Key Exchange (IMKE) protocol, which is
a password authentication and key exchange protocol.
IMKE allows for strong authentication and secure communication in IM systems. It provides authentication
(via memorable passwords), confidentiality, and message
integrity with repudiation. IMKE cannot be layered on
top of existing IM systems without modifications to both
client and server technologies. We designed PFC so that
it could be deployed without any server involvement in
order to enhance the security of a popular chat platform.
In 2005, Google launched its Google Talk platform.

Google Talk has an OTR mode that promises to not
store the contents of an IM session. Users must trust
Google to follow through on this promise since there is
no cryptographic assurance that the policy is enforced.
PFC could be adopted to work with Google Talk. An
OTR mode could be supported by having PFC turn on
the OTR flag in Google Talk so that the encrypted PFC
messages are not retained by Google.
VII. C ONCLUSIONS
We conducted a survey of 65 users to assess their
awareness and attitudes concerning the privacy of instant
messaging. 59% of the users surveyed feel safe or very
safe while communicating via instant messaging, and
15% of that group admit to sending highly sensitive
information in a chat session. Users are more likely to
share sensitive information with a close friend or family
member. Some users trust email or the phone more than
they trust chat. A number of users are wary of chat
service providers; 57% are concerned that providers may
scan their messages for directed advertising purposes,
and 49% have concerns with their messages being stored
permanently.
This paper presents PFC (Private Facebook Chat), a
system that provides end-to-end encryption for Facebook
Chat sessions so that eavesdroppers (including Facebook
itself) cannot access chat messages. The system is designed with good-enough security to thwart eavesdroppers. Security overlays provide a distinct interface on top
of the existing Facebook interface so that the plaintext
of a chat conversation is not available to Facebook
or anyone who could modify a Facebook page during
transmission. The primary design focus is on making
the system easy to use.
We report on a user study that demonstrates the
system is usable by current Facebook users except for
the most novice computer user. The user study revealed
several issues with the system. Including a link in the
bootstrapping messages in order to install the system
may be problematic because some users do not trust links
in a chat message. To overcome this issue, the person initiating the secure chat may need to provide preliminary
information that encourages the recipient being willing
to click on the link. Users reported a increased awareness
of the privacy issues of using Facebook Chat as a result
of participating in the user study.
Our future work includes exploring ways to support
secure messaging in other areas of Facebook where the
communication is asynchronous, such as wall postings
and status updates. We would also like to explore ways
to make the ciphertext less intrusive when displayed
to unauthorized parties. For instance, can we adapt
steganography so that the encrypted message is stored in
an image that is visible to unauthorized users, while the
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actual message is displayed to those authorized to see it.
We also plan to propose a standardized API that service
providers could support to make it easier for third parties
to offer security services based on security overlays.
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Abstract—The current state of email security is lacking,
and the need for end-to-end encryption of email is clear.
Recent research has begun to make progress towards
usable, secure email for the masses (i.e., novice users
without IT support). In this paper, we evaluate the
usability implications of three different key management
approaches: PGP, IBE, and passwords. Our work is the
first formal A/B evaluation of the usability of different
key management schemes, and the largest formal evaluation of secure email ever performed. Our results reveal
interesting inherent usability trade-offs for each approach
to secure email. Furthermore, our research results in the
first fully-implemented PGP-based secure email system
that has been shown to be usable for novice users. We
share qualitative feedback from participants that provides
valuable insights into user attitudes regarding each key
management approach and secure email generally. Finally,
our work provides an important validation of methodology
and design principles described in prior work.

I.

I NTRODUCTION

When email was first developed in 1971, no attention was paid to secure it. In recent years, there has been
a strong push to address this by adopting technologies
that enhance the security of email during transmission.
Still, recent research has shown that these approaches
(i.e., STARTTLS, SPF, DKIM, DMARC) are often
configured incorrectly and have weaknesses that can
be exploited by attackers [8], [7], [11]. Even if these
technologies were properly deployed and configured,
they do nothing to protect email at rest or while it is
being processed by an email server.
These factors motivate the need for secure email that
uses end-to-end encryption.1 In secure email, the sender
encrypts email messages before transferring them to the
email provider, ensuring that no one but the intended
recipients are able to read the messages. While secure
email protocols such as PGP and S/MIME are nothing
new, adoption by the masses has been nearly nonexistent.2
One explanation for this poor adoption is secure
email’s long history of usability issues [29], [24], [20].
1 End-to-end

encryption of email refers to content-based encryption of email as opposed to connection-level encryption (e.g., TLS,
HTTPS).
2 We note that S/MIME is widely used in certain organizations (e.g.,
US government), but this adoption has not spread to the masses.

Recent research has begun making progress towards usable, secure email for the masses. Ruoti et al. evaluated
design principles for creating a highly-usable version of
IBE-based secure email [20], [17].3 Similarly, Atwater
et al. [1] explored how PGP-based secure email could
be made more usable.
In this paper, we build upon this prior research
and explore how different key management approaches
affect the usability of secure email. To this end, we
build and evaluate three secure email systems, each
based on a different key management approach: PGP,
IBE, and passwords. The systems largely have identical
functionality and interfaces, different only as required
by their particular key management scheme. Moreover,
these systems incorporate all prior research into usable,
secure email, giving each system its best chance at
succeeding. To evaluate the systems, we conduct a
within subjects, paired-participant [16] A/B user study
that involved 47 participant pairs (94 total participants)
using all three systems, the largest study of secure email
to date.
The results of our study show that users find both our
PGP- and IBE-based secure email systems to be highly
usable. This is the first time a fully-implemented PGPbased secure email system has been shown to be usable
for novice users. Our study also reveals interesting
details on user attitudes regarding secure email.
The contributions of this paper are,
1)

2)

First A/B comparison of usability of key
management in secure email. In this paper,
we conduct a formal A/B comparison of three
different secure email key management approaches: PGP, IBE, and passwords. Our results demonstrate that each of these approaches
are viable for novice users, though passwords
are rated as slightly less usable. We also
evaluate participants’ qualitative responses and
identify several intrinsic usability trade-offs
between each system.
First empirically verified, usable, PGPbased secure email system. Early examinations of PGP-based secure email found it to

3 Identity-based encryption (IBE) is described in more detail in
Section III-C.

3)

4)

be unusable [29], [24]. More recently, research
has made progress towards usable, PGP-based
secure email, but the studies of these systems did not correctly simulate the experience
of a novice user. In this paper, we use a
fully-implemented system and a formal pairedparticipant methodology [16] to accurately
evaluate the ability of novices to use PGPbased secure email. Our results demonstrate
that participants viewed our PGP-based system
as highly usable, with nearly a third of participants preferring it over our IBE- and passwordbased secure email systems.
User attitudes regarding secure email. Our
study elicits user attitudes regarding the three
key management approaches we evaluate. This
includes security and usability trade-offs identified by participants. For example, even after
understanding that PGP provides more security
than IBE, many users indicate that they do
not need that level of security and prefer
IBE because they don’t have to wait for the
recipient to first install the system. Participant
responses also reveal attitudes regarding secure
email generally, such as the fact that many participants will only feel comfortable installing
a secure email system if they know it has been
verified by security-conscious individuals.
Validation of prior research. Recent research
has proposed several design principles for
making secure email usable for novices. In
this paper we implement principles described
by Atwater et al. [1] and Ruoti et al. [20],
[17]. The positive results of our user studies
provide validation of these design principles.
More particularly, our work demonstrates that
the design principles described by Ruoti et al.
are generally applicable, and not just limited to
IBE-based secure email. Finally, we replicate
Ruoti et al.’s paired-participant methodology
and provide further evidence that it has significant benefits over traditional methodologies
where a study coordinator simulates one end
of an email conversation.
II.

recent years, there have been attempts to patch security
into email. For example, TLS is now used to protect
email during transmission, and DKIM and DMARC are
used to authenticate the sender of an email. However,
the deployment of these technologies is limited and they
are often misconfigured.
In an analysis of email delivery security (i.e., TLS,
DKIM, DMARC, SPF), Durumeric et al. found that a
majority of email is still vulnerable to attack [7]. They
showed that only 35% of SMTP servers are configured
to use TLS, and these servers are often vulnerable to a
downgrade attack. Similarly, they demonstrated that the
adoption of DKIM and DMARC are so low that they
provide no practical benefits. These results were further
confirmed by concurrent work by both Foster et al. [8]
and Holz et al. [11].
As such, email is still an easy target for attackers.
For example, Durumeric et al. found that in seven
countries over 20% of inbound Gmail messages are
being stolen [7]. Additionally, the inability to authenticate the sender of an email increases the likelihood of
email phishing, a multi-billion-dollar problem.5 Perhaps
most troubling, even if TLS, DKIM, and DMARC were
to be widely adopted and configured correctly, these
technologies do nothing to protect email when at rest.6
End-to-end encryption of email solves each of the
above problems. Namely, by encrypting her email with
Bob’s public key, Alice is sure that only Bob can
read her email. Similarly, if Alice has signed the email
with her private key, Bob can verify that the email
actually came from Alice. The most common forms
of public key encryption are PGP, S/MIME, and IBE.
Descriptions of PGP and IBE are given in Section III.
B. Threat Model
In the threat model for secure email there are four
possible entities:
1)
2)

BACKGROUND

In this section we first describe the current state
of email security. We then describe the threat model
for secure email. Finally, we discuss related work on
analyzing the usability of secure email.

User — The user’s computer, operating system, and secure email software are considered
part of the trusted computing base.
Email provider — The email provider can
be treated as either fully-malicious, honest-butcurious,7 or sometimes-malicious. We define a

5 http://krebsonsecurity.com/2016/04/fbi-2-3-billion-lost-to-ceoemail-scams/
6 At rest, email can be stolen as the result of a breach
(https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/chinesehackers-who-breached-google-gained-access-to-sensitive-data-usofficials-say/, a malicious insider (http://gawker.com/5637234/
gcreep-google-engineer-stalked-teens-spied-on-chats, or a subpoena
(https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/PRISM (surveillance program),
http://www.law360.com/articles/488725/post-snowden-googlereport-shows-data-requests-growing).
7 An honest-but-curious entity will gather any information available
to them (e.g., Gmail scans email messages), but will not attempt to
break the secure email system (e.g., impersonating the user to the key
server) or collude with other honest-but-curious parties).

A. Email Security
When email was first designed in 19714 no meaningful attention was paid to security. As such, it was originally trivial for an attacker to steal email during transit
or to send messages with falsified sender information. In
4 http://openmap.bbn.com/∼tomlinso/ray/firstemailframe.html
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3)

4)

sometimes-malicious entity as one that is for
the most part honest-but-curious, but from time
to time can also take malicious action and collude with other sometimes-malicious entities.
The sometime-malicious model is helpful for
two reasons. First, this is a relatively accurate
model of the largest email providers, which are
unlikely to attack users’ security unless forced
to do so by an outside entity (e.g., court order).
Second, this allows us to more accurately analyze systems that only transiently rely on the
email provider, such as using email to verify a
user’s identity before they are allowed to post
a public key to a key directory.
Key server (optional) — Some secure email
schemes rely on the use of a trusted thirdparty key server, which—similar to the email
provider—can be treated as either fullymalicious, sometimes-malicious, or honestbut-curious. The key server can be responsible
for the generation and storage of key pairs
(i.e., key escrow), or it can act as a lookup
directory for individuals to find public keys
(i.e., key directory). In either case, the reliance
on this trusted third-party reduces the overall
security of the secure email system. Still, we
do note that there are methods for reducing potential harm from a sometimes-malicious thirdparty key server (e.g., thresholded-IBE [12],
CONIKS [13]).
Adversary — The adversary is free to eavesdrop on any communication between users,
email providers, and key servers.8 Additionally, the adversary can attempt to compromise
the email provider or key server. The adversary
wins if she is able to use these resources to
access the plaintext contents of the encrypted
email body.

To steal the user’s sensitive data, the adversary must
obtain both the encrypted email and the key material
needed to decrypt the email. The former can be accomplished by either compromising the email provider, or
intercepting an encrypted email that is not transmitted
using TLS. The latter can be accomplished by users
revealing this information, or in the case of key escrow
by compromising the key escrow server. In that case,
just as the adversary must collect the data from both the
email provider and key escrow server, neither of these
parties alone has enough information to unilaterally
steal the user’s sensitive data.
When classifying the security of a system against
this threat model, there are four possible classification:
satisfies the threat model when the third-party entities—
email provider and optional key server—are fullymalicious, satisfies the threat model when those entities are sometimes-malicious, satisfies the threat model
when those entities are honest-but-curious, and does
not satisfy the threat model. We prefer this fine-grained
classification, as it allows more precision in discussing
the security of a system. This is important because
a system that only protects against some adversarial
models (e.g., honest-but-curious) may be sufficient for
some use cases and have higher usability than systems
which protect against more malicious models.
C. Related Work
Whitten and Tygar [29] conducted the first formal
user study of a secure email system (i.e., PGP 5), which
uncovered serious usability issues with key management
and users’ understanding of the underlying public key
cryptography. They found that a majority of users were
unable to successfully send encrypted email in the
context of a hypothetical political campaign scenario.
The results of their study took the security community
by surprise and helped shape modern usable security
research.

We do not consider attacks directly against the user
or trusted computing base (i.e., phishing credentials,
installing malicious software). Similarly, we do not
consider an attacker who can compromise fundamental
networking primitives (i.e., TLS, DNS). While these
are valid concerns, if the attacker can accomplish these
types of attacks, they can already do far more damage
than they could by breaking the secure email system.9
We also note that data needed by the email provider
to transmit email (e.g., recipient addresses) cannot be
encrypted, and may be available to the adversary (e.g.,
this information may be passed over an unencrypted
channel). Our threat model instead focuses on ensuring
that the data in the encrypted body is safe from an
attacker.

Seven years later, Sheng at al. demonstrated that
despite improvements made to PGP (i.e., PGP 9), key
management was still a challenge for users [24]. Furthermore, they showed that in the new version of PGP,
encryption and decryption had become so transparent
that users were unsure if a message they received had
actually been encrypted.
Garfinkel and Miller created a secure email system
using S/MIME and used this system to replicate Whitten
and Tygar’s earlier study [10]. Their work demonstrated
that automating key management provides significant
usability gains compared to earlier studies that burdened
users with key management tasks. Still, they observed
that their tool “was a little too transparent” in how well
it integrated with Outlook Express, and sometimes users
failed to read the instructions accompanying the visual
indicators.

8 In nearly all cases, this communication will be encrypted using
TLS, and the adversary only has access to the encrypted packets.
9 For example, if an attacker can arbitrarily compromise TLS they
can replace all software downloaded by a user, including the secure
email system, with versions that contain malware.

Ruoti et al. used IBE to explore the design principles
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necessary to create usable, secure email. In their first
study, they demonstrated that users strongly preferred
that secure email be tightly integrated with their existing email systems [20]. In a continuation of this
work, Ruoti et al. demonstrated that usability could
be further enhanced by adding context-sensitive inline
tutorials, artificial delays on encryption while users are
instructed regarding the security of their messages, and
contextual clues inserted into the underlying webmail
interfaces [17]. In our systems, we adopt the features
discussed by Ruoti et al. and evaluate whether they are
beneficial to non-IBE-based secure email (i.e., PGP- and
password-based).

ology brought in pairs of participants and observed
whether these users could collaboratively begin using
secure email. Each pair of participants were required
to know each other before the study, better simulating
how grassroots adoption of secure email would likely
progress. Their results showed that this methodology
was preferable to past methodologies for several reasons: first, users acted more naturally during the study;
second, it identified additional pain points in the systems
tested, that would not have surfaced in a traditional
study; third, the methodology allowed researchers to
observe both a) participants who are introducing their
friends to secure email, and b) participants who are
being introduced to secure email. In our study, we use
this methodology to evaluate the systems we built.

Atwater et al. evaluated the usability of PGP using a
mocked secure email tool that automatically generates
key pairs for users, shares the generated public key
with a key server, and retrieves the recipient’s public
key as needed. Their results showed that with these
modifications, users could successfully use PGP to send
and receive secure email. Unfortunately, their mockup did not correctly simulate PGP’s key management,
failing to require users to wait for their recipients to
establish key pairs before they could be sent email. This
makes it unclear if their positive results are valid, as this
is one of PGP’s pain points. In our PGP-based system,
we adopt many of the usability features introduced in
Atwater et al.’s system, but unlike Atwater et al. we
fully implement PGP key management. This allows us
to test whether PGP-based secure email can be usable
by novices, or whether Atwater et al.’s result was an
artifact of their incomplete simulation of PGP.

III.

S ECURE E MAIL S YSTEMS

To compare the usability of PGP-, IBE-, and
password-based secure email, we developed secure
email prototypes that were each implemented with one
of these key management approaches. To ensure that the
interface and functionality of each prototype would be
largely identical, we built each using the MessageGuard
platform. This allowed us to conduct an A/B evaluation
of each system, which restricted variations to intrinsic
properties of the key management schemes we were
testing. While not described below, we also conducted
several cognitive walkthroughs and pilot studies to refine the usability of MessageGuard as a whole, and each
of the three secure email variants individually.
In this section, we first describe the MessageGuard
platform including the overall system look and feel.
We then describe the three secure email variants we
developed: PGP, IBE, and Passwords. For each of
these, we describe the security model of the key
management scheme as well as interface elements
and functionality that are unique to each version.
Each of these systems is available for testing at
https://{pgp,ibe,passwords}.messageguard.io
and source code for each system is available at https:
//bitbucket.org/isrlemail/messageguard-WebClient.

Bai et al. explored user attitudes towards different
models for obtaining a recipient’s public key in PGP [2].
In their study, they built two PGP-based secure email
systems, one that used the traditional key exchange
model,10 and one that used a registration model based on
a key directory.11 Users were provided with instructions
on how to use each tool and given several tasks to
complete. Afterwards, participants shared their opinions
regarding the key exchange models. The results of
this study showed that, overall, individuals preferred
the key directory-based registration model, though they
were not averse to the traditional key exchange model
either. In our study we adopt the key directory model,
which was found to be preferable by Bai et al. Unlike
our work, Bai et al.’s study only gathered data on
user attitudes regarding key management, and did not
evaluate their usability.

A. The MessageGuard Platform
The MessageGuard platform [18]12 is designed to
allow researchers to rapidly prototype secure email
systems.13 These prototypes can then be deployed as
browser extensions in all major browsers except IE.
By building systems using MessageGuard, it is easy to
ensure that the systems have overall identical interfaces
and functionality, an important factor in A/B studies.
MessageGuard also has support for pluggable key management, simplifying our job in developing the three secure email systems. In the remainder of this subsection

Ruoti et al. developed a novel paired-participant
methodology for evaluating the usability of secure
email [16]. Unlike other methodologies that have participants interact with study coordinators, this method10 In this model, users must manually exchange their public keys
with each other. This model is based on the idea of a “web of trust.”
11 In this model, users prove their identity to a trusted third-party
key directory, which will then host their public key. Senders can then
look up a recipient’s public key in this directory.

12 https://bitbucket.org/isrlemail/messageguard

13 MessageGuard supports adding content-based encryption to most
applications on the Web, and not just secure email.
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Whoops! One or more of your recipients hasn’t
installed MessageGuard yet. Click here to send
them a message requesting that they install
MessageGuard.
Once your recipient has installed MessageGuard,
you will be able to encrypt messages for them. In
the meantime, feel free to close this message and
it’ll be saved as a draft.
Fig. 3. Error Shown to PGP Users when Encrypting Message for
Recipient Without Public Key Available in the Key Directory.

Hey,
I want to send you an an encrypted message using
MessageGuard, but I need you to install it first.
Fig. 1.

Here’s what you’ll need to do:

Composition Overlay in MessageGuard.

1. Go to MessageGuard.io/pgp and sign up for an
account.
2. Download and install MessageGuard.
3. Let me know when you’ve set it up, and I’ll send
you my
encrypted message.
Hope that helps!

Fig. 2.

Fig. 4. Invitation Email Generated to Invite Recipient to Install PGP.

Read Overlay in MessageGuard.

automatic encryption, but briefly shows users ciphertext
as part of encryption and decryption, helping users
feel confident that their messages have been encrypted.
Fourth, users can include an unencrypted greeting with
their secure email, helping their friends have confidence
to install MessageGuard and decrypt the email. Fifth,
encrypted emails contain information that help nonMessageGuard-users know how to set up and get started
with MessageGuard.

we give a high level description of MessageGuard; for
further details regarding its security we invite readers to
refer to the MessageGuard paper [18].
MessageGuard tightly integrates with existing web
applications—in this case Gmail—using security overlays [28]. Security overlays function by replacing portions of Gmail’s interface with secure interfaces that are
inaccessible to Gmail. Users then interact with these
secure overlays to create and read encrypted email
(composition–Figure 1, read–Figure 2). The overlays
themselves use a distinctive color scheme to help users
identify them as the interfaces to use when encrypting
their email.

B. PGP
One of the best known approaches for providing
end-to-end encryption is Pretty Good Privacy [9], better
known by its acronym PGP. PGP was developed in 1991
by Phil Zimmerman, and allows users to encrypt and
sign their email messages using public key cryptography. In PGP, users generate a key pair and can then
share their public key in a number of ways, such as
sending the key directly to other users, posting the key
to a personal website, or uploading the key to a key
directory.

In addition to the distinctive interface, MessageGuard incorporates the design principles identified by
Ruoti et al. as being necessary for secure email to be
usable [20], [17]. First, when a message is encrypted, an
artificial delay is added to this process; during the delay
participants are shown informative text helping them understand how their message is being protected. Second,
MessageGuard includes context-sensitive, inline tutorials that appear the first time a user initiates a specific
task; research has shown that tutorials employing this
style are more effective at getting users to read and
understand them [17], [16]. Third, MessageGuard uses

PGP actually has a variety of valid configurations—
for example, public keys can be verified using a webof-trust, the certificate authority system, or by retrieval
from a trusted key directory. In line with work by
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Atwater et al. and Bai et al., we chose a configuration
that maximized usability, while still maintaining the
most important security features: First, keys are shared
using a key directory [2]; users verify that they have
permission to upload a key by creating an account
at the key directory and verifying their email address
using email-based identification and authentication [27].
Second, a user’s private key is only stored on their local
computer, but it is not password encrypted [1]. Third,
if a user attempts to send an email to a recipient who
hasn’t yet uploaded a public key to the key directory, the
user is prompted to send an email to the recipient with
instructions on how to set up MessageGuard [1] (see
Figure 3 and Figure 4). The design of our PGP system
satisfies our threat model when third-party entities are
sometimes-malicious, though we do note that there
would be a need to monitor the key directory (e.g., with
CONIKS [13]).

Fig. 5. Dialog for Entering a New Password with Which to Encrypt
Email.

1)

The following is the workflow for our
MessageGuard–PGP system, for a new user sending
email to a non-user.
1)

2)

3)

4)

The user visits the MessageGuard website.
They are instructed to create an account with
their email address. Their address is then verified by having the user click a link in an email
sent to them. They are then able to download
MessageGuard–PGP.
After installation, the user is told that the system will generate a PGP key pair for them. The
public key is automatically uploaded to the key
directory, as the user is already authenticated
to the key directory from the previous step.
The user attempts to send an encrypted email,
but is informed the recipient hasn’t yet installed the system (see Figure 3). They are
then prompted to send their recipient an email
inviting them to install MessageGuard–PGP
(see Figure 4).
Once
the
recipient
has
installed
MessageGuard–PGP, which generates and
publishes their public key, they inform the
sender that they are ready to proceed. The
sender can now finish encrypting the email
for the recipient.

2)

3)

The user visits the MessageGuard website.
They are instructed to create an account with
their email address. Their address is then verified by having the user click a link in an email
sent to them. They are then able to download
MessageGuard–IBE.
After installation, the user is told that the
system will retrieve their IBE key from the
key server. This happens automatically, as the
user is already authenticated to the key server
from the previous step.
The sender is able to send encrypted email to
any address.

D. Passwords
Password-based encryption refers to allowing a user
to select a password that will be used to encrypt their
email.14 This approach satisfies our threat model when
third-parties are fully-malicious, and has the highest
theoretical security of the three systems we built. Practically, the security of password-based encryption is
limited by the strength of the user-chosen passwords and
security of the out-of-band channels use to communicate
those password. For example, if users choose easyto-guess passwords, then an attacker could obtain an
encrypted message and then brute force the password.
The MessageGuard–Passwords workflow is as follows:

C. IBE

1)

Identity-based encryption (IBE) is a public key
system wherein a user’s public key is simply their email
address [23]. Private keys are generated by a trusted
third-party key server, which authenticates the identity
of the user before providing them with their private key.
IBE satisfies our threat model when third-party entities
are honest-but-curious. As compared to PGP, IBE is less
secure, but potentially more usable—IBE allows anyone
to be sent secure email, regardless of whether they have
already installed MessageGuard.

2)
3)

The
user
visits
the
MessageGuard
website. They are prompted to download
MessageGuard–Passwords.
After installation, the system is immediately
ready to work.
When the user attempts to send an encrypted
email, they are informed that they need to create a password with which to encrypt the email
(see Figure 5). After creating the password, the
user can then send their encrypted email.

14 The password is transformed into a symmetric encryption key
using a password-based key derivation function.

The workflow for MessageGuard–IBE is as follows:
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4)

During the study, participants were asked to complete a multi-stage task three times, once for each of
the secure email systems being tested: PGP, IBE, and
Passwords. The order in which the participants used the
systems was randomized.

The user must communicate to the recipient
the password used to encrypt the email message. This should happen over an out-of-band
(i.e., non-email) channel.
IV.

M ETHODOLOGY

We conducted an IRB-approved user study wherein
pairs of participants used secure email to communicate
sensitive information to each other. Our study methodology is taken from work by Ruoti et al. [16]. We use
this methodology for its various benefits and because it
allows us to compare the results from our systems with
the results produced by Ruoti et al.

B. Demographics
We recruited Gmail users for our study at a local
university, as well as through Craigslist. Participants
were evenly split between male and female: male (47;
50%), female (47; 50%). Participants skewed young: 18
to 24 years old (75; 80%), 25 to 34 years old (18; 19%),
35 to 44 years old (1; 1%).

In the remainder of this section we give an overview
of the study and describe its scenario, tasks, study
questionnaire, and post-study interview. In addition, we
discuss the development and limitations of the study.

We distributed posters across campus to avoid biasing our participants towards any particular major.
Most participants were college students: high school
graduates (1; 1%), undergraduate students (71; 76%),
college graduates (15; 16%), graduate students (7; 7%).
Participants were enrolled in a variety of majors, including both technical and non-technical majors.

A. Study Setup
The study ran for two and a half weeks—beginning
Monday, May 23, 2016 and ending Tuesday, June
7, 2016. In total, 55 pairs of participants (110 total
participants) took the study. Due to various reasons
discussed later in this section, we excluded results from
eight participant pairs. For the remainder of this paper,
we refer exclusively to the remaining 47 pairs (94
participants).

C. Scenario Design
During the study, participants were asked to roleplay a scenario about completing taxes. Johnny was
told that his friend, Jane, had graduated in accounting
and was going to help Johnny prepare his taxes. To
do so, Johnny needed to send her his social security
number and his last year’s tax PIN. Johnny was told
that because this information was sensitive, he should
encrypt it using a secure email system we gave him.15
Jane was told that she would receive some information
regarding taxes from Johnny, but was not informed that
the information would be encrypted.

Participants took between fifty and sixty-five minutes to complete the study, and each participant was
compensated $15 USD for their participation. Participants were required to be accompanied by a friend,
who served as their counterpart for the study. For standardization and to satisfy requirements of the systems
tested in the study, both participants were required to
use their own Gmail accounts.
When participants arrived, they were given a consent
form to sign, detailing the study and their rights as
participants. Participants were informed that they would
be in separate rooms during the study and would use
email to communicate with each other. Participants were
also informed that a study coordinator would be with
them at all times and could answer any questions they
might have.

D. Task Design
Based on the scenario, participants were asked to
complete a two-stage task.
1)
2)

Using a coin flip, one participant was randomly
assigned as Participant A (referred to as “Johnny”
throughout the paper) and the other as Participant
B (referred to as “Jane” throughout the paper). The
participants were then led to the appropriate room to
begin the study; each room had identical equipment.
For the remainder of the study, all instructions were
provided in written form. Participants completed the
task on a virtual machine, which was restored to a
common snapshot after each study task, ensuring that
the computer started in the same state for all participants
and that no participant information was inadvertently
stored.

Johnny would encrypt and send his SSN and
last year’s tax PIN to Jane.
Jane would decrypt this information, then reply
to Johnny with a confirmation code and this
year’s tax PIN. The reply was required to be
encrypted. After Johnny received this information, he would inform Jane that he had received
the necessary information, and then the task
would end.16 .

During each stage, participants were provided with
worksheets containing instructions regarding the task
15 Johnny

was provided a URL for the secure email system to use.
confirmation step is added to ensure that Johnny could
decrypt Jane’s message. We did not require the confirmation message
to be encrypted.
16 This
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and space for participants to record the sensitive information they received.17 Both participants were provided with the information they would send (e.g., SSN
and PIN), but were told to treat this information as
they would their own sensitive information. Participants
completed the same task for each of the three systems
being tested.

which they would be required to enter before MessageGuard would function. This would help protect their
sensitive messages from other individuals who might
also use the same computer. After reading the description about adding a master password to MessageGuard,
users were asked to describe whether they would want
this feature and why they felt that way.

Before beginning any tasks, participants were informed that other than the sensitive information they
were provided, which would need to be transmitted over
email, they were free to communicate with each other
however they normally would. Additionally, participants
were informed that they could browse the Internet, use
their phones, or engage in other similar activities while
waiting for email from their friend. This was done to
provide a more natural setting for the participants, and
to avoid frustration if participants had to wait for an
extended period of time while their friend figured out
an encrypted email system.

F. Post-Study Interview
After completing the survey, participants were interviewed by their respective study coordinators. The
coordinators asked participants about their general impressions of the study and the secure email systems they
had used. Furthermore, the coordinators were instructed
to note when the participants struggled or had other
interesting events occur, and during the post-study interview the coordinators reviewed and further explored
these events with the participants.
To assess whether participants understood the security provided by each secure email system, coordinators questioned participants regarding what an attacker
would need to do to read their encrypted messages.
Coordinators would continue probing participants’ answers until they were confident whether or not the user
correctly understood the security model of each system.

Study coordinators were allowed to answer questions related to the study but were not allowed to provide
instructions on how to use any of the systems being
tested. If participants became confused regarding the
system, coordinators would tell them that they could
answer questions regarding the task, but could not
describe how to use the systems being tested.

After describing their perceived security models,
participants were then read short descriptions detailing
the actual security models of each system. Participants
were encouraged to ask questions if they wanted further
clarification for any of the described models. After
hearing these descriptions, participants were then asked
to indicate whether their opinions regarding any of
the systems had changed. Participants were also asked
whether they would change their answer regarding their
favorite system on the survey.

E. Study Questionnaire
We administered our study using the Qualtrics webbased survey software. As part of this survey, participants answered a set of demographic questions.
Immediately upon completing the study task for
a given secure email system, participants were asked
several questions related to their experience with that
system. First, participants completed the ten questions
from the System Usability Scale (SUS) [5], [6]. Multiple
studies have shown that SUS is a good indicator of
perceived usability [26], is consistent across populations [21], and has been used in the past to rate secure
email systems [20], [1], [16]. After providing a SUS
score, participants were asked to describe what they
liked about each system, what they would change, and
why they would change it.

Upon completion of the post-study interview, participants were brought together for a final post-study
interview. First, participants were asked to share their
opinions on doing a study with a friend, as opposed
to a traditional study. Second, participants were asked
to describe their ideal secure email system. While
participants are not system designers, we hoped that this
question might elicit responses that participants had not
yet felt comfortable sharing.

After completing the task and questions for all three
secure email systems, participants were asked to select
which of the encrypted email systems they had used
was their favorite, and to describe why they liked this
system. Participants were next asked to rate the following statements using a five-point Likert scale (Strongly
Disagree–Strongly Agree): “I want to be able to encrypt
my email,” and “I would encrypt email frequently.”

G. Quality Control

Finally, the survey told participants that MessageGuard could be enhanced with a master password,

We excluded responses from eight pairs of participants.18 First, three pairs were removed because the
secure email tools became inoperative during the study,
making it impossible for participants to complete the
study. Second, two pairs were removed because the
participants were non-native English speakers, making
it difficult for them to understand the instructions they
were given.

17 These instructions did not include directions on how to use any
of the systems.

18 When we excluded a participant’s results, we also excluded their
partner’s results.
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Mean

Standard
Deviation

Range

Percentile

Confidence
Interval
(α = 0.05)

Count

PGP

Johnny
Jane
Both

47
47
94

75.0
76.5
75.7

16.2
13.5
14.9

±4.6
±3.9
±3.0

70.4–79.6
72.6–80.4
72.7–78.7

73%
78%
76%

IBE

Johnny
Jane
Both

47
47
94

77.7
76.9
77.3

13.8
13.3
13.5

±3.9
±3.8
±2.7

73.8–81.6
73.1–80.7
74.6–80.0

82%
80%
81%

Passwords

Johnny
Jane
Both

47
47
94

72.7
67.2
70.0

15.4
14.2
15.0

±4.4
±4.1
±3.0

68.3–77.1
63.1–71.3
67.0–73.0

66%
48%
56%

Percentiles are calculated by looking up the SUS score in a table [22].
When a SUS score is not in the table we estimate the percentile based
on the available data.
TABLE I.
SUS S CORES

H. Limitations
Our study involved a single user sending email to
one other user. This approach was helpful in understanding the basic usability of the systems tested, but it might
not reveal all the usability issues that would occur in
other communication models, such as a user sending
email to multiple individuals. Future work could expand
this research and examine other usage scenarios.

The difference between PGP’s and IBE’s SUS scores
are not statistically significant (two-tailed student t-test,
matched pairs—Johnny–p = 0.12, Jane–p = 0.83,
Both–p = 0.21). In contrast, the difference between
Jane’s PGP and Passwords scores are significant (twotailed student t-test, matched pairs—Johnny–p = 0.28,
Jane–p < 0.001, Both–p < 0.001). Also, the difference
between IBE’s and Passwords’ SUS scores are significant for both Johnny and Jane (two-tailed student ttest, matched pairs—Johnny–p = 0.01, Jane–p < 0.001,
Both–p < 0.001)

Our study also has limitations common to all existing secure email studies. First, our populations are not
representative of all groups, and future research could
broaden the population (e.g., non-students, non-Gmail
users). Second, our study was a short-term study, and
future research should look at these issues in a longerterm longitudinal study. Third, our study is a lab study
and has limitations common to all studies run in a
trusted environment [14], [25].
V.

Participant

Third, we removed three participant pairs that were
clearly not paying attention to the study survey. One
participant answered “neither agree nor disagree” to all
Likert items and did not fill in answers to any other
question. Another participant admitted at the end of
the study that he hadn’t noticed that the SUS questions
alternated between positive and negative phrasings. One
of the participants from the third pair gave nonsense
answers to several questions. Rather than try to extract
the few answers that might have been meaningful from
these participants, we felt it was best to remove them
from our data.

We also compared the SUS scores for our systems
against the SUS scores for other systems previously
tested with the same methodology [16]. Specifically, we
compared systems that had the same key management
approach: PGP to Mailvelope, IBE to Pwm, IBE to
Virtru,19 and Passwords to Tutanota. In each case, our
system out-performed these other systems (two-tailed
student t-test, unequal variance—PGP and Mailvelope–
p < 0.001, IBE and Pwm–p < 0.09, IBE and Virtru–
p = 0.04, Passwords and Tutanota–p < 0.001). This
gives strong evidence that the design principles integrated into MessageGuard [17], [18] lead to strong
usability in secure email systems, regardless of the key
management approach used.

R ESULTS

In this section we report on quantitative results
from our our study. First, we report the SUS score
for each system. Next, we give task completion times
and details on how often participants mistakenly sent
sensitive information in the clear. We then detail users’
understanding of each system’s security model. Finally,
we report on users’ favorite systems and several other
minor results.
A. System Usability Scale

We also tested to see whether there was a statistically
significant difference between the SUS score ratings of
Johnny and Jane. We found no significant difference
for either PGP or IBE (two-tailed student t-test, equal
variance—PGP–p = 0.63, IBE–p = 0.76). For Passwords, we found a nearly significant result, with Johnny
rating Passwords 5.5 points higher than Jane (two-tailed
student t-test, equal variance—Passwords–p = 0.08),
though this difference disappears when Passwords was
the first system tested (two-tailed student t-test, equal
variance—Passwords–p = 0.92).

We evaluated each system using the System Usability Scale (SUS). A breakdown of the scores are given in
Table I. To give context to these scores, we leverage the
work of several researchers that correlated SUS scores
with more intuitive descriptions of usability [3], [4],
[22], [26]. The descriptions are presented in Figure 6.
PGP’s SUS score of 75.7 is rated as having “Good”
usability, receives a “B” grade, and falls in the 76th
percentile of systems tested with SUS. IBE’s score of
77.3 is also rated as having “Good” usability, receives
a “B+” grade, and is in the 81st percentile. Finally,
Passwords’ score of 70.0 is rated as having ”Good”
usability, receives a “C” grade, and reaches the 56th
percentile.

We also explored whether the order in which systems were tested had an effect on their SUS scores.
19 Virtru uses key escrow which from the user’s perspective is
functionally indistinguishable from IBE.
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Percentile

15

35

F

D

Poor
Not acceptable

30

C

OK
Marginal Low

40

50

Mailvelope†

60 70
65

40

60

Tutanota†

80

85

90

Good
M. High

70

SUS Score

95

100

80

Best

90

100

IBE

Virtru†
Pwm

A+

A
Excellent
Acceptable

B

†

Passwords PGP
†

These SUS scores are for other secure email systems tested with the same methodology, and are reference points for the performance of our
systems. Mailvelope is a PGP-based system, Tutanota a password-based system, Pwm an IBE-based system, and Virtru a custom key escrow
scheme.

Mean When
Not First

Effect Size

Stage

Count

Mean

Standard
Deviation

Johnny
Jane
Both

47
47
94

81.6
79.7
80.6

71.6
74.8
73.2

−10.0
−4.9
−7.4

0.04
0.25
0.02

PGP

1
2
Both

47
45
45

8:02
3:24
11:33

3:06
1:28
3:53

±0:53
±0:26
±1:08

7:09–8:55
2:58–3:50
10:25–12:41

IBE

Johnny
Jane
Both

47
47
94

81.0
79.6
80.3

75.8
75.3
75.6

−5.2
−4.3
−4.7

0.22
0.30
0.10

IBE

1
2
Both

46
44
43

3:30
5:58
9:30

1:30
2:36
3:50

±0:26
±0:46
±1:09

3:04–3:56
5:12–6:44
8:21–10:39

Passwords

Johnny
Jane
Both

47
47
94

65.9
66.4
66.1

75.6
67.6
71.3

+9.6
+1.2
+5.2

0.04
0.80
0.11

Passwords

1
2
Both

46
44
43

3:31
6:54
10:22

1:25
3:34
4:00

±0:25
±1:03
±1:12

3:06–3:56
5:51–7:57
9:10–11:34

TABLE III.

† Two-tailed

student t-test, equal variance.
Result is statistically significant

TABLE II.

Range

Mean When
First

PGP

p†

Count

Confidence
Interval
(α = 0.05)

Adjective-based Ratings to Help Interpret SUS Scores

Participant

Fig. 6.

T IME TAKEN TO C OMPLETE TASK ( MIN : SEC )

SUS S CORE B Y O RDERING

lower than its mean score for other orderings. Based
on our analysis of the data, it is possible that this
treatment’s low scores for PGP and IBE is an anomaly
that would disappear over the course of additional
studies.

The results of this analysis are summarized in Table II.
Overall, Johnny’s experience was significantly affected
by system ordering. Jane’s experience was also affected,
but the effect was never statistically significant.

B. Time

Johnny rated PGP 10 points higher when it was
the first system he tested; he also rated Passwords
9.6 points lower when it was the first system tested.
More specifically, we found that PGP’s score only
dropped when it followed Passwords, and this drop was
statistically significant (two-tailed student t-test, equal
variance—Johnny–p < 0.01, Jane–p = 0.13, Both–
p < 0.01). Similarly, Passwords’ score only rose when
it followed PGP, though in this case the relation only
existed if Passwords immediately followed PGP; this
difference was also statistically significant (two-tailed
student t-test, equal variance—Johnny–p < 0.01, Jane–
p = 0.23, Both–p < 0.01).

We recorded the time it took each participant to
finish the assigned task with each system. For timing
purposes the tasks were split into two stages. The first
stage started when Johnny first visited the MessageGuard website and ended when he had successfully sent
an encrypted email with his SSN and last year’s tax PIN.
The second stage started when Jane received her first
encrypted email and ended when she had decrypted it,
replied with the appropriate information, and received
the confirmation email from Johnny. It is possible for
stage one and two to overlap; if Johnny first sends an
encrypted message without the required information,
this will start the timer for stage two without stopping
the timer for stage one.20

IBE’s scores were relatively stable regardless of
ordering, except when the systems were tested in this
order: Passwords, IBE, PGP; in this case, IBE’s score
was 14.0 points lower than the mean score for all other
orderings. This treatment had a similar effect on PGP;
when tested in this order, PGP’s score was 11.4 points

Timings were calculated using the video recordings
of the participants’ screen. In one instance the video file
20 We took this approach as stage one is clearly not finished, but
Jane is also able to start making progress on completing stage two.
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C. Mistakes
Stage 1

IBE

We define mistakes to be instances when users send
sensitive information in normal email when it should
have been encrypted. For Passwords, a user is also
considered to have made a mistake if they send the
email-encryption password in a plaintext email.22

Stage 2

Passwords
0:00

4:00

6:00

8:00

10:00

12:00

14:00

16:00

18:00

20:00

In PGP and IBE there were a low number of
mistakes, and each was made by Johnny (PGP–[n =
1; 2%], IBE–[2; 4%]). In all three cases, the participant
transmitted the sensitive information in the unencrypted
greeting of the encrypted message. This happened in
spite of the fact that two participants watched the
compose tutorial, which warned them that text in that
field would not be encrypted. This problem area could
likely be addressed by making users explicitly enable
unencrypted greetings, instead of displaying it as a
default field.

Mean When
First

Mean When
Not First

Effect Size

PGP

1
2
Both

47
45
45

9:36
4:20
13:56

7:13
2:54
10:14

−2:23
−1:26
−3:42

0.01
< 0.01
0.01

IBE

1
2
Both

46
44
43

4:47
8:01
12:55

2:49
4:48
7:39

−1:58
−3:13
−5:16

< 0.001
< 0.001
< 0.001

Passwords

1
2
Both

46
44
43

4:50
9:49
14:48

3:01
5:48
8:50

−1:49
−4:01
−5:58

< 0.001
< 0.001
< 0.001

p†

Count

Individual Participant Task Completion Times

Stage

Fig. 7.

2:00

In Passwords, all mistakes were a result of users
sending their password in plaintext email (Johnny–
[9; 19%], Jane–[1; 2%]). For five of these mistakes
(5; 11%), Johnny first sent the password over cellular
text messaging, but for various reasons Jane never
got this message. When Jane received her encrypted
email, she didn’t yet have the password and would
email Johnny requesting the password, which he sent
to her using email. It is unclear whether this represents
users’ lack of understanding regarding the security of
email [15], a lack of concern for the safety of their
sensitive information, an artifact of taking the study in
a trusted environment [25], or a mixture of the three.
Additionally, in four cases Johnny used Google Chat to
send their password, giving Google access to both the
secure email and the password used to encrypt it. Still,
we chose not to include this as a mistake as it is not as
egregious as sending the password over email.

† Two-tailed

student t-test, equal variance.
Result is statistically significant

TABLE IV.

T IME TAKEN TO C OMPLETE TASK ( MIN : SEC )

of the recording was corrupted, making it impossible to
gather task completion times. In three other instances
the study coordinators forgot to start the video recording, causing either a complete (one instance) or partial
(two instances) loss of data. Task completion time data
from the remaining recordings is given in Table III and
Figure 7.
By design, PGP shifts a significant portion of user
effort from stage two to stage one—Jane installs PGP in
stage one instead of stage two. As such, the difference
in stage completion times between PGP and the other
two systems are statistically significant (two-tailed student t-test, matched pairs—both stages, both systems–
p < 0.001). For total task completion time (stage one
+ stage two), only the difference between PGP and
IBE is statistically significant (two-tailed student t-test,
matched pairs—PGP and IBE–p = 0.05, PGP and
Passwords–p = 0.14, IBE and Passwords–p = 0.321).

Regardless, we note that the mistake rate of our
Passwords system is significantly lower than that for
Tutanota. In Ruoti et al.’s evaluation of Tutanota, a
system which allows users to password-encrypt email,
they found that Johnny sent the password in the clear
68% of the time. This is 49% greater than our system’s
rate, and the difference is statistically significant (N − 1
chi-squared test—χ2 [1, N = 72] = 16.65, p < 0.001).
This is likely due to the fact that during password input,
our Passwords system instructed users to send their
password using a non-email communication channel.

As shown in Table IV, the task for the first system
tested took longer than the other two.21 The effect was
most extreme for Jane, who didn’t know that she would
be using secure email until receiving her first message
from Johnny. Interestingly, system ordering had the
smallest effect on PGP’s task completion time; though,
this could be tied to PGP having the highest overall

D. Understanding
In the post-study interview we asked participants
to identify what an attacker would need to do to read
their encrypted email. The goal of this question was

21 There wasn’t a strong difference in task timing between whether
the system was second or third.

22 Mistakes can also include revealing PGP or IBE private keys,
though neither of our systems allowed users to make this mistake.
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TABLE V.

Both

C HANGES IN FAVORITE S YSTEM B ETWEEN
S URVEY AND I NTERVIEW

Participants’ Favorite System

While IBE was a slight favorite, the difference was
not statistically significant (Chi-squared test—Survey–
χ2 [2, N = 282] = 2.56, p = 0.28, Interview–χ2 [2, N =
282] = 1.01, p = 0.60). Of the three participants who
did not select a favorite system (3; 3%), two indicated
that they liked all three systems equally, and the third
participant indicated that they disliked all three systems
because he erroneously believed that the systems did
not store his encrypted email in Gmail.

to evaluate whether participants understood the security
model of each system they had tested. Study coordinators would continue probing participants until they were
confident regarding whether or not the participant had a
proper understanding of the system in question. In five
cases (Johnny–2, Jane–3), the study session ran late and
participants had to leave without completing the poststudy interview. As such, percentages in this Subsection
are calculated off a different total number of participants
(Johnny–45, Jane–44, Both–89).

Approximately a sixth of participants (15; 16%)
changed their favorite system after better understanding
the security models of each system. These changes are
detailed in Table V. The differences were all small, with
the only notable changes being Jane’s overall preference
for switching from IBE to PGP.

Participants had a poor understanding of both PGP’s
(Johnny–[2; 4%], Jane–[2; 5%], Both–[4; 4%]) and
IBE’s (Johnny–[2; 4%], Jane–[3; 7%], Both–[5; 6%])
security models. Generally, participants believed that if
an attacker could gain access to a user’s email then they
could decrypt that user’s messages. Only a handful of
participants recognized that signing up for an account
prior to downloading the tool was meaningful. During
the interviews, most participants indicated they saw no
difference in the security of IBE and PGP.

F. Other Results
We observed participants to determine how often
they used various features in MessageGuard. We noted
that Johnny frequently watched both the compose and
read tutorials (Compose–[14; 87%], Read–[38; 81%]).
Jane similarly watched the read tutorial (43; 91%),
but rarely composed a new email and as such was
rarely given a chance to view the compose tutorial23
(6 out of 10 participants; 60%). We also found that
Johnny was somewhat likely to include a plaintext
greeting with his encrypted email (33; 70%). When Jane
did send a new encrypted message, she included an
unencrypted greeting a little under half of the time (4
of 10 participants; 40%).

In strong contrast, nearly all participants had a
clear understanding of how password-based encryption
protected their emails (Johnny–[41; 91%], Jane–[41;
93%], Both–[82; 92%]).
E. Favorite System
At the end of the study survey, participants were
asked to indicate which system was their favorite and
why. Later, during the post-study interview, participants
were given descriptions of each system’s security model
and were invited to ask further clarifying questions as
needed. After hearing these descriptions, participants
were allowed to update which system they felt was their
favorite. Participants’ preferences, both pre- and postsurvey, are summarized in Figure 8.

We also recorded how Johnny sent the password he
used to encrypt his email when using the Passwords
system. Johnny largely preferred phone-based communication channels for communicating the password with
Jane (cellular text messaging–23, phone call–11, email–
9, Google Chat–4, in person–2, Facebook Chat–1).24
Also, in three cases (phone call–2, email –1) Johnny

Overall, participants were split on which system they
preferred (During Survey—PGP–[26; 28%], IBE–[36;
38%], Passwords–[29; 31%]; After Interview—PGP–
[29; 31%], IBE–[34; 36%], Passwords–[28; 30%]).

23 Encrypted

replies do not contain plaintext greetings.
We note that these usage numbers do not sum to 47 as Johnny
sometimes used multiple methods to communicate the password.
24
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I want to be able
to encrypt my email
I would encrypt
email frequently

Johnny

A small number of participants also recognized that
sending PGP messages to multiple participants could
become cumbersome if most of the recipients had never
used PGP before. In this regard, R7A said,

Jane
Both

Johnny
Jane
0%

Strongly agree

20%

Agree
Disagree

Fig. 9.

“[PGP] also didn’t let me send the email
until they had done so [installed the system].
This would be annoying if I needed to send
many emails for work or something similar. I
would want to send the email and move onto
the next task, without waiting for the other
person to have the extension.”

Both
40%

60%

80%

100%

Neither agree nor disagree
Strongly disagree

Participant Opinions Regarding Secure Email

On the other hand, a small number of participants
recognized that these extra steps were tied to PGP’s
stronger security mode. In this vein, R19A stated,

did not actually transmit the password, but merely gave
clues to Jane that were sufficient for her to figure it out.
At the end of the survey, participants were asked
whether they wanted to be able to encrypt their email
and whether they would frequently do so. Participant
responses to these questions are summarized in Figure 9.
Overall, participants were in strong agreement that
email encryption is something they want (want–[71;
76%], unsure–[18; 19%], don’t want–[5; 5%]). Still,
participants were split on how often they would use
secure email, with the plurality going to infrequent use
(frequent use–[30; 32%], unsure–[28; 30%], infrequent
use–[36; 39%]). This is in line with previous results
regarding desired secure email usage [17].
VI.

“Easy to use and felt very secure. There
were more steps to this version than the IBE
version, but that made it seem more secure.”
The annoyance of requiring recipients to first install
PGP was somewhat alleviated by the fact that the system
would automatically generate an invitation message
explaining to the recipient how to install MessageGuard.
This made it clear to participants what they needed to do
next to send or receive an encrypted email. For example,
participants R9A and R33A stated, respectively,
“I really like the idea of being able to send
encrypted messages regularly. I also liked the
automatic e-mail generated for having the
recipients set up the system as well.”

D ISCUSSION

In this section we discuss participants’ qualitative
feedback and observations from the study coordinators.
Within this section, participants have each been assigned
a unique identifier R[1–47][A,B], where the final letter
refers to the role of the participant (e.g., R1A and R1B
were Johnny and Jane, respectively, in the first study
session).

“I also liked that it was easy to send an email
to someone who didn’t have MessageGuard–
PGP and they could easily download it.”
The most significant issue we discovered with our
PGP system was that very few participants understood
its security model (4; 4%), with most participants assuming that an attacker only needed access to the user’s
email account to read their encrypted email. It is likely
that because so much of PGP’s key management was
automated (e.g., key generation, uploading and retrieval
of of public keys) that participants had insufficient contextual clues to determine the system’s security model.
While reducing the automation of the system could improve understanding, these changes would likely come
at an unacceptably high usability cost [29], [24], [19].
Future work should examine how we can help users
establish accurate mental models of PGP’s security
model in a way that does not significantly impact the
usability of the system.

A. PGP
Our work succeeded at creating a highly usable
PGP-based secure email system that was liked by
participants. In general, participants described the PGP
system as fast and easy-to-use.
The most common complaint regarding PGP was
that recipients needed to install PGP before they could
be sent encrypted messages. As stated by R1A, “It’s
not great that sending someone an encrypted email
means you have to ask them to download an extension.”
Additionally, some participants felt that they were less
likely to install the system if they didn’t already have
an encrypted message. For example, R9B described,

After explaining to participants PGP’s actual security model, they felt much more confident in its security.
Particularly, participants liked that it did not rely on
any third parties. For example, after hearing about
PGP’s security model R47B enthusiastically changed
her favorite system from Passwords to PGP and stated,

“I am more motivated (i.e., I can more readily
see the need) to install the app if the encrypted
message is already sitting there in my inbox.
Also, the fewer emails I have to send/receive
the better”.
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“Just because it had to be from your computer, it seems like, if they were to get the
[encrypted contents], it’d be a little bit harder
for them to get [the plaintext contents].”

how best to solve this problem. MessageGuard’s design
anonymizes the identity of the recipients, which makes
it difficult to tell users which email alias they need
to register with their MessageGuard account. This an
area that future work could examine, as it represents an
important edge case for the adoption of secure email.

Participants’ interest in PGP was tempered by the
risk of losing all their encrypted email if something were
to happen to the private key stored on their computer.
In this regard, R18A expressed,

Future work could examine how to best backup and
transfer private keys between devices in a usable and
secure fashion.

As with PGP, participants had a poor understanding
of IBE’s security model. In fact, nearly all participants
assumed that PGP and IBE had the same security model.
After instructing participants on IBE’s security model,
many participants were happy to hear it was more secure
than they assumed. After understanding each system’s
security model, some participants who initially preferred
IBE switched their preference to PGP; most remained
with IBE, stating that it had good enough security.
Additionally, these participants felt that IBE’s ability
to send an encrypted message to recipients without
ensuring they had installed MessageGuard trumped the
security drawbacks of IBE.

B. IBE

C. Passwords

Similar to prior results regarding IBE, participants
found the system to be extremely usable. Additionally,
task completion times show that IBE was faster than the
other two systems.

While participants gave Passwords a lower SUS
score than either PGP or IBE, they did feel that overall
it was quite usable. Still, even though users rated
Passwords as usable, a substantial number indicated that
they liked PGP and IBE due to their not requiring a
password to encrypt email. For example, R29A said,
“There was the benefit of not having to send a password
by exterior means.” Also, R32A stated, “It was simple
to send a message and you didn’t need to set up a
password.”

“I guess, depending on what you’re doing,
[PGP] could be helpful, but it could also be
very frustrating . . . if you changed systems or
something like that, it could be frustrating to
realize that you couldn’t decrypt previously
sent messages.”

Compared to prior version of secure email based
on IBE, our version required that users sign up for
an account before they could retrieve their IBE private
key.25 Having a separate account prevents a sometimesmalicious email provider from downloading the user’s
IBE private key.26 While most users were fine with
setting up an account, several participants indicated that
they disliked the need to set up an account. For example,
R3B and R5B respectively expressed,

The main problem with password-based encryption
was the need to communicate the password to the recipient. As already discussed, many participants shared
their password over plaintext email. In some cases,
they recognized that this didn’t seem secure, but still
proceeded. For example, R32A said,

“As a general comment, I think the password
one was my favorite, since you didn’t have to
create an account for MessageGuard.”

“The recipient of your email needs to know
your password before they can open your
email, so we ended up sharing the password
through an non-encrypted email which seems
counterproductive.”

“Easy to use, installed it, created an account
(I liked that I had to create an account),
worked well”
During the user study, several participant pairs encountered an edge case for IBE—Jane had multiple
email address aliases, and the message was encrypted
for a different alias than Jane used when she set up
her MessageGuard account. This resulted in Jane being
unable to decrypt Johnny’s message. This was especially
confusing for Johnny and Jane as both of them had set
up the secure email systems but had no indication of
what they needed to do to resolve the current issue.

Even when using an out-of-band channel, some
participants questioned the security of those channels.
R24B and R34B, respectively, described this concern:
“We also communicated the password
through a text message. I’m not sure what that
does for the security of the system if we are
using an outside and unprotected means of
communication in order to make it work.”

The difficulty of handling email aliases is not limited
to IBE and affects PGP as well. As of now, it is unclear

“We used a text to transport the password
and I don’t know that that is necessarily the
safest way. If there was some way to have the
person get the password safely, that would be
great.”

25 Our

PGP system also required users to establish a separate
MessageGuard account.
26 As such, our IBE system has stronger security than the IBE
systems previously developed by Ruoti et al. [20], [17].
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“Though it is the most time consuming (and
some would say the most hassle as well), it
is obviously the most secure. I wouldn’t use it
for every email, but I would certainly use it
for sending private information.”

Many participants also felt that communicating a
password out-of-band negated the need to use secure
email, as they could just communicate the sensitive
information over the out-of-band channel. R39B indicated,
“It was way lame that I had to call him because I might as well have just given him the
info that way. . . . If I’m gonna communicate
with them through email, its because I want
to do it through email, not through a phone
call.”

D. Key Management Trade-offs
As partially discussed above, we identify usability and security trade-offs for each key management
approach. These trade-offs were identified based on
both our quantitative data and participants’ qualitative
responses. Overall, there were two clear trade-offs.

Several participants also noted that if they had to
securely communicate with multiple people, it would
be annoying to manage separate passwords for each
contact. In this regard, R9A expressed,

First, hiding cryptographic details increases usability, but inhibits understanding of a system’s security
model. For example, both IBE and PGP hid key management from the user, leading to high usability scores.
However, in the post-study interview it was clear that
participants did not understand the security model of either system. In contrast, the Passwords system required
users to manually manage their keys (i.e., passwords).
This led to lower usability scores for Passwords, but
nearly all users understood its security model.

“I may want to use [Passwords] often in
sending regular messages to many people. If
I had to share a password each time, it may
make the process cumbersome.”
After using the Passwords system, participants had
several suggestions for how it could be improved.
First, participants felt that within an email thread the
password used to encrypt the email should be static and
unchanging. While users could reuse the same password
to encrypt replies, many participants became confused
about this and created a new password, necessitating
an additional round of password exchange. Second,
some participants felt it would be helpful to have a
built-in password complexity meter or random password
generator when creating passwords. As stated by R25A
and R18B, respectively,

Second, tools that rely on third-party key servers
sacrifice security, but significantly reduce the burden of
adopting the system. For example, evaluations of PGP
systems that use manual key exchange have consistently
found these systems to be unusable [29], [24], [19].
In our PGP system, we employed a third-party key
directory, which significantly improved its usability at
the expense of trusting a third-party. Similarly, IBE fully
trusts its third-party server with private keys, making
it trivial to send any recipient an encrypted message.
Even though participants recognized the lower security
of IBE, many indicated that it still had “good enough”
security for their needs.

“I would want it to tell me if my password
is complex or even provide random passwords
that are complex. I would want this to make
myself feel more confident that what I was
sending could not be hacked or decrypted
easily be someone else that I did not intent.”

E. User Attitudes Regarding the Design of Secure Email
We asked participants whether they would be interested in MessageGuard including a master password.27
Overall, participants were interested in this feature
(Johnny–[33; 70%], Jane–[35; 74%], Both–[72; 77%]).
Participants felt that this would provide an important
security property when multiple users shared a single
computer. R6A and R18A expressed, respectively,

“If you don’t have a random password generator, then people will just end up using
familiar passwords, which is actually more of
a problem than if there were no passwords at
all.”

“I let others use my computer enough it
would be nice to now my email was relatively
safe when I was not in control.”

Unlike PGP and IBE, the security model for the
Passwords system was well-understood by participants.
This is likely due to the fact that users have an ingrained
sense of how passwords protect their data. Understanding the security model of passwords helped users trust
the system’s security. As stated by R3A and R23A,
respectively,

“I like the idea of having more control over
what is visible to other users, especially in
cases of using a shared computer.”
27 With a master password, MessageGuard would not encrypt or decrypt email until this password was entered. Moreover, cryptographic
keys would be encrypted using the master password before being
stored to disk.

“It was nice to be able to create a password
that only myself and the sender know. It felt
more secure. . . . ”
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but only two users actually looked at it. In conjunction
with participants’ responses, this behavior suggests that
users are not actually interested in personally reading about MessageGuard’s security, but rather want
these details available for critique by security-conscious
friends and experts. Users would then base their trust
in the system on these individuals’ recommendations.

The participants that were not interested in a master
password indicated that they had sole access to their
computer, and that a master would add a hassle for
no real security gain. As described by R3B and R9B,
respectively,
“I wouldn’t like the inconvenience of having to enter in an additional password when
opening my browser.”

Several participants were especially delighted with
MessageGuard’s ability to verify the identity of the
sender. For example, R16A stated, “I could verify the
sender and make sure the email wasn’t from someone
or something sketchy.” Similarly, R38 said, “I like that
it encrypts and that it tells you whether the name of the
sender is their real name.” This indicates that users are
aware of the ability for sender addresses to be spoofed,
and that they are interested in secure email’s ability to
prevent this type of attack.

“My computer is password protected. While
someone could theoretically get on and obtain
sensitive information, I watch my computer
like I watch my 1-year old: very closely. Not
anticipating needing to protect my data from
non-authorized users of my devices.”
Since a majority of participants were interested in
a master password, future work should explore how
to best implement a master password, with special
attention paid to its potential usability impact.

Finally, we note that users are interested in being
able to toggle encryption for individual email messages
in an email thread. In MessageGuard once an email
is encrypted, future replies in that thread are always
encrypted. While this helps better protect encrypted
email, participants indicated that they would prefer to
be able to turn off encryption for specific emails in a
thread. For example, R45A indicated,

We note that the split in participants’ opinions
regarding master passwords demonstrates two important
principles of usable, secure email. First, the potential
users of secure email have very different usage scenarios
(e.g., shared computer vs. private computer). Second,
no one set of features satisfies all users. While these
principles may seem obvious, the sad reality is that
they are not being respected by any of the industrial
secure email systems we have previously tested. Our
experience has shown that secure email tools are largely
built for a single user group, and are not sufficiently
customizable for groups that have different usability and
security criteria.

“When I reply to an e-mail chain, I would like
to have the ability to turn off the encryption,
instead of not having the option.”
F. Validation of Prior Research
Our research validates prior secure email research.
First, our research confirms that usability modifications
suggested by Atwater et al. [1]—obviating the use of
master passwords, auto-generating invitational emails,
using a key directory—do indeed increase the usability
of PGP-based secure email. This confirmation is important as errors in Atwater et al.’s study made it unclear
if their results were valid.

Participants also expressed a strong desire to better
understand how the secure email systems worked. They
felt that this would help them verify that the system
was properly protecting their data. Additionally, several
participants stated that they would not feel comfortable
using a “random” tool from the Internet. Instead, they
looked for tools that were verified by security experts or
were distributed and endorsed by a well-known brand
(e.g., Google). R40B and R4A shared, respectively,

Third, our results demonstrate that the design principles for usable, secure email discovered by Ruoti
et al. [20], [17] generalize beyond IBE, and are also
applicable to PGP- and password-based systems. Moreover, we demonstrate that these principles are sufficient
to make PGP—a previously unusable type of secure
email [29], [24], [19]—highly usable and preferred to
other approaches by a third of our participants. Many
participant responses demonstrated the importance of
Ruoti et al.’s design principles (e.g., tight-integration;
context-sensitive, inline tutorials; unencrypted greetings) in their high estimation of our systems’ usability.
For example, R7A, R9A, R11A, R26B, and R34B all
commented on these various design principles:

“I’m wary of downloading unfamiliar things
because of viruses. But I don’t know a lot
about viruses. . . . I think to use it I would
have to know it was really legit form a legit
company, or approved by someone. I don’t
know if I could trust a random program with
my personal info.”
“I need very strong reasons to believe that it’s
not just a way that the workers of MessageGuard can access my personal information.
Like knowing that it’s not a spam or can be
broken into.”

“I really like the integration into Gmail, so
that I can safely send information without
having to use an entirely new system.”

Interestingly, a white paper on MessageGuard’s design is available to view on the MessageGuard website,
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evaluation was the first formal A/B evaluation of the
usability of different key management schemes. It is
also the largest secure email study to date, including
twice as many participants as previous studies [16].

“The tutorial was very helpful. I also found
the icons to be helpful in using the tool.
I was surprised at how easily the program
integrated into my e-mail. There was never
any confusion as to what I needed to do or as
to what was going on.”

The results of our study demonstrate that each of
these three key management approaches can be used to
create usable, secure email; though each has their own
trade-offs. As such, our research represents the first time
that PGP-based email encryption has been shown to be
usable by novices. Additionally, participants’ qualitative
feedback provides valuable insights into the usability
trade-offs of each key management approach, as well
as several general principles of usable, secure email.
Finally, our work provides evidence that validates both
the design principles used in our systems as well as the
study methodology.

“The tutorials were great. I really felt like I
didn’t need to know much to be able to use
it.”
“I like . . . that the subject/top of the email
are not encrypted to help others realize that
this is not spam.”
“Cause that [auto-generated PGP invitation
email], where it was just this, ‘Hey, I’m sending you an encrypted message’, that felt very
fake, kind of like those Skype messages when
it’s like, ‘Hey I wanna be your friend’, and
you’re like, I don’t know you so I’m gonna
delete it. . . . I feel like it [the greeting field]
helped me realize it was him because it had
that personality behind it.”
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Chapter 8
Conclusion

In this dissertation we broadly researched usable, content-based encryption on the web.
More specifically, we focused on discovering whether secure email could be made usable for
the masses. Initially, this research focused on discovering what design principles would allow
secure email to be more usable. To evaluate various design principles, we built secure email
prototypes and tested them along with other secure email systems in a series of usability
studies [24, 26, 27]. To better test the ability of systems to be adopted in a grassroots fashion,
we developed a novel, paired-participant methodology for testing secure email [26, 28]. Our
results demonstrated that we had succeeded in creating a usable, secure email system that
could be adopted in a grassroots fashion by the novice users.
Building upon our success in creating secure email, we developed MessageGuard, a
system which adds content-based encryption to most applications on the web [29].
MessageGuard incorporates all of the lessons that we learned from the work in this
dissertation. Using MessageGuard, we added content-based encryption to Facebook Chat,
demonstrating that many of the design principles that made secure email usable were also
applicable to secure instant messaging [23]. We also architected MessageGuard so that it
could act as a platform for research into usable, content-based encryption.
As the capstone of this dissertation, we used the MessageGuard platform to develop
secure email variants, each of which used a different key management approach: PGP, IBE,
and passwords. The three variants all used the MessageGuard user interface, and only differed
from one another as needed for the unique operations of each key management approach. We
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then conducted an A/B study of the three variants using the paired-participant methodology
we had previously developed [28]. The results of this study further demonstrated that the
design principles we had discovered were sufficient to create a PGP-based secure email tool
that was usable by novices, something that has long-eluded researchers and developers.
Moreover, this research revealed intrinsic trade-offs between the key management approaches
we tested.
The research contributions of this dissertation are as follows:
1. Design principles for usable, secure email. In this dissertation, we studied
multiple secure email prototypes we developed (Pwm, Pwm 2.0, MessageGuard) as well
as several industrial systems (Voltage Mail, Encipher.it, Tutanota, Virtru, Mailvelope).
By examining quantitative results and qualitative feedback from these studies, we were
able to distill the design principles that are essential for secure email to be considered
usable by novice users. We also demonstrated that these principles were sufficient to
create usable, secure instant messaging. Additionally, these principles were able to take
PGP and make it usable for the masses, a goal which has long-eluded researchers.
2. A novel, paired-participant evaluation methodology. Past studies of secure
email have generally involved evaluating whether a novice user could begin using
secure email with recipients who are already expert users of the systems (i.e., study
coordinators) [15, 33, 38]. While this is a valid usage scenario, it does not evaluate
whether pairs of novice users (e.g., friends, spouses) could organically begin using secure
email between themselves in a grassroots fashion. To evaluate this aspect of adoption,
we developed a novel two-person methodology where pairs of participants were asked to
self-discover how to send secure email between themselves using a system we provided
them. Additionally, our new methodology also has the benefit of eliciting more natural
and authentic behavior from study participants.
3. A platform for usable, content-based encryption research. While there is a
large body of work on content-based encryption (i.e., end-to-end secure messaging),
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little work has been done to empirically validate this research. This is problematic
as experience has shown that many proposals with strong theoretical foundations are
either unfeasible in real-world situations [16] or have problems that are only apparent
when studied empirically [9, 25, 38]. Still, our own experience has demonstrated that
building content-based encryption prototypes is a time-consuming process.
To encourage more empirical analysis of content-based encryption, we developed
MessageGuard, a platform for research into usable, content-based encryption.
MessageGuard helps amortize the cost of developing content-based encryption
prototypes, making it easier for researchers to implement and test their ideas.
Additionally, prototypes built using MessageGuard can be directly compared with
minimal confounding factors, allowing researchers to more accurately compare their
proposed solutions against others.
4. Trade-offs of PGP, IBE, and password-based key management.

Past

examinations of various key management approaches have all been confounded by the
fact that the systems that implement each key management approach have drastically
different interfaces and functionality. Leveraging MessageGuard, we were able to build
three secure email variants, each of which used a different key management scheme,
but otherwise had identical interfaces and functionality. Through a study of these
three variants, we were able to reveal interesting trade-offs between each key
management system. These trade-offs help inform researchers on the applicability of
different key management approaches in various situations.
As part of this research, we conducted eight usability studies of eleven different secure
email systems. In total, these studies incorporated 345 participants. Details about the studies
and their results are summarized in Table 8.1, Table 8.2, and Figure 8.1.
In addition to the above research contributions, there are several more practical
contributions. First, this research resulted in the first secure email system which was shown
to be usable by the masses. This research also resulted in the first PGP-based system that
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Citation

†

Participant
Count

Systems Tested

Study Design

[24]

Pwm
Pwm, Voltage Mail
MessageProtector
Pwm, MessageProtector

25
32
28
28

Single System
Within Subjects
Single System
Within Subjects

[23]

Private Facebook Chat

17

Single System

[27]

Pwm 2.0

51

Between Subjects

[26]

Pwm 2.0, Virtru, Tutanota
Mailvelope

50
20

Within Subjects†
Single System†

[28]

MessageGuard—PGP, IBE, Passwords

94

Within Subjects†

Total Participants

345

Uses are novel paired participant methodology.
Table 8.1: User Studies in this Dissertation
SUS

System

Confidence
Interval
Letter
Score (α = 0.05) Percentile† Grade

[24]‡

Pwm
Voltage Mail
Encipher.it
MessageProtector

75.7
62.7
61.3
74.0

[27]

Pwm 2.0

80.0

Pwm 2.0
Virtru
Tutanota
Mailvelope

72.7
72.3
52.2
34.5

MessageGuard
PGP
IBE
Passwords

75.7
77.3
70.0

Citation

[26]

[28]
†

‡

Contextual Clues

±5.3
±6.1
±7.7
±6.2

Adjective

75%
35%
32%
70%

B
C−
D
B−

Good
Good
OK
Good

88%

A−

Excellent

±4.7
±3.9
±5.1
±7.5

65%
64%
16%
06%

B−
C+
D
F

Good
Good
OK
Poor

±3.0
±2.7
±3.0

76%
81%
56%

B
B+
C

Good
Good
Good

±2.5

Percentiles are calculated by looking up the SUS score in a table [31]. When a
SUS score is not in the table we estimate the percentile based on the available
data.
In this collection of studies, Pwm was tested three times and MessageProtector
twice. In this table we list the highest score each system received.
Table 8.2: SUS Scores for Secure Email Systems
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Percentile

15
F

40
Mailvelope

C

OK
Marginal Low

50
Tutanota

60 70
65

40

D

Poor
Not acceptable

30

35

60

80

85

90

Good
M. High

SUS Score

Encipher.it
Voltage Mail

70

80

100
A+
Best

90

100

Pwm 2.0‡

Virtru

Passwords†

95

A
Excellent
Acceptable

B

IBE†

MessageProtector
Pwm
PGP†

System’s built as part of the work in this dissertation are shown in red.
†

These are the MessageGuard systems.

‡

For readability we only included Pwm 2.0’s highest score.
Figure 8.1: SUS Scores for Secure Email Systems

was usable by the masses, a significant first in this field. Second, our work has been a part
of the revitalization of research into secure email. Prior to our first paper [24], it had been
seven years since the last paper examined secure email, but since the publication of our paper
there has been a small but steady stream of secure email papers. Our work represents the
largest single contribution to the area,1 with the majority of secure email work citing our
papers [2, 3, 6, 14, 22, 30, 37]
Third, in addition to being a platform for research, MessageGuard is also a functioning
system that adds content-based encryption to the majority of web applications. While other
research has attempted to secure some services and types of data, MessageGuard is the first
system that works across all web applications without requiring the cooperation of the web
application provider.
In the remainder of this chapter, we first discuss in greater depth the research
contributions in this dissertation. We then discuss potential future work that has been
enabled by the research contained in this dissertation.
1

As measured by number of papers published by any given researcher.

128

8.1

Design Principles of Usable, Secure Email

Throughout the various usability studies in this dissertation, we have tested a wide range
of systems with a very diverse set of design features. By analyzing the quantitative results,
qualitative feedback, and video recordings of user studies we were able to determine which
design principles are most important for creating usable and secure email.

8.1.1

Tight Integration

Users overwhelmingly prefer that secure email systems tightly integrate with the email systems
that they already use [2, 24, 26]. In the studies where integrated and non-integrated systems
were directly compared, participants always preferred the integrated systems, indicating that
they did not like leaving their webmail program to use the non-integrated systems. In the
one case where a non-integrated system was well received (MessageProtector), participants
indicated that they liked the system in spite of its lack of integration, and suggested that
futures versions would strongly benefit from tight integration with webmail.
While most users preferred integrated solutions, there was a small but consistent
number of participants (~5%) who preferred non-integrated solutions. For these users, having
a separate encryption application gave them greater confidence that their messages were
being properly encrypted. This is likely related to the design principle of hidden security
details, discussed next.

8.1.2

Hidden Security Details

One of the most straightforward and intuitive ways to increase the usability of a secure
system is to hide complex security details from end users [2]. While this approach does have
merit, we have discovered that it can also lead to confusion and loss of user trust in the
system [24, 26, 27].
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Delayed Encryption
Users perceive encryption as being complex and taking a significant amount of work to
complete [24]. While users are correct that encryption is complex, modern processors have
made encryption of small- to medium-size messages nearly instantaneous. When presented
with a secure email system that instantly encrypts their email (as normally happens), users
are hesitant to trust that the system correctly and sufficiently protected their data. In our
studies, users had very visceral reactions to the speed of encryption, self-reporting their
discomfort without prompting from the study coordinator.2
To address this concern, we evaluated adding an artificial delay to message
encryption [27]. While the added delay is short (1.5 seconds), our studies showed that it was
sufficient to quiet users’ fears regarding the speed of encryption. Additionally, during the
artificial delay we were able to add contextual information to the interface that helped users
better understand how their messages were being encrypted [26, 28]. For example, we added
a dialog which showed who the message was being encrypted for, helping users avoid the
notion that anyone with the software installed could read their messages.3

Automatic and Manual Encryption
Automatic encryption refers to taking a user’s email, encrypting it, and automatically sending
the encrypted email without ever showing the user ciphertext. In manual encryption, after
the email is encrypted, users are allowed to see ciphertext before the message is sent.
In a survey of users, Fahl et al. showed that users slightly preferred automatic
encryption [11]. In contrast, they observed that participants might be more trusting of a
system that used manual encryption. In our own study, we observed a similar effect for
2
In the systems tested, participants were briefly shown a dialog informing them that their message had
been encrypted. Still, users reported that due to the speed of encryption they were unable to believe that
encryption had really occurred.
3
Future work could examine the effect of removing this delay for experienced users who already have a
correct understanding of the system’s functionality.
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manual encryption, though the effect was more pronounced than observed in Fahl et al.’s
study [24].4
To validate these earlier results, we conducted a second study where we ran an A/B
comparison of manual and automatic encryption [27]. In line with previous results, we found
that there was no significant difference in the usability of automatic and manual encryption.
In contrast to prior results, we did not find any effect on user trust from manual and automatic
encryption. The findings in our later study were simultaneously confirmed by Atwater et
al. [2].

Authentication
When users do not observe some behavior they expect to see, they are likely to believe that
behavior did not occur [21]. Two systems that we tested, Pwm 2.0 and Virtru, both use a
trusted third-party key escrow server to manage users’ encryption keys. To obtain the key
necessary to decrypt their messages, a user proves their ownership of the appropriate email
address by clicking a link in an email that is sent to them. While both Pwm 2.0 and Virtru
used this authentication system, Pwm 2.0 automatically opens the authentication email and
clicks the link for the user, whereas in Virtru users had to manually click the link. This
difference was cited by multiple users in describing why they felt that Virtru was more secure
than Pwm 2.0 [26], even though technically both have the exact same level of security. This
makes it clear that users need to be clearly shown when and how they are authenticating so
that they can feel confident that the system is functioning as intended.

8.1.3

Tutorials

While it is not surprising that tutorials would assist users in understanding how to use secure
email, the question is how to convince users to watch and complete the tutorials. In initial
prototypes we created textual and video tutorials that were available on the site where users
4

This effect correlates with the well known HCI principle that users need to be able to clearly observe the
system’s state [21].
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downloaded the secure email system. Unfortunately, our studies demonstrated that users did
not view these tutorials, even when they needed help [24].
An alternative approach to static tutorials is to integrate the tutorials directly into
the webmail system, and show them as they become relevant (i.e., context sensitive). We
implemented this into later prototypes and found that most users watched all relevant
tutorials [24, 26, 28]. More importantly, we found that after implementing these new tutorials,
users better understood how their email was protected and made fewer mistakes when using
the system.5
In designing the text for the inline, context-sensitive tutorials we found that it was
best to keep the text short and to the point. Even though longer, descriptive messages might
provide more potential benefits, users are more likely to skip reading these messages, negating
any potential benefits. If more information is needed, it would be better to inform the users
that the in-depth information exists and provide them a link to learn more [20].

8.1.4

Distinct Interface Design

When using secure email, it is easy to accidentally send sensitive information in the clear,
even when a user intends to encrypt it. In our early studies, we found a consistent mistake
rate (i.e., accidentally sending sensitive information in the clear) of around 10% [24]. While
the nature of the studies probably leads to inflated mistake rate,6 this is still likely to be an
issue in the real world.
One approach to address this problem is to design the secure email interface so that
it is visually striking and distinctive from the underlying webmail application. Our results
show that this helps users clearly distinguish what information is being encrypted and what
text is sent in the clear [24]. Still, our studies revealed that while this design was helpful,
5

Here a mistake refers to sending sensitive information without encryption.
In studies users are not using their own personal, sensitive information, potentially reducing the effort
they expend ensuring they don’t make mistakes. Additionally, some participants in our studies try to
hurry through tasks without fully reading instructions, never realizing that we are asking them to encrypt
information.
6
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it was insufficient to fully stop mistakes, as many users only realized they hadn’t seen the
encryption interface until after they had already sent their sensitive information in the clear.
After making a mistake, users immediately recognized their error, noting that they
had not seen our distinctive interface; regardless, this realization came too late. The reason
for this mistake is likely related to muscle-memory, namely that users are habituated to click
on “Send” immediately after finishing the composition of their email message. In addition to
these mistakes, we noted that many users only enabled encryption when they were ready
to send the message, which allows the webmail provider to read their sensitive information
while their message is being drafted.
To further reduce mistakes, we found that it was helpful to add distinct contextual
clues to the underlying webmail interface, indicating when a message was not being encrypted.
For example, we added a header to email composition indicating when a message was not
encrypted and changed the “Send” button to read “Send Encrypted.”7 In conjunction with
the distinctive interface design, these contextual clues were able to eliminate nearly all
mistakes by users [26–28]

8.2

Novel, Paired-Participant Evaluation Methodology

Other than the work described in this dissertation, all other studies of secure email have
involved participants sending email messages to an expert user (i.e., study coordinator).
While this is helpful in giving a general idea of the usability of a secure email system, it does
not test whether two novice users could begin using secure email between themselves without
outside intervention.
To address this issue, we developed a novel, paired-participant methodology that
allowed us to test whether a given secure email system could be adopted in a grassroots fashion.
In our methodology, pairs of participants are brought into the lab and asked to exchange
7

We also moved the enable-encryption button to the top of the compose form. This prompts users to
encrypt their messages before they begin drafting them, preventing the webmail provider from accessing
sensitive information in draft form.
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sensitive tax information over email using a secure email tool we provide them. When a
participant signs up for this study, they are required to a bring a friend with them, ensuring
that the participant pairs already know each other. During the study, each participant plays
a different role, with the participant initiating communication referred to as Johnny and the
other participant referred to as Jane.8
In addition to testing for the ability to support grassroots adoption, we found that
this study methodology had several other benefits. First, by having participants play different
roles, we were able to gather data about users’ experiences both when they learn about secure
email through self-discovery and when someone else is introducing it to them. While these
same experiences might have been elicited by running two different studies, it was convenient
to obtain them in a single study, and it was helpful to be able to correlate the experiences of
participant pairs. Furthermore, showing that a participant can successfully use a new secure
email system when inducted by another novice user is stronger than only showing that a new
user can be inducted by an expert.
Second, observations by the study coordinators suggest that this study design led
to more natural behavior by participants. In past studies, we observed that participants
expected study coordinators to immediately respond to emails; even after being informed
that a response would take a couple of minutes, participants would constantly refresh their
inbox to see if a message had arrived, and if a response took longer than fifteen to thirty
seconds to arrive, participants would often complain. In contrast, in the studies using our
new design, participant pairs were content to wait to receive their email and did not appear
agitated when their friends took a long time to respond. Also, instead of constantly refreshing
their inbox, participants would browse the web or check their phones, which is likely more
representative of how they use email in practice.
In addition to these observations by study coordinators, participants also noted that
they felt more natural interacting with a friend than with a study coordinator. For example,
8

There is no correlation between the roles and participant gender.
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participants stated that “I don’t have to feel as ‘under-the-microscope’ in the study,” and
that working with a simulated partner would have “felt more mechanical [and] robotic.”

8.3

Platform for Usable, Content-based Encryption Research

Early in our study of secure email, we recognized that the design principles we were discovering
could also be applied to other forms of content-based encryption. To this end, we created
MessageGuard, a system which retrofits most web applications with content-based encryption
capabilities [29]. As part of its design, MessageGuard leverages all of the lessons learned
from our research on the design principles of usable, secure email. Furthermore, we designed
MessageGuard so that it could act as a platform for other researchers to use to kick-start
their own empirical research of usable, content-based encryption.
8.3.1

MessageGuard as a platform

While there is a significant body of content-based encryption research, little of it has been
evaluated empirically [37]. To address this problem, we architected MessageGuard as a
platform that helps enables empirical research of usable, content-based encryption. The
benefits of MessageGuard as a platform include:
1. Simplifies the creation of content-based encryption prototypes. MessageGuard provides
a fully functional content-based encryption system, including user interfaces, messaging
protocols, and key management schemes. The modular design of MessageGuard allows
researchers to easily modify only the portions of the system they wish to experiment
with, while the remaining portions continue operating as intended. This simplifies
development and allows researchers to focus on their areas of expertise—either usability
or security. In our own experience, building prototypes using MessageGuard took a small
fraction (~10%) of the time needed to build similar prototype without MessageGuard.
2. Provides a platform for sharing research results. Researchers who create prototypes
using MessageGuard can share their specialized interfaces, protocols, or key management
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schemes as one or more patches,9 allowing other researchers to leverage and replicate
their work. Additionally, successful research that would benefit all MessageGuard
prototypes can be merged into MessageGuard’s code base, allowing the community to
benefit from these advances and reducing fragmentation of efforts.
3. Simplifies the comparison of competing designs. MessageGuard can be used to rapidly
develop prototypes for use in A/B testing [27].

Two prototypes built using

MessageGuard will only differ in the areas that have been modified by researchers.
This helps limit the confounding factors that have proven problematic in past
comparisons of content-based encryption systems [2, 24, 26].
4. Retrofits existing web applications with content-based encryption. Because MessageGuard
works with most websites, in all common browsers, and on both desktop and mobile
platforms, it enables researchers to design usable content-based encryption for a wide
variety of applications. Researchers do not need to cooperate with application developers
or service providers, allowing them to easily work on systems that have a large user
base. This removes a confounding factor when conducting user studies, since users will
be familiar with the underlying application they are interacting with. It also enables
long-term usability studies, with users interacting with encryption as part of their daily
habits.
5. Provides secure cryptographic operations for all applications. MessageGuard uses
security overlays [24] to isolate a user’s sensitive content from web applications, ensuring
that only an encrypted copy of the user’s data is available to those web applications.
Thus MessageGuard enables HCI researchers to easily test their ideas with applications
that are actually secure, rather than relying on mock systems, which could run the risk
of invalidating their results.
9

A diff-based patch of MessageGuard’s code base.
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8.3.2

Case Studies

Most of the secure email prototypes we built as part of our research were built using
MessageGuard. Other than secure email, we also used MessageGuard to build Private
Facebook Chat (PFC), a system which adds content-based encryption to Facebook Chat [23].
Because PFC is built using MessageGuard, it incorporates most of the design principles
discussed earlier in this chapter. Our usability study of PFC demonstrated that these
principles were also sufficient to secure instant messaging in a usable manner.
In our experience, MessageGuard significantly reduced the time needed to develop
content-based encryption prototypes. For example, PFC was implemented in approximately
80 hours, requiring only 350 lines of JavaScript. This is a significant reduction from the
hundreds of hours and tens of thousands of lines of code needed to build Pwm, our first
secure email system.

8.4

Trade-offs of PGP, IBE, and Password-based Key Management

In the final study in this dissertation, we compared three different key management approaches
for secure email: PGP, IBE, and password-based encryption. In this study, users completed a
task with three different secure email systems, one for each of the key management approaches.
We held the interface and functionality of these systems identical–except for features and
interfaces unique to each key management approach–in order to better examine inherent
differences in each key management approach. Our results revealed several interesting
trade-offs for each key management approach.
The most clear trade-off between the key management approaches was related to
participants’ understanding of each approach’s security model. In the case of PGP and IBE,
participants incorrectly assumed that anyone that could gain access to their email accounts
could also gain access to the contents of their encrypted messages. In sharp contrast, nearly
all users understood how password-based encryption protected their email. Interestingly,
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even though users better understood the security of password-based encryption, they rated it
as less usable then either PGP or IBE.
Additionally, we found that users wanted to be immediately able to send encrypted
email, and didn’t want to wait for their friend to first install a secure email system. This led
many participants to prefer IBE over PGP. After we explained to participants the security
model for each system, several users who previously preferred IBE indicated that they would
now prefer PGP, but most maintained their preference. Participants indicated that while
IBE is less secure, it was secure enough for their needs and they were willing to sacrifice some
security for the greater convenience provided by IBE.
The attitude of accepting good-enough security also applied to participants’ opinions
regarding secure email generally. For example, when asked if they wanted our systems to
employ a master password,10 participants were split. Two-thirds of participants indicated
that multiple individuals used their computer and a master password would be essential to
ensure the safety of their email. The remaining third indicated that their computers were
already password-protected, and that the added security of a master password was not worth
the increased inconvenience of having to enter yet another password.

8.5

Future Work

In this dissertation we demonstrated that secure email, and particularly PGP, could be
designed such that it is usable by novice users. These results open the door to a range of
interesting and compelling future work.

8.5.1

User Understanding of Secure Email

While the work in this dissertation succeeded in helping users understand how to send and
receive encrypted email, there is still significant room for aiding users in building correct mental
models for secure email [22]. Obviously education will play a part in this endeavour [1, 35],
10
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but it is unclear how to ensure that users will participate in training. In businesses, users
could be required to participate in training seminars, but in the wild, users are less willing to
sit through instructional material [24, 26–28].
While the work in this dissertation focused on textual training, another promising
avenue is graphical instruction (e.g., pictures, diagrams, animations, videos). Initial research
in this direction has had moderate success [3, 35], but it is unclear whether users would be
willing to watch this content if it was integrated into a real tool. MessageGuard could be
used to implement this content into a real system, usability studies could then be conducted
to measure the effectiveness of graphical training.

8.5.2

Anti-Phishing Interfaces

Content-based encryption does not address the risk of an attacker creating malicious interfaces
that spoof legitimate interfaces, tricking users into typing their sensitive messages into nonsecure interfaces, thereby leaking it to the attacker. While this is unlikely on many popular
sites (e.g., Gmail, Facebook), it is more likely on small websites and certain on phishing
websites. This problem is compounded by the fact that if the MessageGuard system were to
become popular, people could become accustomed to typing sensitive information across the
web, trusting that MessageGuard would protect this data, potentially increasing the chance
of their falling victim to this type of phishing attack.
The creation of anti-phishing interfaces is a long-standing open problem in the field
of security. One of the greatest hurdles to solving this problem is that promising ideas are
rarely tested empirically, leaving it questionable whether the proposed techniques are actually
viable [9]. Using MessageGuard, researchers could implement these anti-phishing ideas into
MessageGuard’s interface, and then test their effectiveness empirically.
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8.5.3

New Encryption Protocols

Unger et al. [37] provide a comprehensive overview of secure messaging protocols that use
content-based encryption, and discuss a variety of key management schemes. While most of
the work described in their overview focuses on instant messaging, it would be interesting to
determine which principles could be applied to secure email. For example, key ratcheting
could be added to secure email to allow for perfect forward secrecy after the first message.
Additionally, puncturable encryption could be used to add perfect forward secrecy to the
first message as well [17].
While these new encryption protocols are very compelling, we have been unable to
find any work that empirically evaluates the usability impact of these novel protocols.
MessageGuard could be used to implement these protocols within instant messaging
applications (e.g., Google Hangouts, Facebook Chat) or secure email.

The resultant

prototypes could then be used in a series of studies which evaluate users’ opinions towards
the usability of these protocols.

8.5.4

Key Management

In this dissertation, we explored trade-offs between PGP, IBE, and passwords. Additional
research could be done to explore even more types of key management and their trade-offs.
For example, a key escrow server could generate encryption keys for a sender on demand,
and then delete those keys when retrieved by the recipient. This would allow users to send
ephemeral email messages that are no longer accessible after the recipient has opened them.
Another interesting avenue is an idea we have named key escalation. In key escalation,
users are introduced to encrypting their communication using a simple and easy-to-use key
management scheme. As they become more comfortable with the system, it can progressively
help them move to more secure practices, including entirely different key management schemes
(e.g., IBE). This could allow users to start with the level of security they are comfortable with
now, but continue upgrading their security as they become more accustomed to the system.
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Future research could explore what schemes and features best fit together for key escalation,
as well as determining how users at different security assurance levels could communicate
with each other.

8.5.5

Usability Studies

In this dissertation, we have focused on building secure email that is sufficiently usable for
the masses. For this reason, when we gathered study participants we purposely avoided
recruiting computer scientists. Future work could broaden our demographics, and look at
how various secure email systems support the needs of different populations. For example,
an everyday user, a medical technician, and a political dissident all have different technical
backgrounds and information security needs. It would be interesting to explore how various
groups of people react to different secure email paradigms.
Future work should also conduct longitudinal studies of secure email. When we started
this research, it wasn’t practical to conduct longitudinal studies, as participants were unable
to use secure email even in a short laboratory experiment [15, 33, 38]. Now that we have
overcome these initial hurdles, it would be interesting to explore whether new security or
usability problems appear when secure email is tested over a long period of time. Telemetric
data could also be gathered to determine whether users attempt to get their friends and
acquaintances to use secure email, and what adoption of secure email looks like in the wild.

8.5.6

New Applications for Content-based Encryption

In this dissertation, we explored content-based encryption of email and instant messaging.
Still, the MessageGuard platform is not limited to supporting only these two use cases, and
could support a range of other interesting applications:
1. Document storage. Users could encrypt the documents they store in the cloud,
allowing them to leverage the cloud infrastructure without sacrificing data privacy.
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This would be especially helpful to government agencies who want to use the cloud but
currently can’t due to security concerns.
2. Online message boards. Online message boards provide a means for people to share
their opinions and have group discussions. Sometimes these posts are on sensitive topics
that could have negative repercussions if discovered by the wrong parties.11 Encryption
could help protect these sensitive messages from unexpected eyes.
3. Images. Individuals are increasingly sharing images online, which later causes problems
when unintended parties view them.12 Encryption of images, especially schemes with
revocable access, could help address this issue and give users more control of their
online privacy.
In each of these cases, work will also need to be done to explore which key management
schemes are most appropriate. For example, in email a PGP-based approach might be ideal,
but when encrypting documents within an organization, IBE might be preferable.

11

http://www.cnn.com/2016/02/04/asia/china-dissident-crackdown-goes-global/
http://www.forbes.com/sites/kashmirhill/2012/03/06/what-employers-are-thinking-whenthey-look-at-your-facebook-page/
12
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